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10. Introduction
“I wonder if you people aren’t a bit too – well, strong, on the
virtues of analysis. I mean, once you’ve taken it all apart, fine,
I’ll be the first to applaud your industry. But other than a lot of
bits and pieces lying about, what have you said?” (Thomas
Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow)
This is a narratological analysis of a single novel – Thomas
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow. A considerable amount of nar-
rative theory is discussed in it, as well. The twin perspective
results from an examination of the interaction of certain mod-
els of narrative analysis and this remarkably complex and chal-
lenging piece of narrative fiction. For these reasons, the title
of the study could well be Pynchon’s Poetics: Interfacing
Theory and Text. However, Hanjo Berressem has already writ-
ten a brilliant study under that very name, albeit referring to
different theories and different kinds of interfacing. Hence
“Narratologies of Gravity’s Rainbow”, slightly humbler and
sans alliteration, will have to suffice. Before going any fur-
ther, in order to contextualize the project (and perhaps to pro-
vide an initial justification for it), let me briefly discuss a very
distinguished earlier study with reminiscent starting points.
In the preface to his Narrative Discourse (1980), Gérard
Genette famously refuses to give a definite answer to the ques-
tion of whether the “essay in method” should be regarded pri-
marily as a study of the eccentric narrative structures of Proust’s
Remembrance of Things Past or as a theoretical work utiliz-
ing Proust’s work merely as a source of illustration. The ques-
tion has, no doubt, been subsequently answered, not by Genette
himself, but by the critical community that clearly has adopted
Genette’s work as narrative theory. (The fact that the Library
2of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication call number situates
Narrative Discourse among studies of francophone literature
does not alter this.) As a result, Genette’s work is unanimously,
and sensibly, considered most important because of the re-
markable contribution it makes to narratology.
Nonetheless, Genette’s insistence on the basic duality of
his approach should not be overlooked: the strategy holds im-
portant lessons for textually oriented criticism and theory. The
limitation of utilizing one principal exemplary text – granted,
a massive one – underscores the problematic relationship be-
tween the material and theoretical conclusions of any instance
of literary study. Genette does nothing to hide the fact that his
theoretical concepts and tentative rules of narrative spring (al-
most) equally from the intense interaction with Proust’s work
as from more general theorizing. This should be blurred nei-
ther by Genette’s notorious eagerness to coin new terms nor
by his at times overly generalizing rhetoric.
Genette having been dubbed the primary model-builder
and both “arch-formalist” (Darby 2001: 838) and “arch-ge-
ometrician” (Gibson 1996) of narratological theory, it might
be difficult to view his work as in any way capitalizing on the
individual or the specific in a given narrative, or as respecting
the non-conforming ‘otherness’ of texts. Nevertheless, pre-
cisely the procedure of utilizing a single work as the source of
textual evidence demonstrates Genette’s emphasis on the par-
ticular and the uncommon (cf. Kearns 1999: 8). Here is Genette,
writing in the afterword to Narrative Discourse:
It has no doubt become evident, in this comparison of Prous-
tian narrative with the general system of narrative possibili-
ties, that the analyst’s curiosity and predilection went regularly
to the most deviant aspects of Proustian narrative, the specific
3transgressions or beginnings of a future development. (Genette
1980: 265.)
Reading Narrative Discourse in this way, one is faced with
a paradox. It is true that the categories and hierarchical con-
cepts of Genette’s narratology can indeed be used in a most
unsophisticated manner by blindly subjecting texts to the
mechanisms of narratological categories and waiting for the
easily predictable results. On the other hand, even the brief
examination above of the origins of Genette’s concepts sug-
gests that narratology can also be a benign monster, a non-op-
pressive machine. Christine Brooke-Rose (1995: 96) agrees;
she refers to Narrative Discouse in somewhat paradoxical
terms as “structuralism at its humanistic best”. The obvious
fact that narratological categories are based on an undoubt-
edly ideological notion of a ‘normal narrative’ should not
hinder their use to bring to light the particularities of a given
work. Here is Genette again: “The ‘grid’ which is so dispar-
aged is not an instrument of incarceration, of bringing to heel
or of pruning that in fact castrates: it is a procedure of discov-
ery, and a way of describing” (Genette 1980: 265).
In similar terms, Jacques Derrida (1978: 6), writing in
1963, provisionally grants the “structuralist passion[,] simul-
taneously a frenzy for experimentation and a proliferation of
schematizations”, the power to reveal in a structure “not only
its supports but also that secret place in which it is neither
construction nor ruin but lability”. This sounds promising.
Ultimately, however, Derrida does not view structuralist criti-
cism as the “technical liberty” (ibid.) it pretends to represent:
In the future [structuralism] will be interpreted, perhaps, as a
relaxation, if not a lapse, of the attention given to force […].
Form fascinates when one no longer has the force to under-
stand force from within itself. That is, to create. This is why
4literary criticism is structuralist in every age, in its essence and
destiny. Criticism has not always known this, but understands
it now, and thus is in the process of thinking itself in its own
concept, system and method. Criticism henceforth knows it-
self separated from force, occasionally avenging itself on force
by gravely and profoundly proving that separation is the condi-
tion of the work, and not only of the discourse of the work.
Thus is explained the low note, the melancholy pathos that can
be perceived behind the triumphant cries of technical ingenu-
ity or mathematical subtlety that sometimes accompany the
so-called “structural” analyses. (Derrida 1978: 4–5.)
Derrida’s tantalizing allusion to structuralist criticism as
structuralism that has become aware of itself invites to view it
as potentially self-reflexive in a constructive sense, not merely
“avenging itself on force”. The rather dismal view of a struc-
turalist criticism knowingly and willingly separated from tex-
tual force could perhaps be replaced with a view of a
literary-critical paradigm en route toward productive self-rec-
ognition (cf. Gibson 1996: 5). Arguably, the absence of “the
low note, the melancholy pathos” in recent works of
narratological theory attests to this, as will be shown below.
For present purposes the most important and encouraging
lesson provided by Genette’s example – and why not Derrida’s,
too – is that the way to formulate and test narrative theories is
to let theoretical concepts and particular texts mingle, and pre-
pare to be surprised by the outcome. Curiously, however, it is
precisely this tendency to pay attention to individual pieces of
literature that prompts Tzvetan Todorov (1977: 31–33) to ex-
clude Genette’s work (Todorov discusses Genette’s Figures)
from the domain of poetics in the strictest sense of the word.
From an orthodox perspective, Genette’s theoretical criticism
is not “structuralism” in the sense of revealing underlying gen-
5eral structures of literature. It seeks by contrast (and in addi-
tion) to elucidate the concrete structures of individual texts.
Regardless of the ultimate extent and nature of Genette’s
structuralism, an approach at least superficially resembling his
will be adopted in this study. For the most part, the discussion
consists of a series of readings of specific narratological prob-
lems or concepts in the context of Pynchon’s (1937–) third
novel Gravity’s Rainbow (1973). Both the traditional structur-
alist model of narrative analysis, and more recent theoretical
approaches to narratology, namely cognitive narratology and
possible world narratology, will be considered. This obviously
provides one explanation for the plural form “Narratologies”
in the title1. Indeed, as will become evident, narratology can-
not at present be regarded as a homogeneous, monolithic dis-
cipline. In fact, this was probably never possible: narratology,
while not comparable to ‘poststructuralism’ or
‘postmodernism’ in conceptual indeterminacy, presents quite
sufficient problems for the categorizing mind – an issue not
often acknowledged among the critics of the approach. The
heterogeneity of narratology has never been more apparent than
today.
The goal is to examine ways in which Pynchon’s fiction
challenges the concepts of narratological theory by abusing
and extending the narrative conventions underlying them.
Rather than merely presenting theoretical commentaries and
critiques of the various notions of narratology, many chapters
test the concepts in the demanding narrative situations Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow. Now, what is so special about this particular
Pynchon novel? While I do not wish to unnecessarily mystify
the novel, it is sensible to consider Gravity’s Rainbow as epito-
mizing Pynchon’s paradoxical narrative strategies. Pynchon’s
earlier fictions – the short stories as well as the novels V. (1963)
and The Crying of Lot 49 (1965) – involve many unconven-
6tional narrative characteristics. Indeed, it is a critical common-
place to consider these early works as exhibiting in embryo
the techniques more fully developed in Gravity’s Rainbow.
Accordingly, the author’s subsequent novels, Vineland (1990)
and Mason & Dixon (1997) are unmistakably Pynchonian. This
is true despite the less than ecstatic reception (see Green et al.
1994) of Vineland, the novel assigned the unfortunate fate of
following Gravity’s Rainbow after seventeen years of literary
near-silence2. The narratological importance of Mason & Dixon
remains still unexplored. Regarding narrative conventions, the
novel seems less exuberant than Gravity’s Rainbow. Mason &
Dixon involves, however, narrative elements not present in
any of Pynchon’s earlier works; for instance, it can be read as
simultaneously parodying the conventions of both 18th cen-
tury novelistic conventions and today’s historiographic
metafiction (cf. McHale 2000). Nevertheless, this study con-
siders Gravity’s Rainbow Pynchon’s high-water mark of nar-
rative innovation. This is the mundane perspective on the
matter. There is, however, an alternative way to justify the limi-
tation of analyzing the narratologies of Gravity’s Rainbow
alone. The novel can be interpreted, in Theodore Kharpetian’s
words, as a “monstrous omen”, a singular literary event that is
fundamentally different from anything that precedes or fol-
lows it, including Pynchon’s other works. This view, however
concurrent with the aesthetic effect of the novel, is obviously
misguided and mystifying. Gravity’s Rainbow is best inter-
preted as being engaged in an intimate dialogue with the nov-
elistic tradition preceding it.
Variously, Pynchon’s narrative peculiarities will either il-
lustrate and provide (counter-) examples for established theo-
retical positions, or suggest altogether new methodological
insights. This is another, more relevant, justification for the
title of the study: the ‘interlocutions’ between Pynchon’s text
7and narrative theory will inevitably amount to a collection of
multiple and contradictory views of narrative, narratologies
not simply describable with titles such as “traditional struc-
turalist narratology”, “cognitive narrative theory”, or “possi-
ble world semantics”. In other words, Pynchon’s narratologies
really are plural – and inescapably Pynchon’s.
While Gravity’s Rainbow, like Proust’s work, represents
radical convention-shattering and non-conforming fiction, all
narrative texts, at least in principle, present potential challenges
to narrative theories. For this reason, every application of
narratological concepts ought to reflect some of Genette’s in-
tellectual tightrope-walking between the particular and the
general. This examination of Pynchon’s narratology will de-
liberately emphasize the bi-directional influence between the
object of study and the theoretical notions considered.
Each chapter constitutes an individual discussion. I hesi-
tate to label the discussions theoretical, however. The study
certainly addresses theoretical questions, but always from the
perspective of practical application, even from that of the
economy of literary study: what kinds of results would a given
theoretical conception yield vis-à-vis Pynchon’s text, were it
adopted? How should the conceptual apparatus be amended
in order to make it function more efficiently? Gerald Prince
(1996: 163) has called this kind of study simply “narratological
criticism”, dedicated to “test the validity of narratological cat-
egories, distinctions, and reasonings [...] identify (more or less
significant) elements that narratologists (may) have overlooked,
underestimated, or misunderstood”3. Peter Rabinowitz and
James Phelan (1994: 8) introduce the concept of theorypractice
to designate the kind of approach that pays attention both “to
interpretation and to the grounds of interpretation”. This no-
tion has an obvious affinity to the present approach. Also
Claude Levi-Strauss’s concept of bricolage bears a resem-
8blance to the research attitude adopted for this study. Derrida
cites Genette as stating that the “analysis of bricolage could
‘be applied almost word for word’ to criticism, and especially
to ‘literary criticism’” (Derrida 1978: 285). Commitment to
this overall research philosophy supplies the discussion with
a certain tone of ‘observations of a practising narratologist’.
There should, in principle, be nothing wrong with this.
An interesting methodological point of comparison is the
concept descriptive poetics, a favorite of Benjamin Harshav
(formerly Hrushovski) (1976: xv–xvi; see also McHale 1994),
among others. For Harshav, the concept refers to textual study
that does not seek to apply a specific theory, but instead at-
tempts to produce, with the aid of analytical concepts, descrip-
tive accounts of texts that can in turn be utilized as material
for interpretation or theory-formation. The inevitable theoreti-
cal situatedness of descriptive poetics does not escape
Harshav’s analysis, however:
Descriptive Poetics is based on fieldwork, much in the same
way as the research work of a sociologist or a linguist is. It is
nevertheless a systematic study based on a question or a set of
questions derived from the theory of literature. Indeed, the re-
lationship between Theory of Literature and Descriptive Poet-
ics is a very intimate one. It is impossible to make a descriptive
study without a theoretical framework, as much as it is impos-
sible to build a theory without material from descriptive stud-
ies. (Hrushovski 1976: xvi.)
Thus, fieldwork this is, surveying Pynchon’s narrative
zone, if you like. However, in addition to providing readings
of Pynchon with “a set of questions derived from the theory of
literature”, the present project considers the questions (or con-
cepts) themselves objects of study as well. An unfortunate
side-effect of this approach is, once again, that the results of
9the analysis are necessarily tentative, mostly the outcome of
analytical procedures of various narratological heresies, not
of ‘authorized’ methods of narrative analysis. This is the
Catch-22 of narratological criticism.
The initial two chapters present introductory surveys and
commentaries on both the scholarly work on Pynchon, and
the status and future prospects of narratological theory. In the
first, a mapping of the literature on Pynchon will be attempted.
Pynchon being by far the most eagerly studied of the canon-
ized American postmodernists of the 1960’s and 1970’s, a truly
comprehensive account of the literature is obviously unimagi-
nable. This problem will be in part surmounted by presenting
a survey of the narratologically or textually oriented strain in
the study of Pynchon’s fiction. It will become evident, per-
haps surprisingly, that Pynchon has not been extensively stud-
ied from a narratological perspective. Some critics have uti-
lized narratological concepts in their work, but on the whole
the critical attention has been devoted to the thematic aspects
of Pynchon. Far from being the most relevant reason for study-
ing the implicit exchange of ideas between Gravity’s Rainbow
and narrative theory, the apparent methodological gap in
Pynchon criticism provides further justification for the present
study.
The second chapter will look at the history and current
status of narratology. The first section is devoted to the criti-
cism that structuralist narratology has confronted over the past
two decades. The so-called ‘crisis of narratology’ has led to
severe intra-disciplinary re-assessments of the foundations,
goals, and uses of narratology. In particular, the universal as-
pirations and categorical concepts of structuralist narratology
have been subjected to strong suspicion. However, as the dis-
cussion makes evident, the traditional approaches to
narratology have by no means dwindled away; recent times
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have also witnessed theoretically more relaxed and ideologi-
cally less guilt-ridden approaches to the refinement of the struc-
turalist analytical apparatus. The remaining two sections will
comprise brief introductions to cognitive literary theory and
possible world semantics, providing some theoretical back-
ground for later and more detailed discussions.
In the subsequent two chapters the study will turn to a
practical (or theorypractical in Rabinowitz’s and Phelan’s
terms) examination of some concepts of structuralist
narratology in the context of Gravity’s Rainbow. Chapter 3
deals with the notion of narrative hierarchy as it is reflected in
Pynchon’s unconventional narration. In a way, the discussion
serves as an intellectual blueprint for the remaining
text-analytic chapters: it introduces Pynchon’s paradoxical and,
for lack of a better word, deconstructive narrative attitude. The
attitude is manifested as a strategy of simultaneous subver-
sion and confirmation of narrative conventions and, conse-
quently, narratological concepts. The most crucial findings of
the chapter concern the ways in which Gravity’s Rainbow re-
assesses the narratological concept of narrator and the notion
of the stratification of narrative into a stable hierarchy.
Pynchon’s attitude toward narrative conventions will also be
demonstrated to have affinities with the deconstructionist wing
of the critique of narratology.
The deconstructive project implicit in Pynchon’s fiction
will be further probed, as chapter 4 turns to investigate the
faux-didactic nature of Gravity’s Rainbow. The discussion fo-
cuses on the ways in which the complexities of Pynchon’s
narrative undermine the seemingly attractive and useful guide-
lines for thematic interpretation offered by the novel itself. In
particular, a somewhat problematic application of the
narratological concept of implied author is central to the ex-
amination of the novel’s dual strategy of providing the reader
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with untrustworthy interpretive clues and of making the reader
aware of their falsity. In addition, the concept of mise-en-abyme
is both utilized and to some extent reassessed in the process.
Chapter 5 concentrates on a potential remedy for the al-
leged lack of theoretical foundations of narratology: narrative
theory based on cognitive science, or cognitive narratology.
The cognitive approach to literature and language has recently
been gaining strong support on the literary-critical scene. Cog-
nitive narrative theory can be regarded either as complemen-
tary approach to traditional narratology or as its full-fledged
theoretical replacement; its proponents tend to opt for the lat-
ter. This becomes evident, as the chapter discusses in detail
some aspects of Monika Fludernik’s Natural Narratology, hith-
erto the most comprehensive theoretical account of cognitive
narratology.
Chapter 6 is an attempt at a practical application of cogni-
tive narratology. For reasons of relevance and presentational
economy, the textual analyses concentrating on the new
narratologies (chapters 6 and 8) will focus on the related ques-
tions of narrative voice and focalization, though from very dif-
ferent perspectives. Apart from obviously being perennial prob-
lems for narratology, these concepts are also hotly debated in
the discussions of new narratologies (see New Literary His-
tory, 3/2001, a special issue on voice). Thus, chapter 6 con-
centrates on Fludernik’s theoretical contributions to the analysis
of free indirect discourse and the attribution of narrative voices.
The goal is to measure the descriptive and explanatory power
of a combination of Natural Narratology and structuralist
narratology vis-à-vis the complex cases of dual voice narra-
tion in Pynchon’s novel.
Chapter 7 consists of a commentary on Marie-Laure Ryan’s
intensional/illocutionary narratological theory, so far the most
advanced narratological conception based on possible world
12
semantics. In some degree of contrast to Fludernik’s Natural
Narratology, Ryan’s narratology seeks to build on the ideas of
traditional narratology. In this respect, Ryan’s approach reflects
the general attitude of possible world semantics as a literary
theory. Possible world semantics has in a relatively inconspicu-
ous manner been the theoretical persuasion of a small group
of literary theorists since the 1970’s. During the 1980’s and
the 1990’s it gradually established itself as a significant branch
of narrative theory and nowadays arguably provides an alter-
native, or a complement, to both traditional narratology and
cognitive literary theory.
In chapter 8, the problem of perspective in Gravity’s Rain-
bow is examined with reference to a recent conception of
focalization informed by possible world semantics, namely
David Herman’s hypothetical focalization. In the course of an
attempt at practical application, the concept of hypothetical
focalization will be subjected to amendments and extensions.
The discussion will conclude with a tentative general concep-
tion of focalization based on possible world semantics,
Genette’s typology of focalization, and the insights provided
by Pynchon’s narrative.
Chapter 9 will focus on an attempt to synthesize the de-
scriptive potentials of cognitive science, possible world se-
mantics, and ludology, the study of games. The topic of the
discussion is Ryan’s recent study on the immersive and ludic
characteristics of literature and other forms of art. In particu-
lar, the chapter will consider the relationship between the play-
ful and world-evoking effects of literature, mainly by examin-
ing Ryan’s use of the literary metaphors game and world. To-
gether, the critique of Ryan’s notion of game in the study of
literature and the analysis of the world-evoking and ludic func-
tions of Gravity’s Rainbow suggest that cognitive narratology,
possible world narratology, and ludology provide useful
13
insights for the study of literature, playful or otherwise. In ad-
dition, the discussion demonstrates ways in which the notion
of textual games can be used to complement and extend both
cognitive and possible world approaches to narrative fiction.
It is obvious, in the light of the above outline, that the
study cannot conclude with a simple corroboration or refuta-
tion of an initial hypothesis. Each chapter discusses the no-
tions and concepts of various narratologies in ways that render
impossible the recuperation of the results into a coherent
“Narratology of Gravity’s Rainbow”. Or, at least, the result
would be a monstrous narratology crudely stitched together
from incompatible organs and lumps of flesh. (Disturbingly
enough, however, this description seems to fit pretty well any
conception of narratology.)
Nevertheless, the incompatible pieces of the narratological
bricolage definitely point toward novel approaches to narra-
tive analysis and invite further study of both the traditional
structuralist narratology, and its recent theoretical extensions
(or replacements). Most important, each chapter surveys the
selectively permeable boundary between Pynchon’s text and
narrative theory and thus considers ways in which
narratological concepts, old and new, are in a paradoxical
manner promisingly helpful, yet utterly deficient, in coming
to terms with the inescapably textual reality of Pynchon’s great-
est novel to date.
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1. The Question of Form in Pynchon
Criticism
In a trivial sense, it is easy to understand why the novels of
Pynchon have not been extensively studied from a
narratological perspective: Pynchon exploded onto the scene
of literary criticism during the 1970’s, before narratology re-
ally became an option in Anglo-American critical discourse.
The couple of years after the publication of Gravity’s Rain-
bow (1973) produced several influential monographs and criti-
cal anthologies on Pynchon that seem largely to have set the
thematic tone of later achievements of the so-called Pynchon
industry4. Granted, this is a paranoid explanation: a thematic
bias conspiracy theory. Nonetheless, there is some truth in it.
While Pynchon’s textual complexity has in this tradition been
duly acknowledged and often meditated upon, it has for the
most part served as a self-evident, or given, backdrop for the-
matic interpretations, not as a primary object of study.
A good reason to refrain from concentrating on the tex-
tual oddities of Pynchon’s fiction is, in addition, that it simply
responds well to thematic analysis; the novels burst with themes
– controversial, funny, disgusting, politically incorrect, and so
forth (see McHoul and Wills 1990: 30; Kharpetian 1990: 15–
17). Pynchon’s thematic overabundance initiates an interest-
ing chain reaction: many studies become afflicted with the
peculiar attitudes and obsessions of Pynchon’s fiction. At its
best (or worst; funniest in any case) Pynchon criticism gets
noticeably Pynchonian, as the following excerpt illustrates:
Reality is a spectacular put on by the Firm. Literary reality
included. Nothing exists outside the system save death and dis-
solution. But death and dissolution are themselves effects of
15
the system. From the people who brought you reality. The Pu-
ritan God (and the omniscient narrator), when he elects a few
for salvation (eternal life), by the same act consigns the re-
mainder to damnation (everlasting death). (Mackey 1984: 11;
see also e.g. Chambers 1992: 123.)
While getting Pynchonian is arguably possible regarding
structural analysis as well, the enticing call of thematics has
made criticism primarily concentrating on the analysis of nar-
rative scarce, not to mention narratological criticism à la Prince
(1996). The same is true with respect to poststructuralist or
deconstructive work on Pynchon. Good examples of this ap-
proach are Alec McHoul’s and David Wills’s study Writing
Pynchon (1990) and Berressem’s Pynchon’s Poetics (1993).
“Deconstructing Pynchon” was, in addition, the theme of a
special issue (14/1984) of Pynchon Notes, the scholarly jour-
nal devoted to the study of Pynchon’s fictions (see Duyfhuizen
1984a). In general, however, the vastness of Pynchon criti-
cism is a methodological optical illusion.
Brian McHale’s (1992/1979, 1992/1985) essays on Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow most clearly exemplify narratological analysis
of Pynchon’s texts. In addition to presenting textual analyses,
the essays consider the perspectival difference between textu-
ally and thematically oriented literary study. In a mildly chas-
tising tone, McHale observes the critics’ willingness to subor-
dinate Pynchon’s textual particularities to “global interpretive
strategies”, without exception thematic:
Inevitably, the critics misread. Or perhaps it would be fairer to
say that they under-read; that is, they fail to entertain the entire
range of possible interpretations for any given instance of you,
but instead opt for one of them – the one, obviously, that is
most compatible with whatever general interpretive hypoth-
esis they happen to be pursuing – suppressing the other, per-
16
haps equally plausible alternatives. In their reaching (irritable
or otherwise) after fact and reason, the critics do not so much
misconstrue the text but construe it prematurely. (McHale 1992:
103.)
By contrast, Kathryn Hume, studying the mythography of
Pynchon’s fiction, considers Pynchon criticism as habitually
dwelling on the deconstructive, disintegrative characteristics
of the novels. According to Hume (1987: 2–3), postmodernist
or poststructuralist critical approaches to Pynchon seek to
analyze “elements within the novel [...] that foreground
unknowability or uncertainty [that] may have philosophical,
scientific, or linguistic foundations in the works of figures such
as Nietzsche, Heisenberg, or Saussure [and] lend themselves
to deconstructive readings”. To compensate for the alleged
deconstructive bias, Hume propounds an interpretation that
ostensibly synthesizes the deconstructive and affirmative ten-
dencies of Gravity’s Rainbow.
Now, while some of Hume’s “deconstructionist” critical
approaches indeed represent textually oriented research, most
do not. The critics’ frequent remarks on the destabilizing and
alienating features of Pynchon’s text rarely rely on a system-
atic textual analysis of those features. Moreover, as will be-
come evident in the course of this study, analyses of the alleg-
edly deconstructive and negative structures of Gravity’s Rain-
bow are apt also to produce ‘formally positive’ results. Not all
of Pynchon’s narrative structures are bent on denial and ran-
domness.
To be sure, avowed poststructuralist critics do not share
Hume’s view of the deconstructive emphasis in Pynchon criti-
cism. Berressem (1993: 1) considers Pynchon’s fiction an ex-
ceptionally difficult object of deconstructive analysis because
of its inherent tendency to “undercut [...] stable meanings and
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readings”. Ironically enough, according to Berressem (ibid.
7–10), constructing a poststructuralist poetics of Pynchon is
problematic precisely because the novels themselves consti-
tute near-parodies of the poststructuralist notion of text.
Berressem overcomes this difficulty by presenting complemen-
tary analyses of Pynchon’s novels, utilizing several post-
structuralist theoretical frames of reference: Derrida’s
deconstruction, Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis, and Jean
Baudrillard’s simulacrum-theory. However, in terms of the
textual strain in Pynchon criticism, Berressem’s Pynchon’s
Poetics is most appropriately described as an exercise in
poststructuralist thematics. The study provides novel analyses
of oft-discussed passages of Pynchon’s works and situates their
thematic content into the interpretive context of the
poststructuralist theories. Hence, while Berressem’s theoreti-
cal framework prompts him to consider the theoretical idea of
textuality and its interpretive ramifications, the analytic prac-
tice, or method, of his study is not particularly textual.
The most radical pronouncements about the state of
Pynchon criticism have been made by McHoul and Wills, the
authors of the other book-length poststructuralist analysis of
Pynchon’s fiction. Their Writing Pynchon (1990) includes
many a merciless characterization of the traditionalist thematic
aspirations of fellow Pynchonians. According to McHoul and
Wills, the ‘Komical Dekonstructionists’ (see Brown 1997),
the criticism of Pynchon has altogether disregarded “contem-
porary literary theory” and, as a result, continues to produce
uninteresting, not to mention questionable, readings:
We can summarise as follows: Pynchon has only been allowed
to speak in certain ways and not in others. Our complaint about
this is twofold: not only are the possible ways of speaking
thereby limited, they are also, only and always, precisely, ways
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of speaking – not of writing. The critical mode of Pynchon-
author as ‘speaker’ (that is ‘pure representer’) of the real world
of living presence is limited in its logocentrism. (McHoul and
Wills 1990: 4.)
What McHoul and Wills propose instead is textual analy-
sis of the “post-rhetorical” and the “material typonymy” in
Pynchon’s fiction; a textualist reading strategy heavily informed
by deconstruction. One of the analytical concepts McHoul and
Wills (1990: 11–12) introduce to aid the analysis of Pynchon
is ‘bookmatching’, a textual craft whereby it is possible to
analyze the complex relations of Pynchon’s fictions to, princi-
pally, the texts of critical theory. Regarding previous criticism,
McHoul and Wills insist that “[a]lmost any passage from any
book by Pynchon ranged against almost any passage from any
book or paper by his critics [...] shows a simple lack of match-
ing” (McHoul and Wills 1990: 1). Not so with the texts of
poststructuralists5. In terms of the textual tradition of Pynchon
criticism, the frolicsome approach pursued by McHoul and
Wills produces notable results, perhaps accidentally. For in-
stance, many excellent textual analyses of the novel are pre-
sented as abandoned reading strategies of Gravity’s Rainbow.
The deconstructionist ‘method’ of McHoul and Wills makes
the evaluation of the full input of their “post-rhetorical” analy-
ses difficult, however. Donald Brown (1997: 110) is probably
correct in being skeptical about the continuing interest of “ab-
struse discursive practices that negate their own codes even as
they insist upon them”, regardless of how philosophically cor-
rect and non-logocentric they may appear (see also Fludernik
2001b: 710).
The schism between the traditional and deconstructionist
wings of Pynchon criticism leads us into the question of the
uses of textual analyses. Arguably, the sensible conclusion that
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previous scholarly work on Pynchon has been mostly thematic
does not automatically warrant the claims that it has “made an
industry out of choosing between twofold options” (McHoul
and Wills 1990: 17; see 4.2). Surely there is no inevitable con-
nection between thematic criticism and ideologically naïve
criticism? Nevertheless, in a similarly belligerent manner, Terry
Caesar (1984: 71) blames the critics for having disregarded
the “mindless” features of Gravity’s Rainbow with the Pavlo-
vian Edward Pointsman’s “We must never lose control” (GR
144) as their credo; Stephen Schuber (1984: 72) concludes
that “a certain phallologocentrism governs many of the [criti-
cal] orbits around Gravity’s Rainbow”; finally, according to
Duyfhuizen (1984b: 75), critics of Pynchon have “seen their
task as one of control and mastery”. Is there a justification for
such rhetoric?
The fact that analysis of narrative structures is used as a
vehicle of primarily thematic interpretation does not neces-
sarily transmogrify the whole critical effort into rulemaking
or policework. Adopting a more moderate view, one could
well acknowledge the value of textual analyses presented to
support thematic interpretations without losing sight of the
divergence of the aims of textually and thematically oriented
study. Let me demonstrate this by briefly commenting on Molly
Hite’s study Ideas of Order in the Novels of Thomas Pynchon
(1983), one of the targets of McHoul’s and Wills’s critique.
Hite considers many issues pertaining to narrative struc-
tures, in particular the narrator’s apparent heteroglossia (Hite
1983: 143). Hite goes on to support her case with the aid of
examples from the text of Gravity’s Rainbow. For present pur-
poses, the thing to notice, however, is the use Hite has for her
close-readings. Immediately after the textual observations she
concludes:
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The fact that the narrator refuses to stand aloof from the char-
acters has implications for the value systems of Gravity’s Rain-
bow. The novel deals with some of the most horrifying pros-
pects of contemporary life: the rise of megalithic international
corporations, the corresponding dehumanization of twentieth-
century society, the immanent purposes of technology, the threat
of global annihilation. But though the text insists on a polar-
ized vision with indelible lines drawn between Us and Them, it
does not condemn any of its characters. The narrator treats even
the most villainous figures with such compassion that it be-
comes impossible to regard the novel’s world as populated by
villains and heroes. [...] And it is the pathos of this situation
that the narrator is able to communicate because he speaks from
inside the action and even from inside characters. (Hite 1983:
144.)
Hite utilizes her analysis of the indeterminacy of the nar-
rative voices of the novel as evidence to support a major the-
matic claim. In fact, the results of Hite’s textual analysis are
overabundant in terms of a thematic conclusion like the one
she proposes. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with this. If
anything, narrative analysis like Hite’s makes thematic inter-
pretations more plausible than ones based on the established
thematic ‘givens’ of Pynchon criticism (entropy, indetermi-
nacy, non-causal reasoning, paranoia, keeping cool but car-
ing, and so forth). Nevertheless, the difference in orientation
between Hite’s approach and narratological criticism is obvi-
ous. In terms of narratological analysis, the multitude of voices
evoked by the narration of Gravity’s Rainbow is a thing in
itself, not merely an indication of the novel’s ideological sig-
nificance regarding the conditions of the present-day world
(or what have you). For narratological criticism, the subtle ways
in which the voices of the narration seem to mingle, the nearly
imperceptible shifts in focalization, or the ways the narrative
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voice acquires traits from the characters are all features of in-
terest as such – this will become painfully clear in the course
of this study.
Here, Pynchon’s narrative peculiarities are regarded as
functioning as an implicit commentary on narrative conven-
tions and, consequently, on the concepts of narrative theory.
This situates the emphasis on the elucidation of minute tex-
tual features, especially ones that deviate from the various es-
tablished ‘rules’ of narration. From the purview of the
deconstructionist ideology, nonetheless, it is obvious that both
Hite’s thematic approach and narratological criticism reduce
Pynchon’s writing to manifestations of (or anomalous devia-
tions from) pre-established intellectual structures and norms.
The question of formal study also surfaces in the generic
considerations of Pynchon’s novels. Kharpetian (1990) is
among those critics6 who consider Gravity’s Rainbow an in-
stance of postmodernist7 Menippea:
Gravity’s Rainbow is a prodigy, a monstrous omen, and per-
haps the definitive Menippean satire in American
postmodernism [...]: the critical exposure of official cultural
institutions and demystification of power; the focus on the ugly,
the painful, and the ridiculous; the attention to carnality, sca-
tology, and consumption; the caricatures’ paranoid obsessions
[...]; the seriocomic prose and verse [...]; and, finally, the
epideictic variety of the comic and the fantastic represent an
encyclopedic extension of the genre’s possibilities, and any
refusal or failure on the part of the book’s commentators to
acknowledge its Menippean construction is due primarily to
the text’s obscure form, an especially radical departure from
conventional mimesis. (Kharpetian 1991: 108–109.)
Kharpetian (1991: 17) begins his study by lamenting the
already familiar thematic emphasis of Pynchon criticism. This
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is promising: the features that underlie the interpretation of
Gravity’s Rainbow as Menippea invite textual study as much
as they do thematic analysis. However, Kharpetian himself
does not pursue a study of the Menippean structures of Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow. Instead, after designating the novel as formally
exemplifying Menippea, he turns to investigating the thematic
and ideological consequences of that generic consideration.
Somewhat surprisingly, then, Kharpetian’s approach contin-
ues the tradition of using the narrative complexities of
Pynchon’s fiction as a point of departure without really study-
ing them. In a disturbingly circular manner, labeling Gravity’s
Rainbow as an instance of Menippea naturalizes the textual
“monstrosity” of the novel, which consequently never becomes
a legitimate object of study.
Working in more textual terms, Steven Weisenburger
(1995) considers Pynchon’s novel as exemplifying “encyclo-
pedic satire”. As a representative of this genre, the novel seeks
to subvert the value systems of modern society. Of particular
interest is Weisenburger’s detailed analysis of the rhetorical
trope of hysteron proteron. For Weisenburger (1995: 241–256),
the frequent backwards presentation of sequences serves as a
formal indication of ideological dissent inscribed in Pynchon’s
narratives. Weisenburger (1994) presents an equally percep-
tive reading of the ideological functioning of the embedded
narratives of Gravity’s Rainbow. Weisenburger’s interpreta-
tions effectively use perspicacious analysis of narrative struc-
tures for the purposes of ideological criticism. Once again,
they reflect the fact that there is a thin but noticeable strain of
textual analysis to be found in Pynchon criticism, however
significantly the purposes of the analyses might differ from
the ones they have for narratological criticism. The comple-
mentary relationship between formal and thematic approaches
to Pynchon is nowhere clearer than in Weisenburger’s most
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influential work to date, The Gravity’s Rainbow Companion
(1988). In the introductory chapter, Weisenburger inverts the
usual manner of doing Pynchon criticism: he uses the meticu-
lously gathered historical data and thematic information in
order to reveal the governing formal make-up of Gravity’s
Rainbow. (It is a mandala.)
The reconciliatory viewpoint adopted above – acknowl-
edging the textual nested inside the thematic – will be periodi-
cally revisited below. In the course of the text-analytical chap-
ters it will become increasingly evident that the thematic and
textual approaches to Gravity’s Rainbow must be considered
as interdependent and complementary perspectives on the
novel. The structural analysis of Pynchon’s texts relies to a
significant extent on thematic interpretive frames and general
information about the existents and events of the story-world.
In addition to demonstrating the actual thematic emphasis of
Pynchon criticism, the above discussion also reflects the fact
that the critics are themselves aware of it. In this respect, the
story of the thematic bias of the scholarly work on Pynchon is
akin to other topoi of the industry, apologizing for subjecting
Pynchon’s texts to literary study, speculating on the identity of
Pynchon, and the like.
In the next chapter I will discuss the other intellectual con-
text of this study, narratology. It will be demonstrated that the
textual study arguably neglected by the Pynchon industrialists
by no means constitutes a monolithic narratological theory.
Instead, it is formed by several rival – or complementary –
approaches to the analysis of the structures of narrative.
24
2. The Points of Narratology
2.1. Whatever Happened to the Crisis of Narratology?
It seems that Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan has at least twice suc-
ceeded in articulating something essential about the state of
narratology, in different intellectual phases of the discipline.
The first occasion was in 1983, in the “silver age of
narratology” (Mosher and Nelles 1990: 419). In the epilogue
to her influential Narrative Fiction; Contemporary Poetics,
Rimmon-Kenan ruminates on the deconstructive challenge of
narratology, utilizing funereal rhetoric:
In many circles, including some universities, the poetics of
narrative fiction is either ignored or treated with suspicion […]
In other circles, this discipline is already considered dead or at
least superseded by deconstuction. (Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 130.)
In other words – those of Manfred Jahn – Rimmon-Kenan
anticipated narratology’s becoming “sicklied o’er by the pale
cast of poststructuralist thought” (Jahn 1999: 190). While
Rimmon-Kenan eventually ends her book on an optimistic note
about the possibility of narratological life after deconstruction,
the epilogue served to prepare the reader for the subsequent
critique of narratology, as well as for the transformations the
discipline was to undergo during the following decade. As will
be discussed with some examples below, starting in the 1980’s
many theorists of narrative began to dwell upon the problem-
atic philosophical foundations of the discipline and limitations
of its basic tenets, a process Herman (2001b: par. 48) has char-
acterized as narratological “autocritique”.
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Rimmon-Kenan called for a reconsideration of narratology
for the second time in an article in 1989; she declared that the
discipline was in crisis. However, Rimmon-Kenan’s primary
concerns were no longer the challenges posed to narratology
from the hostile outside theories. Instead, she chastised narra-
tive theory for having “neglected its medium”. Rimmon-Kenan
(1989) argued for a more broadly based study of narrative that
would pay more attention to the specificity of the linguistic
material of narratives. Consequently, she encouraged
narratologists to develop new tools for a more ‘language-sen-
sitive’ analysis of literature. Rimmon-Kenan’s shift of focus
arguably reflects the general intellectual development of the
discipline. While the crisis of the 1980’s was characterized by
the questions of context and ideology, the second version of
the narratological crisis concerns the need to furnish
narratology with new theories and methods. Herman’s (2001b:
par. 48) term for the latter phase is, accordingly, narratological
“auto-autocritique”.
The topics of the earlier discussion are represented in the
1990/1991 special issues of Poetics Today titled “Re-Visiting
Narratology”. The latter phase of the crisis is visible in the
proliferation of the interdisciplinary approaches to narrative
witnessed during the 1990’s, and in the continuing refinement
of the concepts and categories of structuralist narratology. Per-
haps crisis is too strong a word? Nonetheless, the dramatic
rhetoric continues; from the vantage-point of the new theories
of narrative the crisis is, conversely, a revolution (see
Richardson and Steen 2002). I turn now to trace the essential
themes of both the intra-disciplinary and external critique of
narratology in order to draw a somewhat more comprehensive
picture of its status and outlook, and to present commentaries
on the intellectual issues at stake. What makes narratology
particularly susceptible to criticism?
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The most conspicuous criticism of narratology has been
contextualist: historicist, new historicist, poststructuralist,
feminist, post-colonial, and so forth (see Chatman 1990; cf.
Darby 2001: 848). The inability and unwillingness of classi-
cal narratology to come to terms with questions of gender,
power, history, or politics has been frequently noted among
the narratologists, as well as among the critics of the disci-
pline. The demand for contextualizing has made the pursuit of
a universal theory of narrative seem exceedingly outdated, not
to mention ideological.
Revisiting narratology in 1990, Mieke Bal sketched out
three alternatives for narratological study: “regression to ear-
lier positions [...], primary focus on application, or rejection
of narratology” (Bal 1990: 728). She considered all three prob-
lematic, either as symptoms of a stubborn and non-progres-
sive adherence to the methodology of yesteryear, or as a de-
nial of the importance of the problems narratology sought to
solve in the first place. (Ibid. 728–729.) Perhaps narratologists
have directed their analytic endeavors to the wrong objects?
This is Bal’s diagnosis. For her, the appropriate solution con-
sists of “moving on” to other fields of investigation, yet with-
out losing the analytical viewpoint of narratology. To support
her case, Bal presents convincing examples of the application
of the narratological apparatus to anthropology, the study of
the rhetoric of science, and the analysis and interpretation of
visual art. She contends that narratology, while mechanistic
and “rigidifying” in the study of narrative literature, can “de-
rigidify” other objects of study. (Bal 1990: 730.)
Curiously, by endorsing the adaptation of narratology to
the study of other kinds of cultural objects, Bal actually leaves
the theoretical foundations of the discipline undiscussed. In
other words, Bal implicitly judges the fundamental assump-
tions that underlie the narratological research sound; appar-
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ently, narratology simply yields more satisfying results in the
study of other cultural phenomena than literature (cf. Bal 1997:
introd.). This conclusion has interesting consequences.
First, almost trivially, the strategy of shifting focus to new
objects of study is susceptible to the full range of the theoreti-
cal criticism directed toward narratology. The fact that narra-
tological study constitutes a somewhat fresh approach in the
analysis of, say, visual art does not alter the discipline’s theo-
retical foundations. Thus, in seeking the “point” of narratology
by widening or shifting the focus of application, Bal does not
address the most fundamental critiques narratology has been
confronted with.
Second, more interestingly, Bal’s observation about the
potentially rigidifying/de-rigidifying tendencies of
narratological criticism invites one to reconsider the uses of
narratology for the study of narrative literature. If we take at
face value Bal’s contention that narratology can be used in
novel, liberating ways in the study of the non-literary, why not
try to find ways to subject literature to this more flexible
narratological criticism as well? In fact, as has been argued
earlier, narratology has always had at least an implicit ten-
dency to de-rigidify also its literary object texts. From this
perspective only bad narratological study is mechanistic, un-
interesting, and violent to its material. There is thus a good
chance that the dissemination of narratological ideas to other
fields of inquiry, the “centrifugal force of narratology” in
Jackson Barry’s (1990) terms, may point toward novel ways
of ‘doing narratology’ in its original domain as well. This train
of thought seems promising enough.
Many critics, however, do not share Bal’s implied view of
the basic theoretical soundness of narratology; for them, mak-
ing a distinction between successful and unsuccessful
narratological research is hardly enough. Discussing
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narratology from the perspective of literary history, Liisa
Saariluoma (1987) points out that the applicability of the con-
ceptions of narrative offered by the likes of Genette or Franz
Stanzel (e.g. 1984) is inevitably limited to the literary conven-
tions dominant at the time of the development of the models.
Consequently, Genette’s concept of focalization and Stanzel’s
typology of narrative situations are not universally applicable,
or at least not historically valid (see also Prince 2001: 50).
This observation might not seem too radical, or even sur-
prising, keeping in mind the openly synchronic nature of
Genette’s categories and the contradictory relationship already
discussed between Genette’s object text and the theoretical
conclusions of his study (on the question of literary-historical
change and narratological categories, see Pavel 1990; Bal 1990:
750; Fludernik 1996: 331). Saariluoma continues, however,
by portraying narratology as the prime exemplum of modern
literary criticism overly engaged in a scientist’s attitude to-
ward its objects. Finally, for Saariluoma, the most fundamen-
tal flaw in narratology has to do not with its particular concep-
tual inadequacies, but with the unfortunate philosophy of sci-
ence that informs the presuppositions of the discipline. In a
more recent essay, though not directly discussing narratology,
Saariluoma (2000) describes the proper manner of establish-
ing the relationship between a theoretical apparatus and the
object of study: the analyzed text is to be regarded as an ‘other’
upon which the critic should not blindly impose a grid of theo-
retical categories. The concepts of a particular theory should
be regarded, metaphorically, as ‘questions’ which the object
of study further refines and provides tentative answers for.
It is easy to see, considering both Genette’s work, and the
approach adopted for the present work, that narratological
concepts can indeed be utilized as questions, as hypotheses to
be corroborated or refuted in the course of an interaction with
29
the analyzed text. Saariluoma’s criticism, though pertaining
to specific theoretical problems as well, demonstrates for the
most part that narratological theory and criticism provide easy
targets for sweeping accusations of literary-critical scientism,
of which they on closer inspection constitute only disappoint-
ingly vague examples.
For Herman, precisely the aspirations toward a “science
of text” of the early narratologists, most notably Barthes, rep-
resent the most valuable heritage of structuralism (see also
Dolezel 1979b: 527–529). Seeking to synthesize, among other
things, discourse analysis, cognitive linguistics, and literary
study into a truly comprehensive interdisciplinary approach to
literature (and other kinds of discourse), Herman considers
the notion of scientific study of texts prematurely jettisoned:
I reject the dominant characterization of structuralism as a fu-
tile exercise in hyper-rationality, a destructive rage for order. I
also dispute the orthodox view that structuralist literary theo-
rists such as Barthes were engaged in a doomed attempt to
scientize (the study of) literary art. Instead, I contend that
Barthes and his fellow-travellers made a productive, consequen-
tial effort to reconfigure the relationship between critico-theo-
retical and linguistic analysis – to redraw the map that had, in
the years preceding the rise of structuralism, fixed the posi-
tions of humanistic and scientific inquiry in cognitive and cul-
tural space. In the mid-twentieth century, granted, neither liter-
ary theory nor linguistics had reached a stage at which the pro-
posed reconfiguration could be accomplished. There is thus a
sense in which the structuralist revolution envisioned by the
early Barthes (among others) has started to become possible
only now. (Herman 2001a: par. 6.)
Herman’s insistence on the scientific goals of structural-
ism is in all likelihood misguided, if not outright abhorrent,
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from Saariluoma’s perspective. Not only does Herman share
the early structuralists’ scientific utopianism, he seems in ad-
dition to believe that the scientific study of literature is possi-
ble today! In this respect, Herman is a bold representative of
narratological auto-autocritique and an agent of Seymour
Chatman’s (1993) “narratological empowerment”. There
seems, thus, to be a real difference between the philosophical
presuppositions of certain kinds of narratology and hermeneutic
literary criticism, at least if one chooses to emphasize it. Let
me turn to narratology’s alleged ideological burden.
Apparently supporting Saariluoma’s perspective on the
scientism of narratology, Virgil Lokke (1987: 546) proposes
that narratologists are dependent upon “the eschatology of late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophies of sci-
ence”. Thus narratology, failing to recognize its faulty philo-
sophical premises, cannot become a truly reliable provider of
neutral literary data. However, for Lokke, in contrast to
Saariluoma, the most crucial flaw of narratology is not its al-
legedly naive scientism; this standpoint is not pursued any
further. Instead, Lokke addresses at length the true danger of
narratology, its political insensitivity:
They [the narratologists] look at myths, or tenant farmer’s sto-
ries, or migrant worker’s stories, or black, or Indian, or wom-
en’s stories, or children’s stories; and they exercise their inge-
nuity, given certain features of their own academic storytelling
habits, in trying to disguise the patronizing way in which they
teach others to tell their stories in a more proper way. The im-
petus of their narratological project is always to subdue the
otherness of the alien story, to accommodate, engulf, and de-
stroy. [...] My quarrel with narratology is simply that it seems
such a handy dandy imperializing, colonizing strategy, which,
frequently enough, conceals its violence to other man’s or wom-
an’s story under the rubric of canons of method, of objectivity,
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of detachment, and of sweet and reasonable good will – forget-
ting, as it is easy to do, that the story of the repression of the
voice of the other is, inescapably, another story. (Lokke 1987:
557.)
Lokke’s argumentation condenses the most unsophisti-
cated ideological arguments against narratology one is likely
to come across. Indisputably, political awareness and contex-
tual situatedness are features that narratological criticism
should pay attention to. There is, however, a difference be-
tween pointing out a theoretical or ideological area of indeter-
minacy, and judging an entire discipline politically corrupt.
As has been demonstrated above, one can find sensitivity to-
ward the particular even in the most manifesto-like pieces of
narratological writing. It is all in the reading; Lokke’s point of
departure, Harshav’s (1979) definition of descriptive poetics,
serves as an example. For Harshav, as we have learned earlier,
descriptive poetics focuses on specific works of literature in-
stead of constructing generalizing accounts of literature. Ac-
cording to one reading, this is a direct refutation of a view of
narratology as executing a program “to accommodate, engulf,
and destroy”. Moreover, Harshav’s (ibid.) acknowledgment
of the intimate relationship between previous theories of lit-
erature and descriptive poetics suggests at least a modicum of
contextual awareness. Now, there is obviously ideology and
“sweet and reasonable good will” involved in this reading.
Lokke is quite right in stating that the expectations and prior
theoretical considerations affect the ways an average descrip-
tive narratologist decides what is ‘literary’ (or worth explicat-
ing) in a given narrative (see Lokke 1987: 546; Hrushovski
1976: xvi.). Nevertheless, I would argue that Harshav’s dis-
tinction between theoretical and descriptive poetics is more
important than the ideological bias informing the distinction.
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The inevitable ideological myopia of all analysis and interpre-
tation is true enough to be trivial; it hardly justifies consider-
ing narratology as merely conforming texts to pre-existing
models of narrative. Nonetheless, Lokke is content to con-
sider all narratological study as not merely contextually indif-
ferent, but intentionally repressive and evil. (See McHale 1994.)
Jonathan Culler, himself critical of narratological catego-
ries, responded in his Structuralist Poetics to the claims of the
ideology of structuralist poetics by utilizing rather defensive
rhetoric: “[W]hile structuralism cannot escape from ideology
and provide its own foundations, this is of little importance
because the critiques of structuralism, and particularly of struc-
turalist poetics, cannot do so either and through their strate-
gies of evasion lead to untenable positions” (Culler 1978: 253).
It is easy to see that the argument, while in principle sensible,
is apt to lead to a premature end of an intellectual dialogue.
Nonetheless, as Lokke’s critique of narratology makes clear,
there is some justification for the ominous feeling that the dif-
ferences between narratology and extreme contextualism can-
not easily be resolved.
To be sure, however, contextual issues have been brought
into the framework of narratology, somewhat more moder-
ately. The works of Marie Louise Pratt (1977), Susan Sniader
Lanser (1981), Phelan (1989), Rabinowitz (1987), Ross Cham-
bers (1984), and Michael Kearns (1999) provide ways to study
both structural and contextually situated aspects of literary
works. While these theorists mostly apply the speech-act theory
to fiction, their contextualism is, nonetheless, strongly attached
to narratological analysis. For instance, Chambers’s strategy
of studying the communicative situation of literary works is
decidedly formal. In his Story and Situation (1984: e.g. 22–
27), Chambers considers the context of reading as structurally
encoded in literary texts (cf. Kearns 1999: 20). Contextual
33
questions can thus be discussed without abandoning the
text-oriented approach of narratology.
Feminist narratology is probably the most visible special
case of contextually oriented narratology, or “eclectic
narratology” in Kearns’s (1999: 3) terms. Robyn Warhol’s
(1999: 354) statement on the relationship between structural-
ism and feminist narratology makes clear that contextualist
narratology is not merely ‘applied narratology’: “[O]ne of the
goals of feminist narratology was to ‘mess up’ the neatness of
structuralism’s binary systems”. Feminist narratology illustrates
the reciprocal influence between narratology and its politically
involved variations; traditional narratological categories are
used as tools of ideological criticism and are, in turn, refined
in the process. Nevertheless, sex and gender remain some-
what controversial as narratological concepts, as the debate
on feminist narratology between Lanser, Nilli Diengott, and
Prince makes evident (Lanser 1986; Diengott 1988; Lanser
1995; Prince 1996).
Continuing his early campaign to legitimize structuralist
poetics, Culler envisions a study of literature that seeks to evade
the ideological pitfalls of structuralist poetics in a particularly
sophisticated manner:
The critic comes to focus, therefore, on the play of the legible
and illegible, on the role of gaps, silence, opacity. Although
this approach may be thought as a kind of formalism, the at-
tempt to turn content into form and then to read the signifi-
cance of the play of forms reflects not a desire to fix the text
and reduce it to a structure but an attempt to capture its force.
The force, the power of any text, even the most unabashedly
mimetic, lies in those moments which exceed our ability to
categorize, which collide with our interpretive codes but nev-
ertheless seem right. (Culler 1978: 261.)
34
Culler’s description of the role of the structuralist critic is
obviously reminiscent of the poststructuralist approaches to
literature. Points of comparison are provided by the reading
strategies of deconstructionist criticism, both literary and philo-
sophical – if such a distinction is allowed. The concept of tex-
tual force figures prominently in Andrew Gibson’s Towards a
Postmodern Theory of Narrative (1996), which provides a
recent attempt at constructing a poststructuralist conception
of narratology8. Informed by Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard
and Michel Serres, Gibson sets out to deconstruct the “geom-
etry” of structuralist narratology. In the process, he presents
several eloquent passages of criticism of the ideologies of struc-
turalist narratology (e.g. 1996: 7, 33, 212–216). Perhaps re-
minding one of the unfortunate exchange9 among Dorrit Cohn,
Mark Seltzer, and John Bender (Cohn 1995a: 17; Cohn 1995b;
Seltzer 1995; Bender 1995), Gibson considers the ethos of
narratology as essentially oppressive:
Indeed, narratological models have tended to construct narra-
tive levels according to the principle of what Foucault calls
‘hierarchical observation’ as practiced within disciplinary so-
ciety. […] Foucault refers to the principle in question as ‘em-
bedding’ […], which can hardly fail to remind us of narratology
itself. (Gibson 1996: 219.)
With Gibson’s poststructuralist contextualism, we are once
again reminded of the ideological bootstraps of narratology:
narratological categories link to the power relations of patriar-
chal society. Mark Currie seeks to alleviate the situation with
a more moderate Postmodern Narrative Theory (1998). Echo-
ing Bal’s previously mentioned three alternatives for narrat-
ologists, Currie describes the recent history of narratology with
three concepts: diversification, deconstruction, politicization
(ibid. 1–6). For him, narratology has not so much been sub-
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verted by contextualism and deconstruction as modified by
them as needed: “Rather than a model of linear displacement,
it would be more realistic to see the new criticisms of the 1980’s
and the 1990’s as approaches that were enabled and resourced
by narratology” (Currie 1998: 10). This view is implicit in
Currie’s (ibid. 131–134) loosely deconstructionist reading of
Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and explicit in his wry
remarks on Edward Said’s interpretation of Conrad’s Heart of
Darkness (Currie 1998: 149–151). In a constructive spirit,
Currie invites consideration of the possibility of an intellec-
tual continuity – in addition to the ever-popular dialectic –
between structuralist narratology and its successors/subversors.
The most inconspicuous response to the challenges posed
by the critiques of narratology is to quietly continue refining
the narratological conceptual apparatus. This is the position
that most resembles the approach of the present study. Is this
an ideologically corrupt choice? The fact that the theoretical
discussion concerning the concepts of traditional narratology
persistently continues in journals of narratology does not, to
my mind, suggest that the present-day narratologists are in any
way oblivious to the theoretical and ideological challenges that
the discipline has faced. Conducting narratological research
(almost) as before does not imply a naïve adherence to the
universalist aspirations of early narratology any more than it
implies disregard of the ideological problems inherent in the
concepts and models of narratology. The intellectual heritage
and conceptual apparatus of structuralist narratology is sim-
ply too valuable to be abandoned on a whim. While Fludernik
(1996: 341) proposes “throwing out the baby” of traditional
narratology (yet preserving the bathwater), many critics con-
sider narratology still a worthwhile topic of theoretical dis-
cussion.
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William Nelles’s Frameworks: Narrative Levels and Em-
bedded Narrative (1997) is a recent book-length example of
this; Nelles’s study of embedded narratives is actually a com-
prehensive narratological theory disguised as a study of “Chi-
nese-box” narration. Most important, the study confines itself
to rethinking basic narratological concepts strictly in the frame-
work of structuralist narratology. Nelles’s approach exempli-
fies most clearly the relaxation of the crisis of narratology.
This is noticeable, for instance, in his discussion of the notion
of narrativity, concluding in a rather pragmatic definition:
Narrativity, if I may so call it, is the product of a tropological
operation by which the metaphor of narration is applied to a
series of words on a page. To read a text by means of the trope
of narration is to read out of it a narrator and its voice, and a
narratee and its ear. […] The text read literally is a series of
words – the text read metaphorically through the trope of nar-
ration becomes a narrative. […] In other words [:] narratives
are those texts we use narratology to study. (Nelles 1997: 116;
see also Kearns 1999: 2, 40.)
The relief of crisis anxiety is also evident in Nelles’s (1997:
162) meditation on the triumph of narratology over its erst-
while nemesis, deconstruction: “I suspect that many
poststructuralists will follow the lead of [J. Hillis] Miller […],
much of whose work hardly breathes the word ‘deconstruction’,
concentrating rather on (highly perspicuous) analyses of nar-
rative voice and point of view”.
To conclude: the criticism and crisis of narratology has
prompted several varieties of response in the narratological
circles, roughly corresponding to the ones Bal (1990: 728)
proposed for narratology. One alternative, as has become evi-
dent, is to move toward application of certain useful concepts
for novel purposes. As a result, narratology has branched out
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to other disciplines; Martin Kreiswirth’s (2000: 295) list of
fields affected by the “narrativist turn” includes communica-
tion theory, pedagogy, sociology, cognition, therapy, memory,
jurisprudence, politics, language acquisition, and artificial in-
telligence. On the other hand, recent times have seen attempts
at an ideological refinement of narratology; at making
narratology more suitable for the purposes of ideological criti-
cism. The development of specialized narratologies for the
needs of specific areas of interest, such as feminist narratology,
attests to this. Chatman (1993) seeks legitimation for
narratology – if all else fails? – from literary pedagogy; by
teaching narratology, it is possible to make the students of lit-
erature more perceptive readers and interpreters of texts. Fi-
nally, as Nelles’s example makes evident, structuralist
narratology continues to produce refinements of traditional
theoretical concepts, crisis or no crisis.
The most ambitious response to the alleged crisis of
narratology is the pursuit of novel theoretical ideas to comple-
ment or replace the structuralist framework. The following two
sections will introduce some ideas of literary theory based on
cognitive science and possible world semantics, and briefly
review the history and criticism of the approaches. More de-
tailed analyses are postponed until chapters 5 and 7, in which
exemplary representatives of both theoretical persuasions are
critically examined.
2.2. A Cognitive Revolution?
In 1991, Mark Turner argued for a new kind of profession of
English and, ostensibly, literary study in general. In his view,
the hitherto elitist, marginal, and self-legitimizing discipline
should start paying attention to the cognitive parameters com-
mon to all uses of language, if not all thinking in general:
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An attempt to reintegrate the study of language and literature
as grounded in human cognition is, I suggest, the most likely
path to restoring our profession to its natural place as central
cultural and intellectual activity. (Turner 1991: 24.)
Informed by the theories of George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson, among others, as well as disgruntled by the allegedly
sorry state of literary criticism, Turner examines ways in which
literary production and reception can be attributed to basic
functions and properties of the embodied mind. Turner is a
prominent figure among the literary scholars for whom the
interdisciplinary theoretical framework of cognitive science
promises novel insights into literary analysis and interpreta-
tion. One of the major attractions of cognitive literary theory
consists in its promise to provide literary study with a broad
theoretical background; most important, it seems, one that has
nothing to do with structuralism.
Of course, cognitive considerations in literary study did
not start with Turner’s declaration of the birth of the cognitivist
paradigm. Sabine Gross (1997: 272; see also Richardson and
Steen 2002: 2–3) divides the cognitive study of language and
literature into three main research traditions: cognitive read-
ing research, research into narrative structure and discourse
comprehension, and the cognitive study of concepts and lan-
guage. Thus, in addition to the most visible branch of
cognitivism, the theory of metaphors and concepts exempli-
fied by Turner, there is also a tradition of cognitive literary
study in the sense of actual empirical research of reading, as
manifested, for instance, in the journal Poetics. Elrud Ibsch
(1990: 411) describes this tradition as the result of the “cogni-
tive turn” in linguistics and literary studies. In terms of critical
attention, however, the phrase “cognitive turn of literary stud-
ies” would perhaps more appropriately be attributed to the theo-
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retical cognitive study of literature exemplified by the likes of
Gilles Fauconnier, Lakoff, and Turner. For instance, the spe-
cial issues on cognitivist literary theory of the journal Poetics
Today attest to this (4/1992; 3/1999; 1/2002; see Fludernik,
Freeman, and Freeman 1999; Richardson and Steen 2002).
However, many contributors of a recent anthology of essays
on narrative perspective (van Peer and Chatman 2001) predict
a bright future for also the empirical psychologically oriented
narratology, or “psychonarratology” in the nomenclature of
Peter Dixon and Marisa Bortolussi (2001).
While many cognitivist critics and theorists have concen-
trated on the study of poetic and other metaphors – “concep-
tual integration” and “blending” being the current terms (Turner
and Fauconnier 1999; Turner 2002) – narrative texts have not
been similarly attractive for cognitivist literary theorists. None-
theless, some narratological applications of the insights of
cognitive science have been made by theorists such as
Fludernik (1993, 1996) Jahn (1996, 1997, 1999), Ansgar
Nünning (2001), and Herman (1997, 2001b, 2002). Even
though the work of these scholars is to some extent related to
the empirical psychological study of narrative comprehension,
there is good reason, at least for now, to demarcate between
empirically oriented “psychonarratology” and theoretical cog-
nitive narratology. Van Peer’s and Chatman’s anthology on
narrative perspective illustrates the matter. While many arti-
cles acknowledge the importance of an interdisciplinary
narratological study, the narratological and psychonarra-
tological accounts of narrative remain distinct: the psycholo-
gists (e.g. Graesser et al. 2001) do not generally utilize the
findings of recent narratological theory; the narratologists do
not make use of the results provided by psychological testing.
Most interestingly, there seems to be no significant connec-
tion between the conceptions of cognitivist narrative theorists
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such as Fludernik, Jahn, or Nünning, and the empirical re-
search conducted by the psychologists.
This is not to say that the parallel efforts of literary schol-
ars and psychologists were completely cut off from each other;
it merely suggests that cognitive narratology is still a
pronouncedly literary effort. For this reason, I will limit the
discussion of cognitivist literary study to the theoretical cog-
nitive narratology, leaving the tradition of empirical research
mostly undiscussed. Fludernik’s version of cognitive
narratology, Natural Narratology, is the subject of chapter 5;
the following seeks to provide a general account of the gen-
eral theoretical assumptions shared by the theorists of cogni-
tive narratology.
Cognitive accounts of narrative rely heavily on the con-
cepts of frames and scripts, discussed in cognitive science and
the research of artificial intelligence by Marvin Minsky, Roger
Schank and Robert Abelson. A frame, in Minsky’s definition,
is
a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by chang-
ing details as necessary […]. The “top” levels of the frame are
fixed, and represent things that are always true about the sup-
posed situation. The lower levels have many terminals – “slots”
that must be filled by specific instances or data. (Minsky 1979:
1–2; quoted in Jahn 1999: 174.)
A script, according to Schank and Abelson, constitutes
a structure that describes appropriate sequences of events in a
particular context. A script is made up of slots and require-
ments about what can fill these slots. (Schank and Abelson 1977:
41; quoted in Jahn 1999: 174.)
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In cognitive literary theory, frame is used to refer to a pro-
totypical, or ‘default’, literary situation which the reader uti-
lizes in the interpretation of specific texts. Jahn (1999: 174–
175) proposes more literary definitions for the concepts of the
frame of a narrative situation and the genre-specific script of
narrative performance. It is easy to see that the narratological
interpretations of the concepts overlap just as the originals do.
In fact, a useful way to think about the concepts is to consider
them different aspects of a single cognitive process of using
pre-established prototypical interpretive models in order to
comprehend a new narrative situation (see also Herman 1997).
Lakoff’s (1999: 392–393) strategy of situating the concepts of
frame, script, and schema under the more general notion of
propositional cognitive models reflects this basic similarity.
Richard Gerrig (2001: 306) proposes a more idiosyncratic
notion of external perspective, defined as the “unique point of
view with which each reader approaches a text”. (Internal per-
spective, by contrast, is the perspective represented in the text
itself.) While Gerrig’s concept bears a resemblance to the pre-
viously mentioned conceptual family of frames and scripts, it
is not meant to be used in the formulation of a theory of text.
Working in the domain of empirical psychological reading
research, Gerrig considers the notion of external perspective
merely a general framework within which to empirically study
the processing of texts by actual readers. In this respect, Gerrig’s
example once again reflects the significant difference between
the goals and procedures of cognitive narratology and empiri-
cal literary research. While the approaches share the processual
view of narrative analysis, their methodologies and goals re-
main very different.
The most essential difference between structuralist
narratology and cognitive narratology is one of emphasis. Jahn
(1997; 1999) adopts directional metaphors “top-down” and
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“bottom-up” to describe the difference. Cognitive analysis of
narrative proceeds “top-down”, concentrating on the interpre-
tive frames the reader uses to make sense of a narrative. In
other words, cognitive narratology is interested in the process
of adapting pre-established typicalized structures to specific
literary situations. Traditional narratology, by contrast, mostly
tends to use refined analyses of bottom-level textual phenom-
ena to formulate more generalized accounts of narrative; hence
“bottom-up”. To use more standard terminology, “top-down”
entails a holistic view of narrative, while “bottom-up” is a
featurist approach (see Stanzel 1990).
As a result, the theoretical representations of the oppo-
sitely oriented approaches look very different. The cognitivists’
descriptions of narrative are simpler and do not attempt to cat-
egorize particularities of specific texts. In this respect, Stanzel’s
(e.g. 1984) holistic theory of narrative has proved useful to
cognitive narratology. Both Jahn (1997) and Fludernik (1996)
provisionally adopt his three situations (authorial, first-per-
son, and figural) as models for their cognitive macro-frames.
By contrast, Genette’s account of different agents and aspects
of narrative, a “bottom-up” model if there ever was one, cat-
egorizes practically everything that is left outside the
macro-frames of cognitivists.
The difference in direction and emphasis is the result of
the diverging goals of cognitive and structuralist narratology.
Unlike traditional narratology, cognitive narratology seeks to
explain narrativity, not merely to describe and analyze narra-
tives. Bearing this in mind, it is only natural for the average
cognitivist not to be awestruck by dazzling analyses of spe-
cific works of literature (see Jahn 1997: 464; cf. 1999: 190–
191).
Jahn (1997: 464) is quick to underscore this contrast be-
tween a cognitive approach to narrative and “narratological
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analysis that does not bother about cognitive principles at all”.
In Jahn’s view, the traditional narratological analysis of tex-
tual features does not manage to describe the actual cognitive
processing of narrative structures. He illustrates the issue by
quoting Chatman’s comment on his own narratological analy-
sis Joyce’s “Eveline” as a “laborious and unnatural way of
reading[;] not what the reader actually does but only a sugges-
tion of what his logic of decision must be like” (Chatman 1978:
206; quoted in Jahn 1997: 463). Now, in one sense there is no
clash between “top-down” and “bottom-up” models:
cognitivist analysis seeks to describe what happens in the proc-
ess of reading; analysis such as Chatmans’s, by contrast, tries
to examine which textual features are likely to influence the
process. In the terms of Dixon and Bortolussi (2001: 277–
278), cognitive (or psycho-) narratologists concentrate on “text
effects”, while structuralists study “text features” (see also
Morrow 2001: 226–227; Nünning 2001: 210, 222). Hence,
one would suppose that cognitive and structuralist accounts
of narrative provided complementary views on texts: a
cognitivist-structuralist narratological symbiosis. However,
Jahn (ibid. 463–465) argues that a cognitive analysis actually
points toward different interpretive conclusions than a meticu-
lous narratological close-reading. A traditional narratological
analysis such as Chatman’s might draw its conclusions from
cognitively irrelevant textual details, and vice versa (see also
Gerrig 2001: 305). It seems, therefore, that “bottom-up” and
“top-down” approaches cannot be considered
unproblematically as complementary analytic strategies. This
is a disturbing observation. How do other theorists approach
this problem?
Fludernik’s (1996) distinction between holistic and
featurist analysis is less pronounced. She does not hesitate to
present complex narratological/linguistic readings that are as
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“laborious and unnatural” as Chatman’s, both in terms of the
everyday experiences of reading and her theory of interpretive
cognitive frames. Textual analysis in the context of Fludernik’s
Natural Narratology is understood as the study of formal and
contextual gestures toward likely interpretations of the reader.
In short, Fludernik considers “top-down” and “bottom-up”
analytic approaches as more or less complementary (see also
Fludernik 2001c: 102–103).
Menakhem Perry’s (1979) early article on the dynamics
of meaning-production is also an example of a synthesis of
holistic and featurist analytic strategies. Perry figures among
the predecessors of Jahn’s (1997) cognitive narratology, mainly
because he uses the concept of frame to describe the way in
which readers organize the information provided by a literary
text (Perry 1979: e.g. 36–37; see also van Dijk 1976). For
present purposes, the most important feature of Perry’s analy-
sis is its reliance on both holistic and featurist strategies. He
presents a general theory of the dynamics of frame adoption
and substitution, and discusses ways in which the prior expec-
tations of readers guide their interpretation. In this respect,
Perry’s account is a “top-down” model. However, on the level
of narrative analysis, Perry relies on interpretive close-reading
and studies textual and thematic features, large and small, in
order to present a “reconstructed first reading” (ibid. 357) of
his example text, Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily”. Thus, Per-
ry’s narrative analysis proceeds in a decidedly “bottom-up”
manner. The holistic perspective is not lost, however; in the
course of the analysis, Perry considers the potential effects the
bottom-level textual features have on reader’s choices of in-
terpretive frames. In this respect, Perry’s approach is not that
different from Fludernik’s. Most important, Perry makes ex-
plicit the “reconstructed” nature of his analysis: he presents
one ‘collection’ of textual features that are likely to influence
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reader’s interpretation, but acknowledges that the holistic in-
terpretive framework allows for other readings as well:
The principles I have enumerated are principles whereby one
can justify the comprehension of a text, as well as principles
which the readers follow intuitively. Misunderstandings by
specific readers stem from unskilled application of these prin-
ciples, but not from failure to use them. I agree with Hrushovski
(1976: 3) when he says that “all readings, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’,
even ‘misunderstandings,’ as well as ‘partial’ readings, em-
ploy similar techniques.” (Perry 1979: 46.)
 It seems that considering featurist narratological analy-
ses as descriptions of specific instances of the cognitive
processing of texts alleviates the contrast between holistic and
featurist approaches. According to this reasoning, bottom-level
narratological analysis produces ‘transcriptions’ of exemplary
readings of texts, not the definitive descriptions of them. As
one would expect, narratologists’ armchair analyses and in-
terpretations of literary texts are overly refined in comparison
to real readers’ non-analytic reading experiences. Empirical
research on narrative comprehension has provided ample sup-
port for this claim (see Ibsch 1990; van Peer 2001: 337). A
narrative analysis slowly and painstakingly performed by a
skilled reader of literature is, of course, more detailed than the
‘working analysis’ of a test subject / first-time reader. It is,
however, misguided to consider this a reason to refrain from
producing detailed narratological analyses. Sabine Gross
(1997: 286) defends the cause of traditional literary study in a
similar vein: “In more ways than one, literary criticism at its
best does exactly what Turner attributes to cognitivism: it ex-
emplifies and highlights how the human mind works and en-
gages texts.” Featurist analysis understood in this way is not
terribly alien to cognitive narratology, even though it might
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sometimes draw attention to cognitively irrelevant details of
narrative.
Jahn’s approach to cognitive narratology, while not yet
providing an account as detailed as Fludernik’s Natural
Narratology, seems to consider traditional narratology princi-
pally a source of inspiration. While Jahn (1997) builds his
approach on frame theory and Jackendoff’s (e.g. 1999: 327)
systems of preference-rules, his theory also springs from
Stanzel’s narrative situations, Bal’s account of focalization and
narrative agency, and Meir Sternberg’s Proteus Principle10. Here
is Jahn on the relationship between structuralist narratology
and its cognitive rival:
The lesson to be learned from Artificial Intelligence is that one
can use process models (like stacks and scripts) as well as state
models (like frames) without losing the heuristics of structur-
alism; specifically, an enriched and flexible structuralism of
this kind allows narratology to escape from its atomistic-holis-
tic doublebind. (Jahn 1999: 190–191.)
Moreover, Jahn utilizes the concepts of frames and sys-
tems of preference-rules in a constructivist rather than a
cognitivist spirit. In this respect, Jahn’s cognitive narratology
is less clearly linked to cognitive psychology than to a more
general conception of interpretive frames (see Jahn 1997: 441–
442). This is evident, for instance, in Jahn’s (1999: 191) tenta-
tive turn toward a more culturally determined notion of pref-
erence-rule systems, which would “differentiate as well as
define what Stanley Fish […] has termed interpretive com-
munities”. Jahn’s approach, therefore, bears a resemblance to
Nünning’s (2001) “constructivist” narratology, whose goal is
to examine both the strategies through which readers process
narrative literature and the textual features relevant in that
processing.
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Cognitivist literary theory has confronted a certain amount
of critical resistance. Gross (1997) finds at least Turner’s (1991)
version of cognitivist literary study problematic insofar as it is
grounded in pseudo-scientific rhetoric and at times in circular
reasoning. In a similar though less hostile manner, Tony
Jackson reviews the achievements of the approach without
being particularly impressed by the interpretive achievements
of cognitive literary study:
If evolutionary psychology and cognitive science are really to
matter in literary studies, then they will have to do more than
say what literature is. In other words, if a theory does not pro-
duce much of interest in the way of practice, then however true
the theory may be, it just will not make much difference to
most literary scholars, who after all have a bottom-line con-
cern with interpreting specific texts. (Jackson 2000: 338.)
Richard van Oort (forthcoming) sets out to debunk the
discipline of cognitive linguistics and, consequently, cognitivist
literary theory on the basis of evolutionary psychology. Draw-
ing, among other things, on the results of research conducted
on the communicative abilities of primates, van Oort demon-
strates that the cognitive explanation of concept formation
prevalent in the theories of Lakoff and Johnson is fundamen-
tally flawed. Regardless of its validity, van Oort’s critique un-
derscores a troublesome feature implicit in interdisciplinary
research such as cognitive literary study, in Michael Fischer’s
(1996) words, that of “putting literary critics in the passive
position of depending on the (still unsettled) expertise of an-
other discipline – [...] waiting for results and then modifying
their self-understanding accordingly”. There is, of course, al-
ways the option of becoming an expert on the field of evolu-
tionary psychology – this alternative hardly seems inviting to
most literary scholars (cf. Turner 2002: 17).
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The fate of cognitive literary theory, however, is unlikely
to depend primarily on the future advancement of cognitive
science. From a traditional viewpoint, the success of a literary
theory relies, ultimately, on its continuing force to inform in-
teresting analyses and interpretations of specific works of lit-
erature, as well as on its heuristic value in terms of
theory-formation. I mean the formation of literary theory (see
Jackson 2002: 176–177). The theoretical foundation of tradi-
tional narratology is an obvious point of comparison;
Saussurean structuralism continues to serve as an (admittedly
vague) theoretical background of narratology long after it has
been become all but obsolete in linguistics. At present, how-
ever, the primary attraction of cognitive literary theory is, ar-
guably, its close relation to cognitive science and thus to the
prestige of empirical sciences.
2.3. From Modal to Narrative Semantics
The above discussion of cognitive narratology strongly sug-
gests that the approach presents itself as a new paradigm for
literary studies in “the age of cognitive science” (Turner 1991).
Despite the heuristic use it makes of the models of structural-
ist narratology, the cognitive explanation of literature inescap-
ably demarcates cognitive narratology from its traditional pred-
ecessors, at least regarding its fundamental research objectives.
In this respect, narratology based on possible world semantics
appears to provide a softer variety of new narrative theory.
Here is Marie-Laure Ryan on the topic, writing a decade ago:
I […] believe that the best use for the ideas put on the critical
market by PWT [possible worlds theory] is to let them infil-
trate the treatment of a variety of cultural phenomena from a
variety of point of views, in the same way that concepts of the
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Genette school of narratology infiltrated most brands of criti-
cism and eventually spread into interdisciplinary discourse stud-
ies. PWT does not offer a critical ideology, but a collection of
analytical tools applicable to many disciplines, in the service
of many purposes. (Ryan 1992: 554.)
Apparently, possible world semantics does not claim to
provide a new explanation for literature, but a conceptual
framework for new ways of looking at literature. Ryan’s com-
parison with the dissemination of the concepts of Genettean
narratology is particularly interesting; it remains to be seen
whether the terms of possible world semantics acquire the sta-
tus of interdisciplinary descriptive tools that certain concepts
of traditional narratology arguably possess. The most reveal-
ing expression in the preceding quotation is “PWT does not
offer a critical ideology”; Ryan attributes the stance of possi-
ble world theory to the deliberately non-ideological attitude
of structuralist narratology. From this perspective, possible
world semantics provides a relatively adaptable complement
to previous models of narrative analysis: a supplementary set
of handy concepts. This view is problematic, however. Possi-
ble world semantics does in fact offer a critical ideology.
This is evident in the decisively political rhetoric with
which Thomas Pavel opens his Fictional Worlds (1986), the
first book-length study on the possible worlds of fiction. He
comments on the lack of concern for the semantic dimension
of fiction in structuralist narratology:
The moratorium of referential issues has by now become obso-
lete. Freed from the constraints of the textualist approach, theory
of fiction can respond again to the world-creating powers of
imagination and account for the properties of fictional exist-
ence and worlds, their complexity, incompleteness, remoteness,
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and integration within the general economy of culture. (Pavel
1986: 10.)
While not setting out to overthrow the “textualist ap-
proach” altogether, possible world semantics does suggest a
shift of focus from structures to the relationships between texts
and worlds, actual and possible. Possible world narratology11
has since the mid-1970’s re-introduced the concerns of refer-
ence and meaning to narratological theory by combining the
age-old intuitive metaphor of a literary ‘world’ with the con-
cept of possible world as it is presented in modal logic. The
outcome of this synthesis of a metaphor and a concept (or two
metaphors, if you like) indeed establishes a literary-critical
belief. It is an ideology insisting both on the essentialness of
the world-creating properties of literature and on the textual
origins of the projected worlds and meanings. A passage from
a relatively early essay by Lubomír Dolezel succinctly illus-
trates the inherent duality, hermeneutic/formalist, of literary
possible world semantics:
Unlike traditional hermeneutics, narrative semantics is a study
of meaning expressed in forms, a study of formally organized
meaning. Unlike formalism, narrative semantics does not claim
that the aesthetic effect results from ‘pure’ forms; rather, its
source is located in the totality of the literary work. […] The
formal base of meaning warrants the objectivity (inter-subjec-
tivity) of textual meaning. The task of narrative semantics is to
recover and to formulate the intrinsic meaning of narrative texts.
(Dolezel 1979: 193.)
In short, possible world narratology aims to incorporate
referential questions of fiction into the study of textual struc-
tures. Dolezel’s insistence on the textual basis of narrative se-
mantics is an interesting point of comparison with Pavel’s “con-
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straints of the textualist approach”. Narrative semantics, while
considering referential issues, is in a sense a paradoxically tex-
tualist pursuit.
How does one manage to utilize the concepts of modal
logic in literary analysis and interpretation? Let me again cite
Dolezel’s description of the assumptions underlying the pro-
cedure. Again, the tone is not one of presenting minute adjust-
ments to previous approaches to narratology:
For imaginative literature, [the perspective of possible world
theory] is doubly significant: first, if literary texts refer at all,
they certainly refer to possible fictional worlds, rather than to
the real world. […] Second, and more importantly, possible-
worlds semantics leads us to postulate a more dynamic rela-
tionship between the literary text and its world; therefore, every
literary text has to construct its domain of reference, has to
bring its fictional world into existence. […] The most attrac-
tive feature of possible-worlds semantics is the scope of its
explanatory power. All the traditional problems of meaning in
literature can be rephrased in the metalanguage of this theory;
moreover, this approach reveals […] semantic aspects of lit-
erature which up to now have not been noticed or have not
been assigned their proper significance. (Dolezel 1983: 511–
512.)
As many discussions of possible world semantics docu-
ment, the origin of the concept lies in the philosophy of Leibniz;
a multitude of possible worlds exist as thoughts in God’s mind,
and God; being infinitely wise and good, has chosen the best
of these for actualization (e.g. Ryan 1991: 16). The notion was
re-defined by philosophers such as Saul Kripke and Jaakko
Hintikka during the 1960’s and 1970’s; subsequently, the meta-
phor “possible world” has been transformed into a theoretical
concept of modal semantics (of which the present survey does
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not pretend to be a comprehensive discussion). In Kripke’s
famous formulation, the model structure of a system of possi-
ble worlds consists of a set K of possible worlds, a ‘privi-
leged’ member G of this set (the real world), and a relation R
that links together the worlds belonging to the set K. (Kripke
1963: 84, 91; paraphrased in e.g. Pavel 1986: 44–45; Dolezel
1998: 12–13.) Hence, the worlds of a particular ‘universe’ are
alternative (or accessible) to each other in ways determined
by the relation between them (relation of alternativeness in
Hintikka 1963: 66).
The postulation of a system of interconnected possible
worlds provides indispensable tools for modal semantics. Fol-
lowing the logic of Kripke’s formulation, it is possible to in-
terpret propositions in terms of their truth-values not only in
the real world, but also in a constellation of alternative worlds
stipulated around it. Thus necessarily true propositions have
a positive truth-value in every accessible possible world. Pos-
sible propositions, by contrast, have a positive truth-value at
least in one possible world accessible from the privileged (real)
world. Accordingly, necessarily false propositions are false in
all accessible possible worlds.
The relevance of possible worlds to literary theory is nearly
self-evident. The concept of possible world joins forces with
the intuitive notion of the imaginative worlds of literature and
provides a more rigorous terminology for talking about them.
However, the conceptual apparatus of modal semantics is not
as such applicable to literary study. It is a duly acknowledged
fact that for logicians possible worlds are abstract construc-
tions stipulated in order mostly to elucidate the theoretical prob-
lems of counterfactuals, whereas students of literature con-
sider the possible worlds of fiction as full-fledged, fully fur-
nished imaginative domains, ‘pregnant’ worlds in Umberto
Eco’s (1979: 218) terms.
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This discrepancy, among others, has prompted the propo-
nents of possible world narratology to adjust their terminol-
ogy accordingly: for instance, Pavel (1986) uses the concept
of fictional world; Ryan (1991: 21–23) discusses recentered
fictional universes. From a more rigorous perspective, how-
ever, simple modification of nomenclature does not suffice.
Ruth Ronen has chastised literary scholars for their sloppy use
of the philosophical concept:
[I]t seems that a fictional world can be considered a possible
world only in a radically modified way. The analogy between
fictional worlds and possible worlds must obey severe restric-
tions. Consequently, ‘a possible world’ can only be considered
a metaphor for fictional existence. In examining the concep-
tual components that build the notion of possible worlds […],
one recognizes that these are understood and interpreted dif-
ferently when applied to the case of fictional worlds. One might
conclude that the interdisciplinary move of possible worlds from
philosophy to literary theory necessarily entails a considerable
loss of original meaning. (Ronen 1996: 27; see also Ronen
1994.)
In Ronen’s (1996: 28–29) view, both the literary and the
philosophical interpretations of possible world reflect a major
change in the understanding of meaning-production, a “relaxa-
tion” of the correspondence theory of truth in favor of more
pragmatic interpretations. Thus, while the terminology of pos-
sible world semantics as such is not directly applicable to lit-
erary analysis, the disciplines share a fundamental belief about
the ‘nature of things’. According to Ronen (ibid.), this is the
truly promising, and philosophically legitimate, intellectual
overlap between literary theory and modal logic.
Unfortunately, however, precisely the ‘heretical’ applica-
tions of the concepts of possible world theory have so far pro-
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vided the most interesting interpretive results. One is tempted
to undertake yet another “willing suspension of disbelief” –
regarding conceptual accuracy – and make the most of the
fertile interdisciplinarity, however theoretically dubious it may
be. The importance of the relationship of creative unfaithful-
ness between modal semantics and possible world narratology
is manifest, for instance, in the interpretation of the concept of
accessibility. Hintikka emphasizes the decisiveness of the re-
lation of alternativeness in the formulation of modal seman-
tics:
What we have […] therefore is a slightly modified version of
the traditional idea that possibility equals truth in some “possi-
ble world” while necessary equals truth in all “possible worlds”.
[O]ur only departure from the traditional idea lies in rejecting
the presupposition that all “possible worlds” are on a par. […]
Hence the use of the alternativeness relation and the conse-
quent appearance of the phrases “some alternative possible
world” and “all alternative possible worlds” where you prob-
ably expected the simpler phrases “some possible world” and
“all possible worlds”, respectively. (Hintikka 1963: 67, see also
76–77.)
The relation of alternativeness is thus, again, the organiz-
ing principle that makes possible worlds more than merely
intuitive concepts. This is also true in possible world
narratology. However, in Ryan’s (1991: 31–33) account, the
accessibility relation is in addition, and most interestingly, used
to make generic distinctions between texts. Ryan presents a
refined set of accessibility relations, the combinations of which
determine the generic contours of a particular fictional uni-
verse. Ryan’s way of turning an abstract concept of modal se-
mantics into a useful analytic tool is nothing short of ingen-
ious. And, most important, it reflects the general attitude with
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which literary scholars approach possible world semantics:
“Make it literary!”
McHale’s (1987) study of postmodernist fiction exempli-
fies the use of possible world semantics in a literary study that
seeks to provide genre-specific descriptive accounts of narra-
tive and thematic strategies. McHale utilizes both Pavel’s and
Eco’s accounts of fictional worlds and entities to analyze the
ontological instability and playfulness of experimental narra-
tives. Of particular interest for McHale is the concept of
transworld identity. McHale’s discussion of the notion illus-
trates, once again, the surprising literary-theoretical value of
the abstract concepts of modal semantics.
Possible world narratology is susceptible to the same
contextualist and philosophical arguments that have been raised
against structuralist narratology. It is not surprising, then, to
find Gibson (1996: 70) criticizing Pavel’s account of narra-
tive worlds for its adherence to referential and thus readerly
issues of literature. From a poststructuralist perspective, nar-
rative semantics is bound to appear ideological; after all, as
Gibson (ibid. 89) notes, possible world narratology grants the
real world “ontological priority” over the worlds of make-be-
lieve. Furthermore, though Gibson does not discuss the issue
further, the notion of fictional universes recentered around a
privileged ‘fictionally actual’ world – an essential insight in
possible world narratology – would in all likelihood seem even
more oppressive. Gibson’s critique illustrates the relatively
meager chances for a meaningful exchange of ideas between
poststructuralism and possible world narratology. All the fun-
damental tenets of narrative semantics based on possible worlds
are thoroughly alien to poststructuralist thought: the referen-
tial, world-creating potential of literary language, the hierar-
chical structuring of narrative universes, the textual basis of
narrative semantics. In this respect, the difference between the
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disciplines is greater than that between structuralist narratology
and poststructuralist poetics. After all, if nothing else, they
have the shared problem of signification to quibble over.
Presenting a “friendly challenge” to narrative semantics,
Hutcheon (1996) suggests that the complex and contradictory
worlds of postmodernist fiction exceed the descriptive capac-
ity of possible world narratology. By analyzing the “politics of
impossible worlds” in Coetzee’s Foe, Hutcheon (ibid. 225)
points out the necessity to go beyond the concept of impossi-
ble world, lest possible world narratology becomes irrelevant
vis-à-vis the politics of literary experimentation. Dolezel’s
response to the challenge again demonstrates a perspectival
difference between contextually motivated literary criticism
and possible world narratology. Dolezel (1998: 221–224; see
also Sternberg 2001: 157–158) concedes that the narrative
universe of Foe indeed is constituted according to the logic of
impossibility. However, Dolezel (ibid. 224) is quick to
downplay the decisiveness of the aesthetics of postmodernism:
“The impossibility of the fictional world of a [postmodernist]
rewrite is judged by the same criterion that applies to all fic-
tional worlds: only those are impossible that contain or imply
contradictory states of affair.”
The exchange of ideas between Hutcheon and Dolezel,
and also McHale’s (1987) work on the world-play of
postmodernist fiction, reflect the surprising fact that precisely
the strong attachment to the tradition of philosophical analy-
sis and fairly conservative views of textual meaning-produc-
tion make possible world narratology a useful framework for
the analysis of experimental fiction. The traditional theoreti-
cal presuppositions of possible world narratology and its con-
siderable use-value in the study of non-traditional texts such
as Gravity’s Rainbow form an irresistible paradox.
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3. Gravity’s Rainbow as a
Commentary on Narrative Hierarchy
In the following two chapters, some of the concepts of struc-
turalist narratology will be subjected to the narrative intrica-
cies of Gravity’s Rainbow. The goal is not so much to relish
schadenfreude vis-à-vis the inevitable weaknesses and blind
spots in narrative theory as it is to point toward ways in which
Pynchon’s fiction explores the margins of narrative conven-
tions, in the process implicitly presenting critiques of specific
narratological ideas. The order of the analyses – moving from
the traditional models of narrative analysis to more current
approaches – is not meant to suggest a teleology of narrative
theory. Pynchon’s fundamentally deconstructive attitude to-
ward literary conventions and theories will become evident
also in the discussion of the more recent developments of nar-
rative theory. Hence narratological work based on possible
world semantics and cognitive science is just as susceptible to
the effects of the textual peculiarities of Pynchon’s fiction as
are more traditional approaches.
In this chapter the novel will be dealt with specifically as
a critique of narrative hierarchy. From the perspective of a
Pynchon scholar, Gravity’s Rainbow is perhaps too obvious
an example of innovation inside the novelistic tradition: much
ink has been spilled over its exuberance. It is, however, still
an interesting case, at least for two reasons:
First, Gravity’s Rainbow’s way of re-assessing and com-
menting on the hierarchies of narrative is more subtle than
what one would expect in the light of the scholarly work on
the novel and its overall reputation. The novel’s relationship
to the traditional novelistic conventions is subversive in a con-
tradictory manner: Gravity’s Rainbow exhibits a strong attach-
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ment to those conventions, at the same time subjecting them
to irony.
Second, the way Pynchon’s novel implicitly criticizes the
conventions of narrative bears some resemblance to the criti-
cism that structuralist narratology has recently faced. One can
see an analogical relationship between the poststructuralist
criticism of narratological concepts and Gravity’s Rainbow’s
commentary on narrative tradition. Characteristic of both is a
strategy of simultaneous subversion and confirmation. While
the commentary implicit in Gravity’s Rainbow should not be
regarded as essentially literary-theoretical, one can at least play
with the idea of the novel having some traits of the criticism
of narratology. Pynchon’s work could perhaps best be described
as raising the same questions that literary criticism does, how-
ever differently.
First I will explicate, with the aid of examples, the contra-
dictory relationship between classical structuralist narratology
and its poststructuralist critique. After this, I will analyze Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow’s implicit commentary on the conventions of
narrative hierarchy. The analysis is divided into two sections,
the first of which examines the category of the narrator, while
the second deals with the novel’s metafictive situations. In
conclusion, I will discuss the nature of the critique of conven-
tions inscribed in the novel, and its relationship to literary
theory and to so-called theoretical fiction.
3.1. Subversive Confirmation
As has been discussed earlier, narratology has received its most
conspicuous criticism from theorists and critics who have
pointed out the contextual insensitivity of structuralist
narratology. For the present discussion, this front of the criti-
cism of narratology is not particularly relevant. The
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deconstructive attack on the hierarchical concepts of the dis-
cipline, however, is all the more interesting a point of com-
parison for Pynchon’s view of the novelistic tradition. Let me
illustrate the matter with two examples, the first already a clas-
sic formulation, the second a fairly recent one.
Culler’s well-known deconstruction of the dichotomy be-
tween the concepts story and discourse (1981: 169–172) is an
illuminating example of the way in which the deconstructive
criticism responds to hierarchical concepts of narratology. One
cannot claim that Culler destroys or even renders the concepts
of story and discourse unusable, even though he questions the
assumptions underlying them.
In Culler’s (1981: 169–172) analysis, the views that story
exists prior to and regardless of discourse, and that the rules
and demands of discourse produce the story, are shown to be
incompatible. The critic has to decide which interpretive op-
tion to rely on in order for the analysis to be possible. How-
ever, there is no logical or absolute solution as to which is the
correct one. The hierarchy between story and discourse is for
Culler an inevitable starting-point of criticism, despite its lack
of ‘natural’ basis. In the absence of a fundamental principle,
the concepts go on with their useful and necessary lives.
A similar contradictory logic about the relationship be-
tween poststructuralism and narratological concepts is to be
found in Gibson’s previously mentioned study Towards a
Postmodern Theory of Narrative (1996). Gibson introduces a
series of new narratological concepts as an alternative to the
apparatus of traditional narratology. Gibson’s most radical ar-
gument is directed toward the “geometricity” of narratology,
the allegedly restricting thinking in terms of hierarchies and
centers. In effect, Gibson wants to use terms such as
“energetics” instead of geometrics and “narrative laterality”
instead of narrative hierarchy. The following quotation
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(analyzing Robbe-Grillet’s The Voyeur) reveals, however,
Gibson’s contradictory attitude toward the notion of narrative
levels, especially in the light of Gibson’s strong views on the
concepts of narratology:
In producing a multiplicity of possible spaces, it [The Voyeur]
rather produces the virtual spaces of thought itself.
In part.
In part, The Voyeur also seems to retreat from the very multi-
plicity of the spaces it produces. [c]ertain parts of The Voyeur
appear to resolve the indeterminacies which others create.  [T]he
text might appear to lure the reader into radically unorthodox
expectations and then frustrate them. This would suggest that
there are at least two narrative levels. (Gibson 1996: 227–228.)
Gibson’s way of interpreting the novel exhibits the logic
of simultaneous subversion and confirmation, beautifully in
concord with the deconstructive tradition. On the one hand,
Robbe-Grillet’s novel illustrates for Gibson the idea of inde-
terminacy and narrative multiplicity. On the other, it forces
the critic to finally acknowledge the novel’s internal logic and
hierarchy. Recognition of this tension obviously makes
Gibson’s interpretation a strong one. Nonetheless, an interest-
ing light is shed on the polemic against all thinking in terms of
geometricity and hierarchy  (see also Fludernik 1996: 305, 314–
315; cf. Ryan 1999: 137–138). Gravity’s Rainbow comments
on narrative conventions with a similar double logic. The novel
does not hesitate to construct narratives highly dependent upon
the conventions of narrative hierarchy, only to make them look
ridiculous in the next instant. The reader of the novel witnesses,
like Culler and Gibson above, the peculiar situation in which
the underlying assumptions of narrative are undermined, but
the practice of narrative is not. An interesting point of com-
parison is Rimmon-Kenan’s (1982) article analyzing the in-
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terchangeability of narrative levels in Brooke-Rose’s novel
Thru (1975). According to Rimmon-Kenan’s analysis,
Brooke-Rose’s novel is drastic in its use of extreme narrative
gimmicks to create ambiguity of narrative hierarchy. As will
be seen below, Pynchon’s strategy is somewhat subtler in its
critique of conventions.
Naturally, Pynchon’s ways of criticizing the novelistic tra-
dition have been dealt with in previous studies. Reference to
the complexity and innovativity of the narrative is a strong
convention in Gravity’s Rainbow criticism. The alienating ef-
fect of changing narratorial characteristics and of the severe
unreliability of the narrator has received its due attention from
all critics. One response to the overdriven narration is suspi-
cion: is the author making fun of the readers? (E.g. Moore
1987: 43–44; Safer 1989: 106.) McHale admits:
Pynchon’s readers have every right to feel conned, bullied, be-
trayed. Indeed, these responses are the essence of the aesthetic
effect of Gravity’s Rainbow. (McHale 1992: 81.)
Gravity’s Rainbow leads its readers astray only temporar-
ily, though. The novel is constantly offering the reader inter-
pretive strategies, only to debunk them later on (cf. Saariluoma
1992: 250–251). In the view of traditional narratology this lead-
ing-astray is of course not directed at the reader, who probably
is able to recognize the novel’s strategy, and perhaps to enjoy
it, too12.
In effect, the novel merely seems to fool its reader. It is
very difficult to be convinced of this, though: the ghostly fig-
ure of an author smirking at the reader’s efforts never quite
vanishes.
Over-emphasis on the reader-fooling strategy turns out,
however, to produce a somewhat simplified interpretation of
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Gravity’s Rainbow’s relationship to the narrative tradition. The
critic becomes too much of a “genius of meta-solutions”
(Gravity’s Rainbow 102, henceforth GR). It seems
commonsensical and gratifying to explain away Gravity’s Rain-
bow’s peculiarities as grossly parodying literary conventions
and mocking its readers. This train of thought is not very ana-
lytical and concludes in a shallow interpretation. The novel
does not merely parody and question, fool and lead astray.
One discovers the most interesting re-assessments of nar-
rative conventions by paying less attention to the obvious chaos
and silliness of the text, and more to the relationship between
chaos and order. The questioning of narrative hierarchy is pos-
sible only because the novel is, in its own twisted way, sur-
prisingly logical and hierarchical (cf. Gibson above). In the
next section, I will explicate how Gravity’s Rainbow applies
its double logic of subversion and confirmation by subtly sub-
jecting the narrator to ironic suspicion.
3.2. The Stumbling Narrator
Charles Hohmann (1986: 25–34) does not think that Gravity’s
Rainbow’s narrator is alone: “[T]he mere fact that the voice
contradicts itself [...] suggests that we should distinguish be-
tween the novel’s several anonymous narrators and the virtual
or implied author who can ’explain’ such contradictions.”
(Hohmann 1986: 29.)
Hohmann is correct in concluding that the narrator of
Gravity’s Rainbow contradicts its own narrative. This happens
often at so many levels that it becomes difficult to judge
whether it is the narrator or its audience that is being fooled.
The contradictory nature of narration does not make it neces-
sary to assume the presence of multiple narrators, however. It
is more useful to interpret Gravity’s Rainbow as stretching the
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concept of unreliable narration, as abusing it, rather than aban-
doning it altogether. Solving the problem of contradictory nar-
ration by postulating several narrators is easy, but it is apt to
introduce a number of new problems.
Hohmann examines interpretive problems that the alleged
multitude of narrators produces. In his view, the implied au-
thor is constructed by studying the relationships of the voices
of the narrators, “the way they modulate into one another across
narrative levels or the way they contradict themselves on one
and the same narrative plane” (Hohmann 1986: 31). The tools
are a bit excessive in this interpretation, too. The modulation
of the narrative voices into one another across narrative levels
can be analyzed reasonably well in terms of focalization and
speech and thought representation, be it direct discourse, indi-
rect discourse (or psycho-narration) or free indirect discourse
(cf. 6.2.2), even in an extreme case like Gravity’s Rainbow.13
This in no way diminishes the complexity of the phenomenon,
however.
Hohmann’s thorough analysis is an example of a drastic,
yet simplifying view of Gravity’s Rainbow’s challenges to the
conventions of narrative. It is tempting to regard Pynchon as a
genius whose work one should not even attempt to analyze
using stock methods. The pressure brought to bear on the con-
cepts is real; it does not necessarily render them obsolete or
unusable, however. It would therefore be in order to find out
how the conventions of narrative and, consequently, the con-
cepts of narratology have to bend with Pynchon. Gravity’s
Rainbow serves as a test case for finding out how unreliable a
narrator can get, and still be called a narrator. In a similar vein,
the novel pushes to the limit the mixing of the narrator’s and
characters’ voices, perceptions and consciousnesses in speech
and thought representation.
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The category of the narrator is not undermined in Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow because of its fantastic adaptability or its tre-
mendous capacity for unreliability. It is placed under suspi-
cion because now and again it is made to trip and stumble.
The first example of this involves some play on words.
The most amazing (and well-known) pun in Gravity’s
Rainbow (e.g. Moore 1987: 36; Weisenburger 1988: 240) is
inscribed in a scene involving the protagonist Lieutenant
Tyrone Slothrop and a bizarre business deal. The most obnox-
ious character of the novel, Major Duane Marvy, is scaveng-
ing fur from the ruins of occupied Germany with his partner
Bloody Chiclitz. The operation uses children, too; Chiclitz has
something considerably more grandiose in mind for the chil-
dren’s future:
“My dream”, he admits, “is to bring all these kids back to
America, out to Hollywood. I think there’s a future for them in
pictures. […] I think I can teach them to sing or something, a
children’s chorus, negotiate a package deal with De Mille [the
producer]. He can use them for the real big numbers, religious
scenes, orgy scenes –”
   “Ha!” cries Marvy, dribbling champagne , eyeballs bulging,
“You’re dreaming all right, old buddy. […] He’ll use them lit-
tle ‘suckers for galley slaves! […] – yeah they’ll be chained to
th’ oars […]”
   “Galley slaves?” Chiclitz roars. “Never, by God. For De Mille,
young fur-henchmen can’t be rowing!” (GR 559)
The last sentence of the quotation puns on “Forty Million
Frenchmen Can’t Be Wrong”14. If the reader recognizes this,
he or she has to ponder on an alienating, perhaps even an un-
pleasant question: is the whole episode presented merely in
order to establish a pun? With good will, one could say that
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the episode in some ways advances the plot, but the pun is
quick to pull the carpet from under the interpretation.
For present purposes, the most relevant observation would
be to note the ambiguous situation the narrator is being placed
in as a result of the pun. The statement about 40 million French-
men reveals itself only when the text is read (preferably aloud).
The communication of the pun seems to be necessarily out of
reach of the narrator. Because of this narrative short-circuit,
both the narrator and the narratee are deprived of the ques-
tionable joy of wordplay, and consequently subject to irony.
The impression is particularly disturbing, in view of the narra-
tor’s overall status as a cunning and manipulative agent (see
also Kharpetian 1990:138).
The pun offers the reader a glimpse of an outlandish, yet
remotely possible approach to reading, one in which the lev-
els of narrative are not relevant. Justified suspicion arises: how
many other ludicrous episodes of Gravity’s Rainbow have been
told just to achieve linguistic joy? The logic of wordplay makes
every bit of text a possible host, with or without story-related
motivation15. Bernard Duyfhuizen seems to refer to this strat-
egy of reading. In order to avoid “traps”,
[R]eaders must adopt for GR [Gravity’s Rainbow] a postmodern
strategy of reading in which the reader avoids privileging any
specific piece of data because the text, in its implied
poststructuralist theory of reading, thematically attacks the tyr-
anny of reductive systems for knowing the world. The reader
must engage the play of “differance” (sic) encoded in GR’s
textual signs to avoid falling into traps of premature narrative
closure. (Duyfhuizen 1991: 1.)
Duyfhuizen’s directions are not easy to follow, however.
Gravity’s Rainbow tempts its readers very effectively into ex-
pecting the rewards characteristic for a traditional narrative:
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plot, causal relations, logic. There is a tension between the
things the novel implicitly shows us, and the things that are
(still?) possible for us as its readers (see also Dällenbach 1989:
48; McHale 1992: 81).
My second example of the novel’s ways of reassessing
the category of the narrator is linked to the paranoid thematic
of Gravity’s Rainbow (e.g. GR 25, 395, 657, 703). Pynchon
criticism has emphasized the feeling of connectedness induced
by the novel: everything in Gravity’s Rainbow seems to be
linked to everything else (e.g. Porush 1985: 116; Slade 1974:
176–177). However, the novel’s final hundred pages are apt to
frustrate a reader seeking narrative cohesion. As the novel
draws toward its end, the launching of a certain V-2 -rocket,
the narration becomes fragmentary and chaotic. The text con-
sists of incompatible parts that seem to add up to nothing.
Joseph Slade (1974: 240) sees the paranoid thematic in this,
too – inversely. According to Slade (ibid.), the finale of Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow illustrates a situation in which nothing is con-
nected to anything: “When Slothrop slips into ’anti-paranoia’,
the narrative itself begins to dissolve.” The outcome of this
dissolution is, however, far from absolute chaos.
The multiplicity of the novel’s themes persists despite the
fragmentary narration. The narration is for the most part a la-
conic statement of facts – the narrator is not too eager to make
the thematic connections for the reader, as one would expect
of this otherwise voluble agent. The reader is presented with
scenes and episodes seemingly unrelated to each other, yet
which magically always return to the novel’s obsessive themes.
“The Story of Byron the Bulb” (GR 647–655) exempli-
fies this tendency. The immortal light-bulb Byron takes a stand
against the Phoebus-cartel, “Them”-agency of the light-bulb
realm. Byron’s longevity alone is subversive, since Phoebus
seeks to keep the bulbs’ burn-out rate steady, in order to en-
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sure sufficient demand. Byron is also a dissident thinker, how-
ever, dreaming of the liberation of light-bulbs (GR 648). It is
bound to fail in its aspirations, of course. The more Byron
learns about the sorry state of all electric appliances and the
international cartel controlling their existence, the more des-
perate it becomes. It is forced to acknowledge – and even en-
joy – its powerlessness to change anything.
In addition to being a mise-en-abyme (with respect to
Slothrop’s story), “The Story of Byron the Bulb” is a platform
for narrative experimentation. The eight pages of Byron’s story
have been filled with clear or unclear references to the charac-
ters of the novel, to themes, to previous and forthcoming epi-
sodes of the novel. These are not in any way made explicit;
the narrator does not comment on them or try to explain any of
them, nor are they motivated by Byron’s story. They seem to
be coincidences which the narrator does not even seem to rec-
ognize. They are, to be sure, anything but coincidences. At
least the following are mentioned (without good reason) in
the context of Byron’s story:
-Géza Rózsavölgyi, a colleague of Edward Pointsman at
the “White Visitation”,
-the ever-present “Them”,
-the notorious company IG Farben,
-kamikaze-squadrons, to be returned to later on in the
novel,
-the mythical story of the Kirghiz Light,
-urolagnia, recalling the coprophagic inclination of one
Brigadier Pudding,
-the Kabbalah, an interpretive frame invoked by the novel,
-the name Hansel, recalling Hansel and Gretel, the fairy-
tale-frame of captain Blicero’s sadomasochistic game,
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-Lyle Bland, a businessman partially responsible for
Slothrop’s alleged conditioning,
-the dive into the toilet bowl, a parallel to Slothrop’s So-
dium Amytal-induced hallucinations.
In addition, Byron’s story is plagued by (e.g. GR 654) the
paranoid attitude of the narrator. However, the feeling of
connectedness in Byron’s story is mainly produced by things
the narrator does not seem to acknowledge. The reader is hard
at work in making connections between the details above, seek-
ing explanation as to why they have been presented.
Byron’s story is a reading comprehension test, which the
reader passes but the narrator fails, or pretends to do so. The
narrator is left in the background and the reader is made to
practise paranoid reading at its worst. Regarding the hierarchy
of narrative, the effect is the same as with 40 million French-
men. The reader finds in the narration something the pedantic
narrator does not. This observation raises, again, troubling
questions about the narrative agent. How should the reader
relate to the impudent verbal talent who nevertheless is made
to appear oblivious to the effects of its discourse?
A final example of a way of questioning the status of the
narrator and thus commenting on narrative hierarchy is related
to the third person singular of the verb say. Gravity’s Rainbow
includes quite a few occurrences of this verb-form spelled sez
(cf. McHale 1992: 100):
“Can’t you read? Sez ’War Correspondent.’ I even have a
mustache, here, don’t I? Just like that Ernest Hemingway.” (GR
292)
It would seem that the form is a feature of the character’s
idiolect, manifested in direct discourse. This is far from being
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the whole truth: a few lines below the situation is different.
The narrator continues:
Oh boy, am I gonna get out of here, sez Slothrop to himself,
this is a badger game if I ever saw one, man. Who else would
be interested in the one rocket out of 6000 that carried the
Imipolex G device? (GR 292)
This time, the form is in the narrator’s inquit phrase, not
in the free direct discourse (or quoted monologue) surround-
ing it. This is a well-directed blow at the idea of distinct narra-
tive levels. One of the finest features of narratological analy-
sis is its ability to obtain information about focalization and
speech and thought representation by examining subtleties of
idiolects – supported by certainty about a stable narrative hi-
erarchy. Gravity’s Rainbow casts a shadow on all this by its
(intentionally) sloppy use of the form sez. This is all the more
noticeable, since the novel contains some very flexible and
precise simulations of the characters’ idiosyncratic speech
(even that of animals’ and inanimate objects GR 44, 229, 677).
Once again, the narrator is portrayed in an ambiguous light.
Sez ironizes the conventions of speech representation for
an additional reason, too: pronounced, the written forms sez
and says sound identical16. The altered written form of the verb
only looks like simulation of idiosyncratic pronunciation, with-
out being that in any reasonable way.
As a diffused form, sez is also present in the acronym SEZ
WHO (GR 271). As with all of the novel’s ludicrous acro-
nyms, it offers yet another perspective on narrative hierarchy:
Sez can be found in the characters’ speech or thought, in the
narrator’s discourse or as a “read-only” element of the text, in
which case the narrator is once again ironically pushed aside.
As if the above was not enough, one should note that Pynchon
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uses the form sez in his non-fiction, too, for example in the
essay “Is It O.K. to Be a Luddite?” (1984) and in the introduc-
tion to Slow Learner (1985). Sez is present on all levels of
communication in Pynchon’s work. In this sense it is best un-
derstood as a joke – a joke that forces the reader into re-as-
sessment of narrative conventions.
 These commentaries on narrative hierarchy are, charac-
teristically, not obvious. Gravity’s Rainbow does not under-
mine the category of the narrator with the overwhelming com-
plexity of the narrative. Quite the opposite: it makes the most
of the convention of omniscient-yet-unreliable narrator. The
deconstructive and subversive intent is portrayed in the well-
placed “mistakes”, alleged lapses of narratorial attention. The
same is true with respect to the most metafictive situations of
Gravity’s Rainbow, which will be considered next.
3.3. Parodying Metafiction
Often the communication of Gravity’s Rainbow seems to op-
erate above the extradiegetic level. This is the case especially
in the many occurrences of second-person narration. McHale
(1992: 96–98) has demonstrated that most of these can never-
theless be interpreted as either communication between the
narrator and narratee or “pretend” communication between the
narrator and a character. In some cases, however, the frames
of narration are broken (ibid. 101–102, see also Genette 1980:
234–235; Margolin 1990: 427, 433–434; Fludernik 1994a:
461).
A clear case of violation of the narrative hierarchy is the
episode in which the narrator speculates about connections
between Freemasonry, Lyle Bland and world history. In pa-
rentheses, the reader is, surprisingly, encouraged to dig up
additional sources:
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Well, and keep in mind where those Masonic Mysteries came
from in the first place. (Check out Ishmael Reed. He knows
more about it than you’ll ever find here.) (GR 588)
A traditional narratologist (provided such a a creature ex-
ists) would say that the narrator addresses the narratee. The
status and role of the narratee is persuasively offered to the
reader, though. The trap is ingenious: by temporarily position-
ing ourselves in the role of the narratee, we get to enjoy the
gratification of recognizing the author mentioned by the nar-
rator. The reader is made to feel like a specialist.17 It is all too
obvious that this blatantly disregards the idea of distinctness
of narrative levels.
Indeed, the narrative hierarchy is made to startle much
more interestingly when it is not, despite all indications to this
effect, transgressed. One could say that this is a way of fooling
the reader. More analytically, it consists of play with the con-
vention of mixing the narrative levels, of subverting the narra-
tive hierarchy only to restore it later. An often-mentioned ex-
ample of this is the episode “A Moment of Fun With Takeshi
and Ichizo, the Komical Kamikazes” (GR 690–692). The
radarman companion of the merry kamikaze-pilots on stand-
by improvises a haiku, which seems to get a rather hostile
reception:
[...] – what? You didn’t like the haiku. It wasn’t ethereal enough?
Not Japanese at all? In fact it sounded like something right
outa Hollywood? Well, Captain – yes you, Marine Captain
Esberg from Pasadena – you have just had, the Mystery In-
sight! (gasps and a burst of premonitory applause) and so you –
are our Paranoid...For The Day! (band burst into “Button Up
Your Overcoat,” or any other suitably paranoid up-tempo tune
[...]. Yes, it is a movie! (GR 691)
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The reader is in for a disappointment if he or she has sup-
posed that the narrator reacts to the feedback from its narratee.
The implicit criticism comes from the previously unknown
Captain Esberg from Pasadena. According to McHale’s (1992:
97) analysis, the reader has to adjust his or her hypothesis about
whom the “you” addresses. It is easy to interpret sequences
like this too heavily, leaning on the notion of metaleptic sec-
ond-person narration. McHale (ibid.) does not, however, em-
phasize the questioning of narrative hierarchy implicit in the
episode, for present purposes its most important effect.
In a paradox, the fact that narrative levels are in the end
kept distinct makes them seem artificial and arbitrary. A (hy-
pothetical) reader steps into a vacuum with the attempt to in-
terpret the narrator as addressing the narratee (and
metaleptically the reader), thus becoming a victim of some
narrative agent’s vile joke. The introduction of a brand new
diegetic group narratee (Capt. Esberg & co.) to be fitted into
the narration makes the reader’s situation even more awkward
and embarrassing. In addition to having probably
overinterpreted the episode, he or she has severely confused
the narrative levels. What began as a simple playful narrative
trick to be appreciated by a reader versed in conventions of
experimental fiction, turns out to be a seemingly futile exer-
cise in the hierarchy of narrative. The concept of a stable nar-
rative hierarchy becomes effectively dubious, as the narrator
ad libs whole subworlds and provisional layers of narrative
communication with a few hasty strokes.
In Woody Allen’s movie Husbands and Wives (1992) the
characters of the movie reflect in retrospect on the situations
of the movie, apparently in a documentary based on their lives.
This has been made to seem very believable, even to the ex-
tent of imitating the editing conventions of documentaries.
Gravity’s Rainbow has moments filled with this documentary
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feeling, too. The novel’s most characteristic kind of documen-
tary is the Making of -documentary. The title “The Making of
Gravity’s Rainbow” would appropriately describe the effect
achieved by the commentaries of various specialists that in-
trude into the narrative. Examples abound: Mitchell Prettyplace
is a King Kong enthusiast and a movie critic (GR 113, 275);
Mickey Wuxtry-Wuxtry is a “world-renowned analyst” (GR
738); a “spokesman for the Counterforce” (ibid.) is interviewed
in the Wall Street Journal; Steve Edelman has esoteric knowl-
edge both of the Kabbalah and of the folklore of
Schwarzkommando (GR 753–754, cf. 755); one Shetzline has
written a “classic study” on Oneirine, a fictional designer drug
(GR 389). All experts are ambiguous in reference to both the
story of the novel and its narrative levels. The most distinc-
tively metafictive of the experts is the “spokesman for the
Counterforce”, who openly discusses the events of the novel
in a retrospective interview (GR 738).
Mitchell Prettyplace is similarly mainly an outside author-
ity, a commentator on the story. Here’s Prettyplace as the nar-
rator’s outside source of information:
Von Göll, with a straight face, proclaims it to be his greatest
work. “Indeed, as things were to develop,” writes noted film
critic Mitchell Prettyplace, “one cannot argue much with his
estimate, though for vastly different reasons than von Göll might
have given or even from his peculiar vantage foreseen.” (GR
113)
Schwarzkommando is, of course, a peculiar movie because
it seems to have to have brought to life the German Herero
rocket outfit. Prettyplace thus implies fairly early on in the
novel that he has reliable retrospective information on the
events of the novel. In fact, he gives the impression that the
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events of the novel are common knowledge, at least among
the cognoscenti.
Prettyplace takes part in an imaginary scholarly debate on
the story of the novel in an non-specific space and time, from
which, purportedly, one gains sufficient perspective to resolve
the chaos of the novel into an integral whole. The reader is
given the impression of the historical importance of the events
of the novel, of their value as objects of study. Later on, how-
ever, Prettyplace is seriously ironized as an expert.
The narrator scorns Prettyplace’s work as a film critic by
making his 18-volume King Kong study look ridiculous in its
totalizing aspirations (GR 275; cf. 6.3.2). Prettyplace is also
chastised for not having been able to predict all the conse-
quences of the film:
And so, too, the legend of the black scapeape we cast down
like Lucifer from the tallest erection in the world has come, in
the fullness of time, to generate its own children, running around
inside Germany even now – the Schwarzkommando, whom
Mitchell Prettyplace, even, could not anticipate. (GR 275)
 Prettyplace becomes more and more involved in the world
of the novel. He is shown at the same time to be a metafictive
character, a “real” expert of cinema above the fictional world,
and a more or less normal Pynchonian character with his own
peculiarities. Once again, the reader with a strong interpreta-
tion, anticipating metafiction, is disappointed.
The status of Steve Edelman is even more unclear. At first,
he is presented merely as a outside source of information about
the Kabbalah and Schwarzkommando-folklore. Later on, how-
ever, Edelman evolves into a minor character who is plagued
by an addiction to Thorazine. Edelman is transformed rapidly
from a metafictive specialist into a multifaceted character: a
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few pages after being presented as a scholar he suddenly is a
transgressive “Hollywood businessman” (GR 755). As a re-
sult, then, Edelman is both a commentator on the novel and its
sad and comic minor character, whom children try to trick into
eating capacitors as tranquilizers. (GR 753).
This certainly gives an impression of transgressing against
the narrative hierarchy. The effect is similar to the previously
discussed cases of seemingly metaleptic second-person narra-
tion. Viveca Füredy (1989: 764–765) has introduced the con-
cept of pseudotransgression to describe cases in which an art-
work gives the impression of a subversion of ontological
boundaries. The cases of pseudotransgression in Gravity’s
Rainbow are considerably more complex than Füredy’s ex-
amples, one of which is the typical whodunit cliché of making
the detective refer to his or her task as the plot of a detective
novel. The narrative hierarchy is undermined by playing with
the conventions of metafiction, not by simply applying them.
Nonetheless, Pynchon’s fiction is often considered as a
good example in the theory of metafiction (Hutcheon 1980;
Waugh 1984; cf. Moore 1987: 14–15). Both Hutcheon18 (1980:
20, 33) and Patricia Waugh (1984: e.g. 31, 145) emphasize the
radical metafictional traits of Pynchon’s novels. There is plenty
of reason for this, to be sure. As the brief analysis above dem-
onstrates, however, Gravity’s Rainbow is not merely a good
example of metafiction, it is also an implicit commentary on
the typical conventions of metafiction.
In fact, Waugh’s (1984: 18) central idea that metafiction
“lays bare the conventions of realism; it does not ignore or
abandon them” coincides, mutatis mutandis, with Gravity’s
Rainbow’s attitude toward the conventions of metafiction it-
self. This does not lessen the novel’s metafictionality, but only
supplements and deepens it. Pynchon’s novel is also a prime
manifestation of Hutcheon’s version of postmodernism, using
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and abusing conventions both traditional and experimental
(Hutcheon 1988). In this respect, Pynchon’s parody of
metafiction is an indication of the current fast turnover rate of
narrative conventions. Published in 1973, it already includes
an implicit commentary on the conventions of radical
metafiction, at the time a supposedly emergent style of writ-
ing. On the other hand, Gravity’s Rainbow’s sensitivity toward
metafiction should probably be interpreted in the light of the
ever-present metafictional strain in novelistic writing.
Both Gravity’s Rainbow’s complex second-person narra-
tion and the status of its curiously ambiguous specialists dis-
play the double logic of subversion and confirmation. By dem-
onstrating laboriously that the distinctness of narrative levels
prevails in seemingly transgressive cases, Gravity’s Rainbow
reveals the artificial nature of narrative hierarchy. In the proc-
ess, the reader is forced to re-assess both the traditional hier-
archical view of narrative and the typical violations of it.
3.4. Theoretical fiction?
Currie (1998: e.g. 68–70) uses the concept theoretical fiction
to describe the literary-theoretical fashion of contemporary lit-
erature: theory in a novel form. John Barth, Umberto Eco, John
Fowles and Italo Calvino are among the obvious examples.
Pynchon is not, I would argue.
In the present chapter I have maintained that Gravity’s
Rainbow portrays an ambivalent relationship toward the con-
ventions of prose. The novel has been shown to play with trans-
gressions of narrative hierarchy and to raise futile expecta-
tions of subversion in its readers. In this sense Gravity’s Rain-
bow relates to traditions of narrative in a manner analogous to
deconstruction’s way of criticizing the concepts of classical
narratology. Why, despite all this, does it feel wrong to de-
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scribe Pynchon’s novel as theory in novel form? I offer two
points of comparison and potential illumination.
Barth’s LETTERS (1979) forces its readers to ponder on
the relationship between curiously filled calendar pages and
the novel’s structure. Moreover, the novel cannot be read if
the interpretive (and certainly theoretical) problem posed by
the presence of a fictional author is not in some way solved.
Calvino’s If On A Winter’s Night a Traveler (1979) is, like-
wise, bound to make the reader feel ambiguous about his or
her metaphorical involvement in the story. In both Barth and
Calvino, the reader is made explicitly conscious of the theo-
retical questions underlying the text. The reader is made, at
least in play, to act like a theoretician in order to survive.
Pynchon’s commentary is more practical and subtle.
Duyfhuizen (1991) exagggerates in referring to the implicit
“poststructuralist theory of reading” of the novel. Gravity’s
Rainbow could perhaps be more appropriately described as a
series of playful but subversive readings of narrative conven-
tions, not amounting to a theory, yet making the reader think.
In this sense, my position resembles that of Charles Caramello
(1983), who interprets American literary postmodernism as
both having internalized the tenets of poststructuralist theory
and resisting them in its practice. The novel abuses the read-
er’s familiarity with – and yearning for – conventional narra-
tives; despite its apparent chaos, Gravity’s Rainbow relies on
the reader’s will to get a grip on it. This will is in large part
frustrated by the small, well-directed, and disturbing blows
against the novelistic tradition. This peculiar relationship,
making the most of the conventions while ironizing their un-
derlying assumptions, makes Pynchon’s novel a good test case
for the concepts of narratology.
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4. Gravity’s Rainbow as a “Gravity’s
Rainbow Reader”: Interpreting a
Faux-Didactic Novel
As the analyses and interpretations of the previous chapter il-
lustrate, Gravity’s Rainbow is an equally rewarding and chal-
lenging test case for narrative theories. It is filled with exam-
ples of wonderful abnormalities and one-of-a-kind conditions
of narrative. In addition to functioning as a rich repository of
narrative peculiarities, the novel also presents a terrifying ar-
ray of thematic perspectives.
In the following discussion the goal is to combine – or
juxtapose – a thematic reading and structural analysis in order
to achieve a satisfactory interpretation for the novel’s faux-
didactic function. I will consider the ways in which the novel
implicitly provides guidelines for the reader to follow in his or
her interpretive task. In my view Gravity’s Rainbow offers quite
a few possible key elements of interpretation. They are, how-
ever, offers which the reader is not obliged to accept. In fact, I
consider Gravity’s Rainbow in many ways an inadequate read-
er’s guide to Gravity’s Rainbow. That is why it is referred to as
a faux-didactic novel – in recognition of its tendency to lead
readers astray.
Gravity’s Rainbow is by no means alone in its dubious
teachings. All Pynchon’s novels display the tendency to a cer-
tain extent. In V., the reader is continuously offered the inani-
mate/animate thematic as a key element of interpretation, for
example. Similarly, in Crying of Lot 49, the entropy-theme is
all too strongly underscored as an ‘authoritative’ clue to a good
interpretation. In fact, the idea of faux-didacticism in fiction
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invites one to review with a healthy skepticism a great many
works of fiction that include implicit interpretive suggestions19.
First I will briefly introduce ways in which textual narra-
tives have been considered as having reader-instructing func-
tions. The argumentation will then center on the metaphorical
presentation of reading and interpretation in Gravity’s Rain-
bow. The object is to point out ways in which the novel stresses
the importance of the activity of interpretation. Demonstra-
tion of the centrality of the arguably obvious themes of read-
ing and interpretation in Gravity’s Rainbow is followed by a
discussion of the themes in the context of the novel’s hypo-
thetical faux-didactic functioning. The argumentation will
concentrate on the meta-level messages that the novel sends
to the reader. The narratological concept of implied author
plays a crucial role in an attempt to move beyond mere the-
matic analysis. Metaphorical presentation of interpretation on
different narrative levels, especially interpretive embeddings
or mises-en-abyme20, will be analyzed in order to present an
interpretation encompassing both the novel’s interpretive the-
matic and its faux-didactic features.
While certain interpretive dilemmas of Gravity’s Rainbow
can be better understood by reference to narratological con-
cepts, it is again evident that the novel also very efficiently
evades narratological scrutiny. The fact that analytic concepts
such as implied author or mise-en-abyme do not seem to be-
have as they are supposed to in Pynchon’s context does not
render them useless, however. Gravity’s Rainbow is a good
test case for narratology precisely because of its tendency to
do something to the literary-critical concepts utilized. Thus,
in addition to providing an interpretation of the faux-didactic
nature of the novel, the goal is to further explicate the ways in
which Pynchon’s fiction probes the margins of narrative con-
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ventions and, consequently, narrative theory and invites one
to re-assess certain tenets of narrative analysis.
4.1. A Didactic Novel?
The idea of a fictional narrative being somehow pedagogical
is not new. Classical structuralist narratology has always, at
least implicitly, proceeded from the assumption that all texts
include the means for their own decipherment. In other words,
an operating manual structurally encoded within the narrative
guides the reader in his or her reading. This is obviously in
accord with the structuralist notion of having direct access to
the text and the text alone.
The idea was nicely put by Todorov in his discussion of
the construction of a character in a novel: “A text always con-
tains within itself directions for its own consumption” (Todorov
1980: 77; see also Chatman 1990: 83). The directions to which
Todorov refers are applicable to a number of narrative situa-
tions. Most texts that one is likely to encounter are decipher-
able using a set of interpretive functions sometimes called the
“basic realist assumptions” (cf. Fludernik 1994: 12), the as-
sumptions, that is, implicitly formed as a result of numerous
instances of dealing with texts with basic realist “consump-
tion directions”.
The pedagogical function of texts has had considerably
more specific implications for the theory of metafiction. A
non-traditional text, for example a programmatically
metafictional novel such as LETTERS, forces the reader to
discover new ways of coming to terms with texts (e.g. Waugh
1984: 91–92). The gimmicks needed for making sense of LET-
TERS are not easily applicable to other texts, however. (Noth-
ing, of course, prevents the reader from willfully misusing them
to make, say, the “genuine” epistolary novels radically new.)
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Not all metafictional novels are dramatically idiosyncratic,
which is why the reader is nowadays likely to have quite a few
tactics under his or her belt with which to approach metafiction.
The many radically non-conforming texts have forced readers
to modify their assumptions about how fiction should be con-
sumed. And readers, being flexible and ingenious, have re-
sponded. Generally, though, metafiction gives readers ad hoc
hints about how to make it through the narrative in question.
This is evident in the case of LETTERS – it is not typical to
consult a peculiarly filled calendar pages interpolated in the
text when reading novels (LETTERS 1, 55, 195, 343, 433, 537,
657 – in toto 769). This is, nevertheless, necessary if one wishes
to grasp the working idea of Barth’s novel, “an old-time epis-
tolary novel by seven fictitious drolls and dreamers each of
which imagines himself factual”.
Prince (1980) has written about sequences of narrative in
which the text can be read as commenting on the ways it should
be read. Prince concentrates on narratorial “reading interludes”,
serving as “indication[s] of how it ostensibly wants to be read
and cue to the kind of program it considers most useful for its
decoding” (1980: 237; see also Dällenbach 1989: 99–100).
The pedagogical function of Gravity’s Rainbow is not, how-
ever, limited to overt narratorial commentary. The didacticism
goes much further: readers are given made-to-order thematic
clues pointing toward what purports to be a sound interpreta-
tion of the novel.
With Pynchon’s work, however, it is necessary to retain a
doubtful attitude toward the novel’s interpretive innuendo.
There is good cause for this skepticism, in part because the
reader never really finds out how the novel works. This has
been amply demonstrated in Pynchon criticism: it is very hard
to come to grips with the novel’s narratology. Studying the
novel in narratological terms, McHale (1992) has analyzed
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the way in which Gravity’s Rainbow tends to betray the mod-
ernist reader’s expectations of reliability and coherence. It
achieves this in part by violating the stability of the depicted
world, violations ranging from subtly foul ontological play to
flagrant contradictions in the novel’s fictional world. Yet it is
relatively easy to read the novel by partly overlooking these
discrepancies. This is the case not least because of Gravity’s
Rainbow’s thematic generosity mentioned already in the in-
troduction. The novel provides a plethora of themes to con-
centrate on, as McHoul and Wills (1990: 33; see also
Kharpetian 1990: 15; Weisenburger 1994: 70) have very per-
suasively observed:
Critics return to the book in terms of its themes. The ‘entropy’
theme, relevant to a number of Pynchon’s texts, has been worked
to death; but many other ‘themes’ present themselves in Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow: death itself, sex, science, religion, art, music.
And in search of a theme, one can always turn to para-
noia: creative, operational or anti-. In fact, Gravity’s Rainbow
does not merely present a smorgasbord of themes – it offers
reading and interpretation as kinds of master themes accord-
ing to which the novel as a thematic whole can purportedly be
structured. LETTERS, by comparison, is structurally open,
despite its multi-layered narrative complexity. Yet the novel
gives no specific interpretive suggestions, at least not thematic
ones. The reader is faced not so much with the dilemma of
reconstructing the narratology of the text, as with the equally
disturbing task of figuring out what to make of it. In other
words, with LETTERS the most compelling question is not
“How does this novel work?” but “How can a novel work like
this?”
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At the heart of my argument lies the paradox of Gravity’s
Rainbow’s seemingly easy thematic interpretation vis-à-vis its
complex narrative structure. I will now undertake to demon-
strate the centrality of the themes of reading and interpretation
in the novel by analyzing metaphors of interpretation in the
narrative.
4.2. Debunking Binaries
A special concern for the themes of reading and interpretation
has been a mainstay in Pynchon criticism. Studies of Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow have frequently commented on the novel’s pecu-
liar sensitivity toward the problematics of sense-making and
understanding. This has led critics to produce broad conclu-
sions:
Reading Pynchon’s novel gives us a renewed sense of how we
have to read the modern world. (Tanner 1982: 77; see also e.g.
Hite 1983: 17-18; Safer 1989: 106)
In other words, the themes of reading and interpretation
in Pynchon’s works have been shown to have implications far
exceeding the scope of the novels. This observation is easy to
agree with. The world-interpretive dimension is visible, for
instance, in the way the problem of historiography is dealt with
in V. and Gravity’s Rainbow, not to mention Mason & Dixon
(see e.g. Putz 1987: 144; Chambers 1992; Foreman 2000: 161–
163). The present reading, however, concentrates merely on
the ways in which the novel as a narrative anticipates or in-
vites certain interpretive strategies, only to undercut them later
on.
The most obvious place to start looking for metaphors of
reading and interpretation in a narrative is the character. Inter-
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pretation abounds in Gravity’s Rainbow, though interpretation
of what and why is not always obvious. The schlemihl-like
yet charismatic Slothrop does his interpreting in the Zone of
postwar Germany. His search for clues leads to only partially
achieved epiphanies about his personal history and a specific
specimen of a German V-2 rocket. The scope of Slothrop’s
interpretive performance is tremendous. At all times he is con-
fronted with choices to make, symbols to understand. The nar-
rator makes Slothrop’s status as interpreter quite explicit:
Those like Slothrop, with the greatest interest in discovering
the truth, were thrown back on dreams, psychic flashes, omens,
cryptographies, drug-epistemologies, all dancing on a ground
of terror, contradiction, absurdity. (GR 583)
A significant addition to Slothrop’s interpretive lot is the
familiar Pynchonian paranoid question: “Is there a conspiracy
surrounding me or am I just delusional?” Other characters are
equally into interpretation. Thus, for example, the rocket en-
gineer Franz Pökler has to deal with the interpretive problem
of the seemingly changing identity of his daughter Ilse, whom
he can meet but once a year. Russian officer/agent Tchitcherine
roams the Zone tracking down his Herero half-brother Enzian
of Bleicheröde, who in turn considers the V-2 rocket a holy
scripture of sorts.
Despite the major characters’ anomalous sensitivity to
reading and interpreting, ludicrously manifest, for instance, in
Slothrop’s capacity to hear quotation marks in speech, they
are far from being the most talented sign-decipherers in the
Zone. The novel is overloaded with hermeneutic freaks: Säure
Bummer, who interprets reefers; the whipscar-reading Miklos
Thanatz; Eddie Pensiero, who interprets shivers. A Gravity’s
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Rainbow character is more likely to be an interpretive oddity
than not; the conclusion is force-fed to the reader.
In her 1980 article “Fiction as Interpretation / Interpreta-
tion as Fiction” Naomi Schor has developed the concept of
interpretant, designating a fictional character who metaphori-
cally reads and interprets the story to which he or she belongs.
The interpretant’s strategies of sense-making would accord-
ing to Schor’s thesis in turn be reflected in those of the inter-
preter, i.e. the actual reader. Lucien Dällenbach (1989: 78–79,
81–86) approaches the character-as-interpreter dilemma in a
similar vein, as an element in his typology of mise-en-abyme.
The characters of Pynchon’s novel are indeed metaphorically
interpreting Gravity’s Rainbow. Frantically, it might be added.
But this conclusion is by itself not sufficient.
With Pynchon, merely acknowledging the characters’ func-
tions as interpretants produces a deficient reading. One also
has to take into account the interrelations of the numerous
interpretants and other elements of the narrative in order to
grasp the presentation of interpretation in the novel more com-
prehensively. Hasty interpretations are to be avoided. To make
a similar point, Dällenbach (1989: 85–86) refers to criticism
of Kafka’s The Trial: in his view, the critics have been too
eager to formulate their interpretations to conform to K’s in-
terpretation of his position. In reading both Kafka and Pynchon,
the reader has to strive for a certain attitude of skeptical de-
tachment to avoid too obvious interpretations.
Hite (1983:13–14) has referred to interpreting characters
as “hermeneuticists” and “critical” characters, functioning “as
analogues to the reader”. Hite (1983: 15) sees the protagonists
of Pynchon’s novels as trapped between binary interpretations,
neither of which seem satisfactory: Slothrop, for example,
“vacillates between paranoia and antiparanoia until he begins
to disintegrate”. I agree with Hite in that Pynchon’s novels do
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not support either pole of these oppositions but instead invite
exploration of the “excluded middles” in between (see also
Kharpetian 1990: 131; Mendelson 1976: 188; Schaub 1981:
15; Slade 1974: 188). In Gravity’s Rainbow, however, the idea
is carried even further. It is the idea of discarding binary think-
ing itself that is placed under suspicion; it is an interpretation
anticipated or internalized by the novel itself. Consequently, it
is only a pseudo-interpretation.
In a similar vein, David Seed (1988: 161-162) has ob-
served that characters “personify different ways of interpret-
ing phenomena, even of interpreting the novel itself, and are
arranged in the narrative so that no single possibility gets un-
conditional authority” (see also ibid. 209; Pütz 1987; Safer
1990; Slade 1974: 177; Schuber 1984: 67–69). Seed is correct
in stating that Pynchon’s novel is constructed in a way that
does not allow the reader to use any of the characters’ inter-
pretations as a vantage-point from which to come to grips with
the novel as a whole. He does not, however, analyze the way
in which Gravity’s Rainbow further underscores the charac-
ters’ critical attempts.
In contrast to Hite and Seed, I argue that Gravity’s Rain-
bow actually does seem to valorize certain strategies of inter-
pretation. To demonstrate how the novel produces this effect,
I will analyze two interpretations overtly personified by the
characters. The interpretive strategies employed by Pynchon’s
characters appear to have very specific implications for the
interpretation of the novel, despite their lack of comprehen-
siveness.
The most obvious and telling example of this is the fun-
damental schism between the behavioral psychologist Edward
Pointsman and statistician Roger Mexico (cf. Weisenburger
1995: 253–254). The well-known problem is the coincidence
of Slothrop’s erotic conquests and the V-2 rocket blasts in
87
London. Pointsman, a stimulus-and-response-oriented Pavlo-
vian, is eager to see a causal relation between the V-2 rockets
and Slothrop’s erections. By contrast, Mexico the statistician
insists on the random distribution of the fall sites and the in-
determinable causality of the phenomenon.
In one of the many memorable scenes of the novel Mexico
pleads for a new perspective on things: “there’s a feeling about
that cause-and-effect may have been taken as far as it will go.
[…] The next great breakthrough may come when we have
the courage to junk cause-and-effect entirely, and strike off at
some other angle.” (GR 89) It is easy to view Mexico as sug-
gesting “strik[ing] off at some other angle” in reading Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow, too. The Mexico-focalized meditation on the
matter strengthens the notion of characters personifying inter-
pretive strategies. In Pavlovian terms:
Roger stares back at the man. The Antimexico. “Ideas of the
opposite” themselves, but on what cortex, what winter hemi-
sphere? What ruinous mosaic, facing outward into the
Waste...outward from the sheltering city...readable only to those
who journey outside...eyes in the distance...barbarians...riders...
(GR 89)
Are we, the readers of the novel, the questionably privi-
leged ones for whom the “ruinous mosaic” is readable? Yes,
in a way we are “eyes in the distance”. We do read Pointsman
and Mexico as personifying opposing views on the novel. This
interpretation is constantly flirted with in the novel. The capa-
bility of dealing with indeterminacy and inhabiting the “gray
area between one and zero” haunts the reader, for example, in
the words of the spirit of Walter Rathenau: “All talk of cause
and effect is secular history, and secular history is a diversion-
ary tactic.” (GR 167). The thematization of an interpretation
deconstructing “ideas of the opposite” is reflected in multiple
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sets of paired characters personifying the alternatives. Exam-
ples of this are, for instance, the difference in view between
Pointsman and other “casual Pavlovian” Dr. Kevin Spectro
(GR 142), the seance including Nazi officials/businessmen and
the mediated spirit of Rathenau, quoted above (GR 167). Here
is yet another interpretive pair, a film-induced discussion be-
tween Franz Pökler the “cause-and-effect man” (GR 159) and
his wife Leni Pökler:
“Not produce,” she tried, “not cause. It all goes along together.
Parallel, not series. Metaphor. Signs and symptoms. Mapping
on to a different coordinate systems, I don’t know […]” She
didn’t know, all she was trying to do is reach.
   But he said: “Try to design anything that way and have it
work.”
   They saw Die Frau am Mond. Franz was amused, conde-
scending. He picked at technical points. [...]
   Leni saw a dream of flight. One of the many possible. Real
flight and dreams of flight go together. Both are the same move-
ment. Not A before B, but all together... (GR 159)
Joseph Slade (1974: 222) finds it odd that the scientifi-
cally adept Pökler does not recognize the implicitly sketched
Theory of Relativity in the words of his wife. This would in-
deed be strange, if Pökler was not, like Pointsman, function-
ing as a sad exemplum of a technocratic scientist, at least in
this scene (see also Tabbi 1995: 118; Cooper 1983: 171). In
my opinion, Leni utters the fundamentals of the faux-didactic
interpretation of “debunked binaries” in the quote above.
Hite (1983: 41) sees Leni’s non-causal view as reflecting
“Pynchon’s narrative strategy in Gravity’s Rainbow”. Thomas
Moore (1987: 278) finds support for Leni’s arguments in Jung’s
concept of synchronicity, which he also considers the govern-
ing structural principle of the whole novel. The hermeneutic
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clues inscribed in the characters’ opinions would serve as re-
curring and partial enunciative mises-en-abyme, referring to
the interpretation of the novel (Dällenbach 1989: 60, 70–71).
In my opinion, Leni’s (and Mexico’s) indeterminacy-approach,
the non-causally-minded way of dealing with interpretive di-
lemmas, is what the novel seduces us into considering a sound
interpretation of the novel, which it definitely is not. Thus, the
overt mises-en-abyme must be judged untrustworthy, or faux-
didactic. Duyfhuizen (1981) comes close to my view by argu-
ing that the novel entices the reader to adopt the causal way of
interpreting the novel itself (Duyfhuizen’s example is
Pointsman’s reading of Slothrop’s map of London). To my
mind, by contrast, the numerous pairs of characters valorize
the non-causal interpretation of phenomena: the strategy of
Mexico, Leni, Spectro, and Rathenau. However, Duyfhuizen
(ibid. 20) is right in concluding that the whole map-yarn is
best understood as a narrative device fulfilling the sole pur-
pose of motivating the “complex picaresque plot” of the novel.
To summarize: interpretation is more than just a recurrent
theme in Gravity’s Rainbow. The novel not only emphasizes
hermeneutic action; it seems to spell out a specific interpreta-
tion. The idea of resisting binary thinking and causal reason-
ing is particularly valorized in the overt juxtapositions of char-
acters’ interpretive strategies and attitudes toward interpreta-
tion. I will be referring to this view as the interpretation of
“debunked binaries”. The validation of creative indeterminacy,
personified by key characters, is made exceedingly clear to
the reader.
It is, however, also an interpretation later deconstructed
by the novel. In the next two sections I will consider how the
novel casts suspicion on this attractive non-oppositional in-
terpretation with the aid of covert metaphors of interpretation.
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In the following cases the interpretants, to use Schor’s termi-
nology, are less aware of their roles as decipherers.
4.3. The Anxiety of Interpretation
Characters in Gravity’s Rainbow are often put inside little para-
bles of interpretation (GR 25). In such cases the characters,
despite their often exceptional abilities, are unable to come to
terms with the “text of the day” (GR 204). This form of meta-
phorical presentation of interpretation comes in two variations:
the character can be somehow unable to perform the required
task of reading and interpreting, or wholly oblivious of it. In
both cases it is from the vantage-point of the reader that the
interpretive metaphor, or mise-en-abyme, is perceived (see Ron
1987: 424). The instances discussed below confirm
Dällenbach’s (1989: 86) observation about readers and char-
acters vis-à-vis mises-en-abyme: “[T]he reception of the fic-
tional mise-en-abyme by the reader is qualitatively superior to
that of the character”. Pynchon’s characters, then, find them-
selves in hermeneutic culs-de-sac that, nevertheless, are in-
formative for the reader.
Slothrop is the most complicated of the many critical char-
acters in the novel. Slothrop’s admirable ability to interpret is
constantly shadowed by his schlemihl’s attitude, however:
Slothrop displays at times a frustrated indifference toward in-
terpretation. The most obvious case of this is near the novel’s
end, when he becomes increasingly unmotivated in his mis-
sion of discovering the secret of the S-Gerät (GR 623–626).
Slothrop, however, also shows signs of hostility or indiffer-
ence toward interpretation much earlier on in the novel:
He gets back to the casino just as big globular raindrops, thick
as honey, begin to splat into giant asterisks on the pavement,
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inviting him to look down at the bottom of the text of day,
where footnotes will explain all. He isn’t about to look. No-
body ever said a day has to be juggled into any kind of sense at
day’s end. He just runs. (GR 204)
Slothrop’s identity as a tragicomically talented interpretant
is presented in condensed form in the Roseland Ballroom-epi-
sode (GR 60–71). Slothrop’s light Sodium Amytal narcosis is
referred to in the novel as the Allied Intelligence’s way of get-
ting in touch with repressed American racial feelings (GR 75).
More important, the disturbingly funny episode of hallucinated
toilet-diving is the scene of powerful and complex metaphors
of interpretation. It illustrates essential problems involved in
reading the novel.
The sediments of excrement in the Roseland Ballroom’s
sewers, “patterns thick with meaning, Burma-Shave signs of
the toilet world, icky and sticky, cryptic and glyptic” (GR 65)
guide Slothrop in his search for his lost harmonica. At first
Slothrop is represented as a sovereign interpreter, finding that
“he can identify certain traces of shit as belonging definitely
to this or that Harvard fellow” and even that “he can, uncan-
nily shit-sensitized now, read old agonies inside poor Dumpster
[Willard], who’d tried suicide last semester” (GR 65).
After a while, however, things get bit more complicated:
At which precise point there comes this godawful surge from
up the line, [...] a jam-packed wavefront of shit, vomit, toilet
paper and dingleberries in mind-boggling mosaic. [...] ...seems
he’s been tumbling ass over teakettle – though there’s no way
to tell in this murky shitstorm, no visual references. [...] It oc-
curs to him he hasn’t felt the touch of a hard wall since he
started to tumble, if that indeed is what he’s doing. (GR 66)
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Slothrop is no longer in control of the situation, but at the
mercy of the “mind-boggling mosaic” of excremental signifi-
cation. The sudden change in Slothrop’s ability to interpret
can be read as reflecting the protagonist’s oscillation between
paranoia and anti-paranoia, pathologies overtly commented on
in the novel. Slothrop’s interpretive achievements are in any
case the object of disarming irony, manifest for example in
Slothrop’s conviction that “negro shit [...] all looks alike” (GR
65). Ironical or not, Slothrop’s futile attempt to understand his
position reflects beautifully the reader’s puzzlement before the
text (see Chambers 1992: 164).
The effect is heightened as the hallucinatory episode shifts
to depicting Slothrop’s journey through the quasi-solipsistic
western-movie world of the “westwardman” Crutchfield and
his sidekick Whappo, inhabited by “one of each of everything”
(GR 67). As if this were not in itself enough to grasp, Slothrop
is faced with a blatant contradiction: the allegedly sparse world
of Crutchfield seems to be swarming with activity. The obser-
vation leads to ontological nitpicking, though with whom is
not made clear. Typical of Gravity’s Rainbow, the passage con-
cludes in an indirect paranoid reference to the dark Them-
agency.
Slothrop is puzzled. Isn’t there supposed to be only one of each?
A. Yes.
Q. Then one Indian girl...
A. One pure Indian. One mestiza. One criolla. Then: one Yaqui.
One Navaho. One Apache...
Q. Wait a minute, there was only one Indian to begin with. The
one that Crutchfield killed.
A. Yes. [...]
Q. Then what about all the others? Boston. London. The ones
that live in cities. Are those people real, or what?
A. Some are, some aren’t.
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Q. Well are the real ones necessary? or unnecessary?
A. It depends what you have in mind.
Q. Shit, I don’t have anything in mind.
A. We do. (GR 70)
The metafictional interlocution manifests Slothrop’s in-
ability to reach a cogent interpretation of the fantasy world of
which he is a part. Obviously, this seems to be in accord with
the reading presented here. Expectedly, though, with Pynchon
there are no clear cases supporting this or that interpretation:
the metaphoric presentation of interpretive problems is inter-
twined with the omnipresent paranoid thematic of the novel.
The dialogue and the whole Sodium Amytal -episode is
multifunctional. On the one hand, it is a relatively isolable (cf.
Ron 1987: 427–429) enunciative mise-en-abyme; on the other,
it is at the mercy of the obsessions of the narrative.
One of the most puzzling sections of Gravity’s Rainbow
is the “Disquieting Structure” episode. It creates an illusion of
pseudo-summary: the action of the novel fades away and some
of the characters gather at a dreamlike or hellish cocktail-party
or “convention” to discuss, among other things, the problems
of interpreting their positions. The whole section is a reader’s
guide in miniature to the novel. Captain Geoffrey “Pirate”
Prentice functions as the reader’s fellow newcomer to the “very
extensive museum, a place of many levels” (GR 537). Prentice
has guided readers before, too: the novel’s beginning is a (sup-
posed) depiction of his nightmare (GR 3–4). Prentice is set
before a difficult interpretive puzzle in approaching the party:
er, excuse me, sir, could you hold this for a moment? thank you
– the joker is gone, leaving Pirate Prentice here, newly arrived
still a bit puzzled with it all, holding one end of a candy clew
whose other end could be anywhere at all...well, he might as
well follow it... [...] well, its labyrinthine path turns out, like
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Route One where it passes through the heart of Providence,
to’ve been set up deliberately to give the stranger a tour of the
city. This taffy trick is standard orientation device here it seems,
for Pirate now and then will cross the path of some other
novice...(GR 537–538)
Prentice’s strategy, granted, cannot be said to be among
the most ingenious ones in the novel. It rather resembles that
of the first-time reader of Gravity’s Rainbow: clinging to what
string of a plot one can. Probably to find, in retrospective, that
sections of the novel seem indeed to be “set up deliberately to
give the stranger a tour”21.
After this Ariadne’s Thread initiation, the outcome of
which is a cumbersome ball of taffy, Pirate is introduced to
the “Committee offices”. The offices reflect conspicuously the
web of the novel’s themes: “A4...IG...OIL
FIRMS...LOBOTOMY...SELF-DEFENSE...HERESY” (GR
538). Pirate is, metaphorically, the reader of the novel: stand-
ing clumsily, sticky ball of puzzled reading in hand before the
plurality of thematic approaches to the novel. The metaphor
of interpretation climaxes in the curiously natural conversa-
tion between Pirate and a previously unknown young woman:
“Naturally you’re seeing this all through a soldier’s eyes,” [...]
“For you it’s all a garden,” he suggests.
“Yes. Perhaps you’re not such a stick after all.”(GR 538)
The juxtaposition of a “soldier’s” or “gardener’s” attitude
in the face of plurality echoes once again the previously
sketched debunked-binaries interpretation. The reader is not
offered anything concrete, however. After the initiation
Prentice, along with the reader, is clearly incapable of coming
to terms either with the situation or with the novel at large.
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Father Rapier’s “Critical Mass” sermon, which follows
Prentice’s introduction to the scene, is a compelling metaphor
of the interpretive situation, including this gloomy view on
the future, and arguably also on the novel itself: “Once the
technical means of control have reached a certain size, a cer-
tain degree of being connected one to another, the chances for
freedom are over for good. The word has ceased to have mean-
ing.” (GR 539.) Rapier’s sermon, once again, functions dou-
bly: As a metaphor of reading and interpreting, it refers to the
difficulty of comprehending the novel. As a rundown of the
novel’s paranoid thematic it suggests that “it is possible that
They won’t die [...] that we die only because They want us to:
because They need our terror for Their survival” (GR 539).
The novel grants the reader a glimpse of potential meta-level
understanding, at the same time continuing to weave its web
of unclear paranoid allusions, effectively discouraging the
reader in the search for definite interpretive clues.
The problematic of summarizing is also presented in the
hallucinatory episode. Prentice asks a nearby double agent for
a “sort of a sitrep on all of this”. The response certainly is
analogous to the reader’s frustrating experience of trying to
understand the novel: “Geoffrey, by the time you get any sum-
mary, the whole thing will have changed. We could shorten
them for you as much as you like, but you’d be losing so much
resolution it wouldn’t be worth it, really it wouldn’t.” (GR
540–541.) The problems of summary and a holistic view of
things, metaphorically on Gravity’s Rainbow itself, are recur-
rent in the novel, and will be considered at length in the next
section.
The Disquieting Structure -episode does not let the reader
draw conclusions about how to interpret Gravity’s Rainbow.
At the same time, it forces the reader to draw conclusions about
what it is to interpret the novel. Reading Gravity’s Rainbow is
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random orientation within the “labyrinthine paths” of narra-
tive, juxtaposed with dubious thematic abstractions and para-
noia, with no hope of a reliable “sitrep” on anything, least of
all the novel itself.
4.4. Structural Metaphors of Interpretation
In this section I will concentrate on metaphors of interpreta-
tion embedded in the narrative that are not directly linked to
characters’ actions or thoughts. The characters are involved in
interpretive situations similar in principle to those in the pre-
vious section. In the following examples, however, the char-
acters function increasingly like parts in a puzzle and not as
individual hermeneuticists. This difference in degree warrants
reference to the examples as structural metaphors of interpre-
tation. These instances cut across Dällenbach’s (1989: 75, 94–
98) typology: on the one hand, they are enunciative mises-en-
abyme, representing the interpretive burden of the reader, while
on the other, they are textual mises-en-abyme, reflecting the
structure of the novel. In this respect, the complex mises-en-
abyme in Gravity’s Rainbow succinctly illustrate the frustrat-
ing fact that the presented typologies of embedded narrative
mirror-structures do not seem to be helpful in the analysis of
actual cases. Dällenbach’s categories, for instance, provide only
a very general typology with which to approach mise-en-abyme
structures. This does not affect the value of mise-en-abyme as
an interpretive concept, however.
Gravity’s Rainbow presents interpretation as a complicated
issue in these embedded metaphors, often resulting in perpetual
hermeneutic confusion. Needless to say, this is in sharp con-
trast to the relatively simple interpretive options overtly per-
sonified by the characters. This reading supports Moshe Ron’s
more general remark (following Jean Ricardou and Dällenbach)
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about the functioning of mise-en-abyme: “mise-an-abyme al-
ways ironically subverts the representational intent of the nar-
rative text, disrupting where the text aspires to integration,
integrating where the text is deliberately fragmentary” (Ron
1987: 434; also Nelles 1997: 145).
Berressem (1993: 8) has analyzed the representation of
Slothrop’s desk, according to the narrator a “godawful mess”
(GR 18), as an “architectural blueprint for the book” (cf. Cham-
bers 1991; Siegel 1978: 23). It is easy to agree with Berressem:
Slothrop’s desk is indeed a telling example of the many in-
stances of textual mise-en-abyme, mirroring the structure of
the novel. Slothrop’s seemingly chaotic, yet, according to
Berressem, rigorously organized desk does not serve solely as
a map of the novel, however. It is also apt to elicit a particular
strategy of reading, a strategy many critics have called “para-
noid reading” (e.g. McHale 1992: 81–82; Moore 1987: 30;
Siegel 1978; Tabbi 1995: 122). Thus, the desk functions both
as a textual mise-en-abyme and as a potential enunciative mise-
en-abyme. While the representation of the messy desk does
nothing to corroborate simple thematic interpretations of the
novel, it does not go to the other extreme, either. It is not a
grim celebration of the impossibility of understanding the text;
it invites the reader to search for connections and correspond-
ences, however “Kute” they may be. This represents well the
novel’s implicit attitude toward hermeneutic activity; while
the novel continuously frustrates interpretive attempts, it does
not seek to extinguish the reader’s will to understand.
A hilarious example of figural embedded interpretation is
set in the second part of the novel, “Un Perm’ au Casino
Hermann Goering”, where at a party Slothrop organizes the
drinking-game “Prince”. The simplicity of the game can be
assessed from the way Slothrop explains it to Sir Stephen
Dodson-Truck, a sympathetic agent of the They-system:
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 “[E]verybody takes a number, a-and you start off the Prince of
Wales has lost his tails, no offense now, the numbers going
clockwise from that Prince, or whatever number he wants to
call out actually, he, that’s the Prince, six or anything, see, you
pick a Prince first, he starts it off, then that number two, or
whoever that Prince called, sez, but first he goes, the Prince
does, Wales, tails, two, sir” [...]
   “Yes yes but –” giving Slothrop the most odd look, “I mean
I’m not quite sure I really see, you know, the point to it all.
How does one win?”
   Ha! How does one win, indeed. “One doesn’t win,” easing
into it, thinking of Tantivy, one small impromptu counter-con-
spiracy here, “one loses. One by one. Whoever’s left is the win-
ner.” (GR 212)
The game is a seemingly innocent example of the slap-
stick fun that Pynchon is famous for, complete with ludicrous
features such as impromptu songs, a tub filled with ice, and
champagne in beer mugs. It serves, however, many purposes:
on the story-level it is for Slothrop a means of getting infor-
mation about the conspiracy he is starting to perceive around
himself (GR 214). It also provides an opportunity for getting
back at the system in some marginal way, by way of harassing
Dodson-Truck. In terms of narrative suspense, the game is a
climactic point, after which Slothrop for a short period seems
to be in control of his own life. As a metaphor of interpreta-
tion, the game is a sign of things to come, representing the
difficulty of fathoming the novel.
The metaphorical functioning of “Prince” becomes in-
creasingly evident as the game progresses: “The game has
switched to Rotating Prince, where each number called out
immediately becomes Prince, and all numbers shift accord-
ingly. By this time it is impossible to tell who is making mis-
takes and who isn’t. Arguments arise.” (GR 213) The last time
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the narrator refers to the game it is “difficult to locate any
more” (GR 214). Rotating Prince is a dramatized reading and
interpretation of Gravity’s Rainbow. The Pynchon industry has,
of course, been immersed in a session of the game for three
decades (see 9.2).
The difficulty of finding a satisfying interpretation of the
novel is also metaphorically present in the discussion of the
song “Sold On Suicide”. The song repudiates the value of eve-
rything the world has to offer, save the act of suicide. Accord-
ing to the narratorial commentary,
The trouble [...] is that by Gödel’s theorem there is bound to be
some item around that one has omitted from the list, and such
an item is not easy to think of off the top of one’s head, so that
what one does most likely is go back over the whole thing,
meantime correcting mistakes and inevitable repetitions, and
putting in new items that will surely have occurred to one, and
– well, it’s easy to see that the “suicide” of the title might have
to be postponed indefinitely! (GR 320)
In wanting to be absolutely sure that there is nothing posi-
tive to be said about the world, the singer bent on self-annihi-
lation is engaged in a perpetual game of Rotating Prince. The
position is reminiscent of that of the faithful interpreter of the
novel: trying to find a plot that would make sense, struggling
to come across a thematic structure to survive with – only to
find the novel once again debunking the whole enterprise.
The Gödel’s theorem of indeterminacy mentioned in the
quote above appears in yet another embedded metaphor of
comprehension, in the episode in which Pointsman, along with
his personnel, spend Whitsun by the sea. In the scene Pointsman
is hallucinating, hearing voices, and consequently acting
strangely, which causes concern in the company. Jessica
Swanlake, Mexico’s part-time girlfriend, retreats into “kind
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of a protective paralysis” (GR 275), imitating the terrified Fay
Wray in King Kong. The narrator uses this as a point of depar-
ture, immersing the reader in the following:
“Yeah well,” as film critic Mitchell Prettyplace puts it in his
definitive 18-volume study of King Kong, “you know, he did
love her, folks.” Proceeding from this thesis, it appears that
Prettyplace has left nothing out, every shot including out-takes
raked through for every last bit of symbolism, exhaustive biog-
raphies of everyone connected with the film [...]...even inter-
views with the King Kong Kultists, who to be eligible for mem-
bership must have seen the movie at least 100 times and be
prepared to pass an 8-hour entrance exam...And yet, and yet:
there is Murphy’s Law to consider, that brash Irish proletarian
restatement of Gödel’s Theorem – when everything has been
taken care of, when nothing can go wrong, or even surprise
us...something will. (GR 275)
The narrator’s escapade results in a terrifying sequence
that includes narratorial reductions, paranoia, thematic con-
densing, questioning of narrative conventions – and metaphors
of interpretation. Prettyplace’s massive study is a metaphor of
an attempt to give a comprehensive interpretation of anything,
including the novel itself. It also gives a flagrantly parodic
view of criticism, in a way anticipating today’s Thomas
Pynchon Kultists (cf. Moore 1987: 38). The narrator then pro-
ceeds to propound an ironic interpretation based on Murphy’s
Law of another attempt at a totalizing interpretation, Briga-
dier Pudding’s frustrated mammoth work Things That Can
Happen In European Politics. In Pudding’s combinatorial
analysis the “permutations ’n’ combinations” for 1931 “don’t
give Hitler an outside chance” (GR 275). Earlier on in the
novel Pudding complains: “[n]ever make it, [...] it’s changing
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out from under me” (GR 77), as developments in history in-
evitably preempt his work.
The sheer impossibility of a reliable summary and over-
view of the novel as a whole is a fact which the reader faces in
interpretation. That is, if one insists on some kind of coher-
ence – as most readers still do. The insurmountable difficul-
ties involved in summarizing the novel are delightfully illus-
trated in the (pseudo)summary presented by McHoul and Wills
(1990: 23–31), which, ironically, is one of the best summaries
of Gravity’s Rainbow that I have seen.
4.5. Leveling Interpretation
In what follows, I will analyze some instances of interpretive
metaphors with respect to narrative levels. First an inevitably
dubious summary of the findings so far. The argument has
been that Gravity’s Rainbow functions as a faux-didactic novel
by thematizing interpretation and offering the reader interpre-
tive strategies. This is fairly obvious in the overt presentation
of reading and interpretation as recurring themes on the story
level. In the covert mode, the reader is given clues concerning
the interpretation of the whole work in the form of numerous
allegories or metaphors of reading and interpretation embed-
ded in the narration. Both the thematization and the more im-
plicit yet abundant metaphoric presentation of reading and in-
terpretation foreground them as governing themes in Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow.
The novel was found to represent reading and interpreta-
tion metaphorically in three principal ways:
1) by attributing interpretive strategies to certain charac-
ters, making them perform as surrogate readers or
interpretants of the novel,
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2) by having the characters face interpretive dilemmas that
function as metaphors of the reading and interpreting of
Gravity’s Rainbow itself, and
3) by making elements of narrative function as embedded
metaphors or mises-en-abyme of reading and interpreta-
tion of the novel.
The first of these ways of incorporating interpretation into
the novel seemed to guide the reader in a very specific way.
The novel’s characters were shown to personify opposing views
of interpretation, together pointing toward an interpretation of
debunked binaries. This reading was to some degree reflected
in the embedded metaphoric presentation of interpreting the
novel. In general, however, the embedded mises-en-abyme of
interpretation did not offer any single interpretation, but quite
the opposite. At the heart of these structural metaphors of in-
terpretation was the infinite complexity of reading and inter-
preting in general, including interpreting Gravity’s Rainbow.
The interpretive mises-en-abyme do not warrant a simple the-
matic reading of the novel, but instead function as embedded
warnings against it.
As has become evident in the course of the previous chap-
ter, Gravity’s Rainbow, like all of Pynchon’s novels, can justi-
fiably be read as parodying narrative conventions of all sorts
(cf. e.g. Moore 1987: 44). Thus, the narrator of Gravity’s Rain-
bow performs daunting ventriloquist stunts in shifting focalizer,
mood, and genre with fluidity and ease – only to betray its
craft with far-fetched puns and subtle and gross violations of
the established conventions of narration. In particular it was
demonstrated that with Gravity’s Rainbow, the idea of deter-
minable or fixed narrative levels is an emphatically suspect
concept. Nevertheless, I would argue that provisionally insist-
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ing on the relatively strict division of labor between the narra-
tor and the implied author gives an insight into the dilemma of
the metaphorical presentation of interpretation.
The category of the narrator is a relatively simple one: the
narrator tells the story, and it is the narrator’s voice that the
narratee “hears” (see Nelles 1997: 9–10). This is true for Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow, too – however the novel stretches the possibili-
ties of the concepts. The narrating agent, in addition to being a
flexible mouthpiece, has to be considered severely unreliable.
I would argue that the overt thematization of a specific inter-
pretation in Gravity’s Rainbow should be attributed to the do-
main of the narrator. In other words: the faux-didactic nature
proposed for the novel is a feature of the agent telling the story.
In some ways, this is quite obvious. The fact that the reader is
able to perceive, with Seed (1988: 161–162, 209), that the
characters personify different yet equally incomprehensive
interpretive strategies is a tell-tale sign of this. But this con-
clusion is not enough. The fact that the so-called debunked-
binaries interpretation has become suspect in the light of the
metaphors of interpretation embedded in the narrative demands
a more sweeping argument. In addition, an interpretation in-
duced from the juxtaposition of characters’ differing interpre-
tive strategies has to be part of the narrator’s faux-didactic
scheme. It is possible to find ample support for an argument
against the debunked binaries interpretation, as has been shown.
The category of the implied author is, in my view, follow-
ing Chatman (e.g. 1990: 86; also Nelles 1997: 12; O’Neill
1994: 69–70; cf. Genette 1988: 145; Walsh 1997), best under-
stood as a function of the text inferred by the reader (see chap-
ter 7). What makes the function of the implied author crucial
in interpreting a novel like Gravity’s Rainbow is the previ-
ously mentioned complexity and unreliability of the narrating
agent – at times blatant, at times cunningly inconspicuous. It
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is the implied author which makes the narrator contradict it-
self so that whole sections of the narrated story becomes dubi-
ous, which often happens in the novel (see McHale 1992). It
is the implied author, again, which makes it possible to per-
ceive discrepancies in narration (cf. Hohmann 1986: 29, 31).
It is the implied author that we turn to in our puzzlement when
the narrator attributes wrong linguistic traits or bits of knowl-
edge to a character. And, finally, it is the implied author that
we turn to when the narrator seems too eager in its interpre-
tive instructiveness.
According to this interpretation, the narratee of Gravity’s
Rainbow is the prime target of the narrator’s didactic plotting,
while the implied author shares a significant wink with the
implied reader (cf. Tammi 1992: 124). The narrator serves its
narratee (and at least some readers of Gravity’s Rainbow as
well, in the process) with a seemingly cogent yet deficient in-
terpretation; the implied author invites readers not to be con-
tent with it.
Of course, it is also possible to approach the problem from
the other end of fictional communication. Eco’s concept of
Model Reader furnishes us with an alternative way of describ-
ing the novel’s dual strategy of faux-didacticism. According
to Eco (1979: 11), the Model Reader is inscribed in the work
itself, “a textually established set of felicity conditions […] to
be met in order to have a macro-speech act (such as a text is)
fully actualized”. In these terms, it is possible to interpret Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow as postulating two kinds of readers: a naïve reader,
on the one hand, ready to accept the novel’s thematic faux-
didacticism; and a critical reader, on the other, perceptible to
the novel’s implicit structural strategies against it. Ultimately,
it seems to be a matter of choice (and expositional elegance)
whether the capacity of sober interpretation of Pynchon’s novel
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should be allotted to the implied author, or to the reader-func-
tion ideally capable of deciphering the novel’s devious plots.
Having said all this, how should the thematic and meta-
phoric presentation of interpretation in Gravity’s Rainbow be
interpreted? The interpretive over-determination of Gravity’s
Rainbow, implicit and explicit, specific and vague, narratorial
and implied-authorial, entices the reader into exploring the
cultural notion of interpretation as such. Theoretically, this
aspect of the novel raises questions about the relations of nar-
rative structures and themes. In complex narratives like
Pynchon’s, the easily perceived thematic is often implicitly
undermined or even falsified by the intricateness of narrative.
This can in part explain the familiar suspicion that Pynchon
entertains himself by mocking his readers. But only in part;
again, the uneasy feeling of having been had persists.
In order to analyze a situation such as this – the suspicion
that even the implied author might somehow be unreliable –
Patrick O’Neill (1994: 70; cf. Prince 2001: 43) has introduced
the term implied implied author. There is, ostensibly, a hierar-
chy of implied authors just as there is a hierarchy of narrators.
To my mind, this concept calls for Ockham’s attention, at least
in the case of Pynchon. While the above analysis and interpre-
tation only partially convince a suspicious reader and leave
ample room for puzzling questions about the meaning of it all,
stipulating yet another abstract agency above the implied au-
thor hardly solves the problem (see chapter 7 for further dis-
cussion of the implied author). Instead, it is enough to proceed
on the path of anthropomorphizing, and ponder, though per-
haps not in so many words, what the implied author might
have had in mind. Or one can turn to Booth’s concept of ca-
reer author, the composite image of the author as presented in
his or her other works. In the case of Pynchon this works ef-
fectively: the reader is in all probability familiar with both
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Pynchon’s strange public image and the peculiarity of his fic-
tions. As a result, it is easy to imagine a sardonic, tall, slightly
bucktoothed author in the wings, perhaps paring his finger-
nails in a Joycean manner, making an ass of yet another gulli-
ble reader.
Reference to the concepts of implied author and narrative
levels does not offer a satisfactory interpretation for the novel,
while it might make the readers abandon some of the most
obvious thematic interpretations. The fact that the novel else-
where both blatantly and subtly parodies narrative conventions
and, consequently, concepts of narrative theory makes it diffi-
cult to rely wholeheartedly on the findings of the narratological
analysis. While to a certain extent the narrative structure of
Gravity’s Rainbow responds well to narratological scrutiny,
the novel’s tendency to anticipate and preempt various ana-
lytical and interpretive approaches should be borne in mind.
The explicit and implicit presence of interpretation in its vari-
ous guises gives the novel a distinctive feeling of interpretive
overdetermination. This, in turn, makes the actual making sense
of the novel the notoriously difficult task Pynchon-criticism
has invariably stressed. I enjoy the aesthetic effect this para-
dox produces in me, however unable I am to analyze or ex-
plain it.
The reader does not need to be satisfied with interpreting
the novel even at this level, however. It is possible to question
the overabundance of the interpretive thematic as such. In-
deed, the mere bulk of interpretation-related material on any
narrative level makes any interpretation look redundant. The
thematic of reading and interpretation become the object of a
meta- or anti-interpretation, the nature of which one can only
guess at.
To conclude, I will turn to one more embedded metaphor
of interpretation in Gravity’s Rainbow. Scattered throughout
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the novel’s first 300 pages are five “Proverbs for Paranoids”.
The narrator cites these (apparently well-known) proverbs in
conjunction with the developments of Slothrop’s quest. As
such, they function as narratorial abstractions of the novel’s
themes. Needless to say, they serve also as metaphors of the
interpretive dilemmas of the novel. Proverb three, in particu-
lar, speaks volumes about the novel’s faux-didactic function-
ing:
Proverbs for Paranoids, 3: If they get you asking the wrong
questions, they don’t have to worry about the answers. (GR
251)
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5. Cognitive Narratology: Narrative
as Experientiality
The preceding two chapters sought to analyze some of the
concepts of structuralist narratology in the extreme narrative
circumstances of Gravity’s Rainbow. Both discussions dem-
onstrated that narratological models provide useful tools for
the description of the novel. However, more interestingly, it
became equally clear that narratology is hopelessly incapable
of coming to terms with the more adventurous characteristics
of Pynchon’s narrative. While Gravity’s Rainbow quickly
makes the structuralist impulse of categorization appear ri-
diculous, the effect is not one of dismal frustration but rather
of creative anxiety. In other words, Pynchon transgresses and
plays with narrative conventions in aesthetically interesting
ways. This is an encouraging observation: it invites more analy-
sis. In the course of this and the following chapter, I will turn
to assessing the theoretical and practical input of cognitive
narratology. The present discussion comprises a theoretical
commentary on certain aspects of Monika Fludernik’s Natu-
ral Narratology. Chapter 6, in turn, exposes Fludernik’s ac-
count to the practical narratologies of Gravity’s Rainbow.
Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (1996) marks the first,
and to date only, attempt to construct a comprehensive
narratological theory within the framework of cognitive sci-
ence. Somewhat anachronistically, however, the conclusions
of Fludernik’s earlier monograph on free indirect discourse
(1993) were already built on the ideas more explicitly devel-
oped in the latter study. Fludernik (1996) bases her narratology
on a wide theoretical substructure: the theory of cognitive
frames (or schemata), the prototype theory of cognitive lin-
guistics, and the so-called natural linguistics of Wolfgang
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Dressler. In addition, previous narratological theories are taken
into account in Fludernik’s theory, and not only to illustrate
their shortcomings.
For present purposes, the relationship between the tradi-
tional narratological models and Fludernik’s narratology is of
the utmost importance. Since Fludernik’s project serves in this
study as the primary example of cognitive narratology, and in
order to provide some theoretical basis for the more practical
assessment of Natural Narratology in the next chapter, I will
in what follows comment on the similarities and divergences
between structuralist narratology and its Natural counterpart.
Three issues are most in need of explication: the Natural in-
terpretation of narrativity, Fludernik’s account of focalization,
and her distinction between theoretical and illusionistic analysis
of narrative.
Fludernik does not aim low: the goal of her theory is not
only to provide novel interpretations or categorizations of types
and features of narrative literature. Instead, true to its cognitivist
affiliations, Natural Narratology seeks to explain narrativity.
Fludernik’s explanation of narrative is based on the basic func-
tions of human cognition; on the most fundamental level, read-
ing and interpreting rely on natural cognitive parameters
(Fludernik 1996: 12, 17). In this respect, Natural Narratology
is intimately tied to theories of cognition, in particular to the
concept of cognitive frames. Fludernik’s theory has received a
fair amount of attention among literary scholars; the reader
might do well to consult some of the review articles of both
Fludernik’s study of free indirect discourse (1993), and To-
wards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (Herman 2000, Jahn 1994; see
also Kearns 1999: 31).
Essentially, Natural Narratology entails a theory of narra-
tive that involves the dynamic interplay of four cognitive lev-
els. In the order of cognitive fundamentality: Level I consists
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of the “axiomatic natural parameters of real-life experience”
(Fludernik 1996: 43). These form the basic cognitive sche-
mata to be utilized in the interpretation of texts as well as prac-
tically everything else we do. Level II is occupied by four “ex-
planatory schemas of access to the story” (ibid.): TELLING, VIEW-
ING, EXPERIENCING, and ACTION (or ACTING). In other words,
these are the principal varieties of mediation in a natural nar-
rative situation. Level III includes “well-known naturally oc-
curring story-telling situations” (ibid. 44), that is, information
about the typical features of narratives, the characteristics of
genres and the like. The information on level III is, however,
still schematic and functions in a non-reflective manner; the
reader is not conscious of the schematic structures of informa-
tion. Level IV constitutes an “all-embracing dynamic process
engendered by the reading process”. Narrativization22 is
Fludernik’s concept for this procedure whereby readers “uti-
lize conceptual categories from levels I to III in order to grasp
[...] textual irregularities and oddities”. This process is con-
scious: the reader is actively seeking to make the text sensible
by attributing it to familiar narrative situations. (Ibid. 45.)
In reading actual texts, then, readers narrativize with ref-
erence to various cognitive frames depending on what kind of
experientiality is represented in the text. Hence, prototypically,
if a narrative’s ruling consciousness, and thus mediated expe-
rience, is that of a protagonist, the EXPERIENCING frame is
adopted. If, by contrast, a narrative is constituted by the con-
sciousness of the narrator persona, the TELLING (or REFLECT-
ING, in the case of self-reflexive narratives) frame is utilized.
Finally, should the narrative portray neither a teller nor a char-
acter as a central consciousness, but merely evoke an illusion
of vision, the reader resorts to the VIEWING frame. (Fludernik
1996: 50.) The schema of ACTION is used when confronted
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with “texts that are highly inconsistent […] to tease out a rudi-
mentary sense in story-referential terms” (ibid. 44).
Fludernik’s tactic of anchoring the process of
narrativization in the foregrounded consciousness in the texts
reflects her view of narrativity23. In stark contrast to traditional
narratological views, Natural narrativity relies on
experientiality mediated by the text, instead of the represented
event structure (story, fabula). Any text that evokes an experi-
encing consciousness – the narrator’s, protagonist’s, or view-
er’s – is a narrative, regardless of its formal or contentual
makeup. (Fludernik 1996: e.g. 26–30.) As a result, the range
of potential object texts of Fludernik’s theory differs some-
what from that of structuralist, story-oriented, narratology:
Natural Narratology, surprisingly, can justifiably study expe-
riential lyric poetry, but cannot consider purely reportative texts
such as historiography as narratives in the strictest sense
(Fludernik 1996: 28, 328–329)24.
The strength of Fludernik’s conception lies in its flexibil-
ity. The process of narrativization is powerful enough to make
readers comprehend many kinds of spoken and written texts
by attributing them to familiar, basic narrative situations that
are recuperable in terms of the cognitive parameters of natural
storytelling. Even postmodernist experimental texts are to some
extent narrativizable within Natural Narratology. For instance,
the extreme self-reflexivity of Barth, Sukenick, or Federman
can be narrativized with reference to the frame of REFLECTING
(Fludernik 1996: 275–278). Similarly, texts that seem formally
non-narrative, such as those utilizing a question-and-answer
format, can sometimes be narrativized by reading “against the
grain of the text” (ibid. 288), and thereby reconstructing a story
(the frame of ACTION), or a ruling consciousness (the frame of
EXPERIENCING) for the text. (Fludernik 1996: 288–294.)
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However, Fludernik considers the most radical modernist
and postmodernist experiments as only partially accountable
within the framework of Natural Narratology; for instance,
texts that involve a montage of highly incompatible parts, such
as Richard Brautigan’s Trout Fishing In America. Extreme
narrative experimentation resists narrativization in numerous
ways:
Narratives [such as these are] no longer recuperable as the con-
sciousness of a narrator figure because the juxtaposed material
[is] too heterogeneous either stylistically or thematically to
warrant integration as part of a verisimilar stream of conscious-
ness. These texts therefore constitute a limit-case of
narrativization where the unification of disparate material be-
comes impossible: neither story and/or common situation nor a
group of consistent characters, nor even a consistent narratorial
voice can be projected from ‘stories’ like [these]. (Fludernik
1996: 287–288.)
The most challenging and non-narrativizable texts are for
Fludernik (1996: 294) the instances of “hermetic writing” that
aspire to transform literature into instances of non-referential
linguistic sound-stream. Certain texts by Samuel Beckett and
Gertrude Stein, for instance, evoke “no setting, no dramatis
personae, no minds, no speakers. Language exists in and of
itself, disjoined from its referential anchorings, free-floating
in proper Derridean fashion” (ibid. 302). Natural Narratology,
therefore, cannot describe or explain all literary experimenta-
tion; Fludernik’s model, based as it is on the cognitive param-
eters of natural storytelling, cannot describe experimental writ-
ing that is no longer attributable to any version of real-life
experientiality25. Fludernik is quick to acknowledge this. To
point beyond her account of narratology, Fludernik (1996: 305,
314–315) refers to Gibson’s (1996) previously discussed
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postmodern narrative theory as a potential extension of Natu-
ral Narratology, “build[ing] from postmodernist reading and
writing strategies that complement and transcend real-world
parameters”.
From a more traditional point of view, Fludernik’s discus-
sion of the modernist and postmodernist limit-cases of Natu-
ral Narratology reveals that in extreme cases the traditional,
story-oriented definition of narrative seems to work better than
one based on mediated experience. This is Fludernik on what
happens should no ruling consciousness be reflected in a text:
When narrativization breaks down […], it does so where the
consciousness factor can no longer be utilized to tide over radi-
cal inconsistency, and this happens first and foremost where
overall textual coherence or micro-level linguistic coherence
(and cohesion) are at risk. Where texts have turned into a jum-
ble of words [,] or where sentences are internally discontinu-
ous or cohesively non-alignable in their sequence,
narrativization is seriously impaired […]. (Fludernik 1996: 317.)
This seems clear-cut enough. It should be noted, however,
that the experiential definition also fails to provide grounds
for narrativization in less extreme cases. For instance, in her
discussion of experiments with question-and-answer format,
she frequently considers an underlying story the basis for
narrativization and thus the ultimate indication of narrativity26.
This is manifest in Fludernik’s (1996: 288–290) interpreta-
tions of the ‘Ithaca’-episode of Ulysses and Jack Matthew’s
“Questionnaire for Rudolph Gordon”, in which the reader
“reads a story where there is none” by reconstructing the events
with the aid of the clues provided in a question-and-answer or
questionnaire format. For Fludernik (ibid.) “the questions re-
veal potential story matter much on the presuppositional lines
of the notorious When did you stop hitting your wife?” In other
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words, the experience of the reflected consciousness no longer
establishes narrativity but, instead, a sequence of events in-
ferred by the reader (cf. Fludernik 1996: 30). To demonstrate
the applicability of Natural Narratology even to these texts,
Fludernik prefers to emphasize the experiential characteris-
tics implicit in them. For instance, she proposes that the “Ques-
tionnaire for Rudolph Gordon” is primarily interpreted by “in-
venting a disturbed and guilty mind for Rudolph Gordon […]”
and hence the piece is “narrativized in terms of a ruling con-
sciousness, and only secondarily in terms of ‘story’ material”
(ibid. 290). It might well be the other way round, but this is
not important; regardless of which of the narrativizing tech-
niques is considered primary, both remain indispensable for a
narrative understanding of the text. The “understanding---as-
narrative” of a question-and-answer text is not merely the re-
sult of perceiving an experiencing consciousness in a text. The
traditional story-oriented view of narrative creeps in to aug-
ment Natural Narratology when texts present insurmountable
problems for the experiential model. The traditional account
of narrativity, while not rooted in cognitive parameters, has no
trouble in describing narratives that do not represent an expe-
riencing consciousness but nevertheless tell a story.
Hence, when faced with radically experimental texts, read-
ers cannot rely on cognitive parameters of natural narrativity
but, instead, are forced to seek interpretive frames from other
conceptions of textual comprehension. The most pressing ques-
tion is, of course, how this supposed shift in readers’
narrativizing strategies should be reflected on the level of tex-
tual analysis and theory. As mentioned above, in addition to
the traditional event-sequence model, one can conceivably turn
to poststructuralist theories of narrative or other re-concep-
tions of narrativity as complements or replacements for Natu-
ral Narratology (cf. Ryan 1991: 266–267). Chapter 9 of this
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study tentatively offers one such complement by discussing
game as a literary-critical concept.
What is the relationship between Natural Narratology and
structuralist models with respect to the tools of textual analy-
sis? As has been discussed above (2.2), cognitive narratologies
tend to apply a holistic “top-down” strategy in narrative de-
scription, as opposed to the word-smitten “bottom-up” strat-
egy of traditional narratology. Ambitiously, Fludernik ap-
proaches narratology from both directions. In addition to pro-
viding the natural frames of narrative understanding, Natural
Narratology seeks to subsume and reorganize the traditional
concepts of narrative analysis. Apparently, all questions pre-
viously answered by narratology can be answered within the
framework of Natural Narratology. Moreover, the answers
come with a backbone provided by cognitive science. And, as
if this was not enough, in addition to providing a better de-
scription of narrative in a given historical situation, Natural
Narratology has a diachronic dimension:
What the present model therefore attempts to do is to rescue
diachronic considerations for the study of narrative [by]
establish[ing] a theoretical framework which transforms the
standard narratological paradigms into prototypical special
cases which can be extended in radial fashion. […] The para-
mount use of this model, besides that of ‘explaining’ narrative
situations as cognitively relevant categories, would therefore
lie in its ability to trace the development of new narrative types,
tracing, that is, the active deployment of cognitive strategies
which are based on cognitive schemata drawn form real-world
experience and prior textual and generic models. (Fludernik
1996: 51–52.)
The continuity between Natural Narratology and traditional
narratology is mainly the result of Fludernik’s adoption of F.K.
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Stanzel’s (1984) typology of narrative situations. Hence,
Stanzel’s three principal modes of narrative – teller, first-per-
son and figural – more or less correspond to the prototypical
narrative situations of Natural Narratology, which in turn are
“metaphorical applications of typical real-world strategies of
sense-making” (Fludernik 1996: 51; see also Jahn 1997: 442).
Building on Stanzel’s distinctions, Fludernik considers narra-
tor an optional function of narrative: according to Fludernik,
the analysis of pure reflector-narrative does not require the
stipulation of an underlying narrator (see also Fludernik 2001a;
cf. Nelles 1997; Ryan 199127). In this respect, Natural
Narratology links with yet another narratological predecessor,
namely Ann Banfield’s (1982) controversial account of the
“unspeakable sentences” of fiction. Thus, Natural Narratology
appears to be at least somewhat malleable in terms of the in-
clusion of previous models of analysis. Fludernik (ibid. 330)
seeks to provide support for this conclusion by observing that
“the many useful conceptual tools made available by Genette
and others […] are especially relevant to the fine-tuning of the
model”. Fludernik’s conception of narrative does not, how-
ever, manage to incorporate the analytical concepts of “Genette
and others” to a significant extent. None of the central con-
cepts of structuralist narratology are welcomed without sub-
stantial modifications to the analytical toolkit of Natural
Narratology (Fludernik 1996: 343–344).
The differences and similarities between Natural
Narratology and its structuralist predecessors are interwoven
most tightly in the questions of voice and focalization. The
principal difference is that Natural Narratology, despite pro-
viding some analytical concepts, is essentially a “top-down”
model. For Fludernik, the most important feature of a text (or,
more appropriately, of the reading process) is the interpretive
frame it prompts the reader to adopt. According to Fludernik,
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the general-narrative situation of a given text and, consequently,
the utilized interpretive frame define the perspectival charac-
teristics of a text. Once the reader reaches an initial conclu-
sion about the overall nature of the narrative, the minutiae of
focalization automatically fall into their places. As a result,
the categories of the Genettean typology of focalization are
superfluous in terms of the interpretive frames of Natural
Narratology; Fludernik’s (1996: 346) model salvages only two
parameters from previous models of focalization:
– Viewpoint: external / internal (‘objective’ vs. experien-
tial focalization).
– Access to internality: a scale ranging from no access to
complete access to another’s consciousness.
Moreover, the internality-scale is applicable only to
teller-mode, or externally (in Fludernik’s sense, not in
Genette’s) focalized, narratives. Internally focalized narratives
are necessarily limited because a “realistically conceived teller
(first-person) cannot read others’ minds” (Fludernik 1996:
346). The minimalism of Fludernik’s typology is, again, the
result of her contention that the perspectival qualities of nar-
ratives are less varied than Genette’s model presupposes (cf.
Fludernik 2001c: 103; Prince 2001: 45):
A first-person narrator’s presentation of her own story is usu-
ally fairly consistent and slippages are motivated by suspense,
part of the narratorial rhetoric […] rather than indicative of a
change in focalization. [F]ocalization ties in with frame, as
Stanzel has already proposed for his narrative situations. TELL-
ING frames and ACTION frames afford some kinds of
focalizations, VIEWING frames quite different kinds of
focalization. (Fludernik 1996: 345.)
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Extrapolating from this reasoning, the macro-perspectival
options in Natural Narratology are the following:
– first-person narrator option (Stanzel’s first-person nar-
rative situation; Genette’s fixed internal focalization or
prefocalization),
– omniscient narrator option (Stanzel’s authorial narra-
tive situation; Genette’s zero focalization; Chatman’s
narratorial slant), and
– reflector character option (Stanzel’s figural narrative situ-
ation; Genette’s internal focalization).
In addition, the last two categories may alternate in a text,
constituting Stanzel’s authorial-figural narrative (all Genette’s
focalization categories possible); this is obviously a typical
perspectival configuration in contemporary fiction. To describe
these main options, one does not necessarily need to talk about
focalization at all. Moreover, beyond the macro-frames,
Fludernik (1996: 346–347) considers the analysis of
focalization as “fine-tuning”, apparently a pursuit of second-
ary importance. In this respect, Fludernik is quite right in pro-
posing to abandon the concept of focalization. So far so good.
While the prototypical cases of consistent external or in-
ternal focalizations are easy to describe by means of the above
macro-frames, the complex bottom-level textual characteris-
tics of perspective equally present problems for Fludernik’s
model, just as they do for the Genettean typology. Fludernik
(1996: 346) acknowledges this: “It is only when one has de-
termined on a macro-frame […] that one can then proceed to
discuss how the details of this are handled in the discourse”.
And, because Natural Narratology does not provide concep-
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tual tools for the analysis of this “how”, one is indirectly in-
vited to utilize the conventional narratological terminology28.
At this point, however, a brief detour is necessary. To ap-
preciate fully the potential of Natural Narratology for the de-
scription of voice and focalization, Fludernik’s concepts of
reflectorization and figuralization require explication. Though
Fludernik does not make it explicit in either her Fictions of
Language (1993) or Natural Narratology (1996), her theory
in fact provides potential analytical tools with which to re-
phrase the questions pertaining to the concepts of both narra-
tive voice and focalization. Fludernik (1996: 217) defines
reflectorization as the narrator’s strategy of provisionally adopt-
ing the viewpoint or mental habitus of a character, either for
ironic or empathetic purposes. Requiring the presence of a
“more or less prominent narrator function” (ibid. 191),
reflectorization is thus a feature of authorial or author-
ial-reflectoral narrative situations. Figuralization, on the other
hand, refers to an evocation of subjectivity in a reflector-mode
narrative that has no ruling figural consciousness attached to
it – a narrative with neither a narrator nor a reflector.
As the “echoing of figural discourse well beyond free in-
direct discourse into the very opinions voiced by the narrative
itself” (Fludernik 1996: 217), the concept of reflectorization
potentially reframes the question of speech and thought repre-
sentation. Reflectorization is not a variety of speech and
thought representation; rather, speech and thought representa-
tion is a special case of reflectorization. Consequently,
reflectorization can be used to describe all kinds of idiomatic,
perceptual, or ideological assimilation between the narrator
and a character (or a group of characters). In this respect, the
traditional question of who speaks? is subsumed under the
concept of reflectorization.
120
What about focalization? Throughout the discussion of
reflectorization and figuralization, Fludernik (1996: e.g. 181,
183, 185) uses Genette’s categories of focalization, as well as
the more general concepts of perspective and point of view, to
describe the phenomenon. It seems that the concept of
reflectorization covers the conceptual domains of both voice
and focalization. The most notable difference between
Fludernik’s reflectorization and Genette’s focalization is, once
again, Fludernik’s insistence on the typically ironic function
of reflectorization; Fludernik considers empathetic
reflectorization (her example is James’s What Maisie Knew)
as a special case of the generally ironic phenomenon.
Fludernik’s emphasis on the ironic nature of reflectorization
logically follows from her contention that the narrator is op-
tional. Again, according to Fludernik (e.g. 1993: 64–66, 443;
1996: 196; 2001) there is no narrator in a reflector-mode nar-
rative unless the text includes markers of narratorial conscious-
ness. Irony, of course, is a typical “sign of the I” in Prince’s
(1982) terms; thus, for Fludernik, the prototypical case of
reflectorization is ironic.
The concept of figuralization makes its entrance, should
neither narrator nor reflector persona be reflected in a narra-
tive. Thus, the concept applies to texts that evoke an “empty
deictic center” (Fludernik 1996: 192–198). According to
Fludernik (ibid. 201), in the absence of narrative agents avail-
able for consciousness attribution, the reader steps in to adopt
the deictic position of such texts. Thus in Woolf’s The Waves,
for instance, the reader takes the role of a story-internal ob-
server. Indeed, this is the only way to interpret plausibly such
texts, if one insists on the narratorless view of reflector-mode
narratives (cf. Stanzel 1984: 184). Owing to the lack of a
narratorial viewpoint, figuralization is by definition non-ironic.
121
Now, many people are inclined to adopt Nelles’s (1997:
ch. 2, esp. 59–73; see also Genette 1988: 101–102) view of a
“general narrator”, overt or covert, underlying each and every
instance of narrative discourse. Stipulating a narrator behind
all narratives makes the concepts of reflectorization and
figuralization even more interesting; a narrator becomes a sca-
lar feature instead of either being there or not29. Moreover, the
necessary presence of a narrator would remove the ‘ironic bias’,
i.e. the need to consider reflectorization as a primarily ironic
phenomenon. Most important, postulating a general narrator
allows one to rewrite both Genette’s focalization categories
and all varieties of speech/thought representation as instances
of reflectorization. The concept of figuralization could in the
general-narrator version of reflectorization/figuralization be
used to refer to cases of reflectorization that conspicuously
invite the reader’s adoption of a story-internal viewpoint and
not that of a neutral covert narrator agent.
Regardless of whether one extends Fludernik’s concept
of reflectorization with the stipulation of a general narrator,
reflectorization remains a broad concept. Reflectorization cov-
ers all kinds of amalgamation of the narratorial and the figural
domain; it is desperately in need of operationalization.
Fludernik (1996: 219) proposes two focal points for the analysis
of reflectoralization: matters of speech and thought represen-
tation, and a scale of empathy/irony. Stipulating a general nar-
rator would add yet another variable: expressed narratorial
presence. Thus, the varieties of alterity between the narrator’s
and character’s viewpoints, attitudes, thoughts and idiomatic
characteristics could conceivably be analyzed in a manner that
cuts across both the traditional categories of discourse repre-
sentation and focalization. Defined in this way, reflectorization
would by definition break down Genette’s distinction between
who speaks? / who sees, a distinction Fludernik has crusaded
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against on many occasions (see Fludernik 1993: 326; 1996:
344; 2001).
It is, however, questionable whether the reframing of the
questions of voice and focalization with the concepts of
reflectorization and figuralization would ultimately yield a
more efficient model for textual analysis. As Fludernik (2001a:
635) herself notes, all of the concepts provide “illusionistic
solutions” to the problems of attribution of the voices and per-
spectives of fiction:
Both narratological categories [of voice and focalization] are
established on the basis of roughly the same textual features,
and they are so established by way of an interpretive move
that, in the case of voice, projects a communicative schema on
the narrative, and – in the case of focalization – uses a visual
metaphor for determining the source of fictional knowledge.
[…] The concepts of figuralization and reflectorization […]
elicit ingenious illusionistic solutions to the problem [of voice
attribution]. Such attempts, therefore, take the reading experi-
ence as their departure point, arguing from the perplexity of
unclear attribution. (Fludernik 2001a: 635.)
Adopting reflectorization and figuralization in favor of
voice and focalization only replaces one set of illusionistic
metaphors with another. Hence, the usefulness of a broad in-
terpretation of the concepts of reflectoralization and
figuralization remains to be assessed.
The question of focalization once again illustrates the dif-
ference between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to
narrative. In a sense, Fludernik is right to banish the concept
of focalization from Natural Narratology: Genette’s catego-
ries mostly concern the details that need not be discussed in
cognitive narratology. The crux is, of course, that precisely
the subtle differences and inconspicuous changes in
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focalization left undiscussed by Natural Narratology have tra-
ditionally been of great interest to narratologists. Consequently,
students of narrative are likely to continue using the Genettean
typology of focalization even if they accept the Natural defini-
tion of narrativity; the traditional categories of focalization
creep in irresistibly. This makes Fludernik’s rhetoric of “throw-
ing out the baby” of focalization (among other concepts of
structuralist narratology) appear too dramatic. Many
narratologists are still eager to nurse the (30-year-old!) con-
ceptual infant, bottom-up. The problems of voice and
focalization will be returned to in chapters 6 and 8. I turn now
to Fludernik’s distinction between theoretical and illusionis-
tic narrative analysis, an issue that has direct consequences
for the practical application of Natural Narratology.
Fludernik is careful to distinguish between the illusionis-
tic effects that texts have on their readers and the theoretical
representation of textual structures. The questions of the nar-
rator and narrative voices will serve to illustrate the matter: on
the level of narratological description, Fludernik denies the
existence of a general narrator and is sympathetic to Banfield’s
notion of the univocality of narrative; on the level of readerly
illusions, by contrast, she is happy to grant a provisional onto-
logical status both to a narrator and to narrative voices.
In terms of readers’ reactions to individual texts, the tendency
to attribute stylistic features to a hypothetical narrator persona
and/or a character is a simple fact. However, this fact (that read-
ers are led by the illusionism of the narrative to impose a
communicational framework on the text) does not necessitate
the stipulation of a narrator persona on the theoretical level at
all. After all, narratologists are then repeating readers’ inter-
pretive moves on a theoretical level, without due consideration
of the illusionism involved. (Fludernik 2001a: 634–635.)
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Jahn (2001b: 697) criticizes Fludernik for “hypostatiz[ing]
a corrective level of narratological abstraction that is some-
how superior to what the reader sees a text as being, doing,
and meaning”. Fludernik’s distinction between analytical and
illusionistic approaches to narratives may indeed be ideologi-
cally dubious, but this is not important. There is a theoretical
issue involved, one with practical consequences. Bluntly:
narratological analysis is nearly impossible, should one heed
Fludernik’s advice.
A narrative understanding of a text in terms of Natural
Narratology, it is recalled, is based on the interplay of four
cognitive levels. According to Fludernik, three of these (lev-
els I–III) are inaccessible to us and serve as the schematic cog-
nitive machinery upon which the fourth level rests. Level IV,
by contrast, is the arena of the readers’ conscious efforts of
narrativization. On this level, the reader labors to attribute the
numerous and often strange texts to typical literary situations,
genres, and so forth. Now, this process is fundamentally illu-
sionistic: in reading and narrativizing a text, the reader evokes
an army of fictional existents, settings, events, and narrative
agents in order to make sense of the text (see the quotation
above).
Because of the non-conscious nature of levels I–III, the
reader’s process of narrativization is the only aspect open to
narratological study. Of course, Fludernik has arrived at her
account of the cognitive parameters involved in the reception
of literature by studying (an awe-inspiring) number of literary
texts and making generalizing hypotheses about the mental
processes involved. It is, however, not possible to observe these
processes; they are merely stipulated as existing and function-
ing. In fact, at least within the confines of the methodology of
literary criticism, we cannot really observe even the
narrativization of level IV, save by introspection. The closest
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thing there is to observing the process is to analyze texts and
make educated guesses as to what textual feature might trig-
ger this or that interpretation. We have learned earlier (2.2)
that this is precisely what Fludernik does. Throughout her dis-
cussions of FID (1993) and in constructing Natural Narratology
(1996), she very meticulously utilizes the concepts of both
linguistics and narratology to explicate the assumed textual
indices of the narrativization process.
Now, it is obviously necessary to make a theoretical/illu-
sionistic distinction between the theory of narrativization in
Natural Narratology (cognitive frames, parameters) and the
study of the illusion-eliciting features of texts. This distinc-
tion, however, is not the only one Fludernik makes. Accord-
ing to Fludernik, there is a way to analyze and describe the
narrative structures that evoke “readers’ interpretive moves”
without repeating them. There are, apparently, three ways to
do narratology: first, one can describe and explain what hap-
pens when we process narrative texts (the schemata of Natu-
ral Narratology, cognitive narratology in general); second, one
can construct a theoretical system to depict ways in which texts
evoke illusions (Fludernik’s linguistic/contextual analysis);
third, one can create a non-theoretical and illusionistic account
of the way in which texts evoke illusions (traditional
narratology based on the model of fictional communication).
Is there really a difference between the latter two categories?
Since the process of narrativization involves a great deal of
readerly illusionism, it seems fitting to utilize illusionistic cat-
egories (such as narrator, narratee, character, implied author
and so forth) to analyze it.
Instead of posing a danger to analytical description of texts,
the illusionist approach to narrative acknowledges the inher-
ent illusionism of all reading and interpretation, even of
narratological analysis. Moreover, the link between an illu-
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sionist and a non-theoretical approach is somewhat dubious.
Surely it is possible to use illusionistic concepts rigorously? A
relaxation of the stark distinction between theoretical and il-
lusionistic textual analysis is necessary for narratological analy-
sis that seeks to combine the viewpoints of Natural and struc-
turalist narratology, as will become clear in the next chapter.
To summarize: the most important and truly
groundbreaking feature of Natural Narratology, and cognitive
narratology in general, is the attribution of narrative process-
ing and understanding to basic cognitive parameters, to the
embodied mind. Whether this achievement has an elevating
effect on the status of literary criticism, an effect Mark Turner
was anticipating in 1991, remains to be seen. However, the
liaison of narratology with cognitive science has certainly re-
newed the yearning for a sound theoretical foundation for nar-
rative theory (e.g. Herman 2001a, b). As has been demonstrated
with regard to Fludernik’s Natural Narratology, the theories of
cognition are indeed able to provide many valuable tools for
the analysis and interpretation of narrative literature, in addi-
tion to providing a general explanation for at least certain kinds
of narrativity.
Nonetheless, the commentary on Natural Narratology also
made evident that cognitive narratology cannot at present sur-
vive on its own. In terms of the detailed analysis and interpre-
tation of texts, at least two sources of substantial difficulty
remain. First, as noted by Fludernik herself and emphasized
in the above discussion, Natural Narratology stems from a
notion of narrativity based on the parameters of vernacular
storytelling and is thus unable to come to terms with texts that
transcend all conceptions of real-life storytelling. Second, and
for present purposes more importantly, Natural Narratology
relies inescapably on the concepts of the traditional models of
structuralist narratology. This is evident in the way in which
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Natural Narratology utilizes Stanzel’s narrative situations.
More interestingly, as became clear regarding the concept of
focalization, the omissions in Natural Narratology also im-
plicitly invite one to seek ways to bridge the gap between the
structuralist paradigm of narrative analysis and Natural
Narratology. The next chapter will contribute to that project.
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6. The Voices of Gravity’s Rainbow
Eliciting the descriptive terms heteroglossia, cacophony, and
ventriloquism, in addition to phrases such as Joel Black’s
(1984: 26) “open-ended discursive playground”, the narration
of Gravity’s Rainbow evokes a multiplicity of speakers. The
illusion of several voices simultaneously present in narration
has traditionally been considered a feature of speech and
thought representation, particularly of free indirect discourse
(FID). Studies of FID (e.g. McHale 1978; Fludernik 1993;
1995; see also Hrushovski 1979) have demonstrated, however,
that expressions of subjectivity typical of FID can be found in
all forms of narration. The case of Gravity’s Rainbow corrobo-
rates this: it is necessary to consider all types of narration in
order to grasp the phenomenon of narrative voice more com-
prehensively. The choice of the present operational metaphor
reflects this: the following will not be a study of FID in Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow. What is attempted instead is an examination of
the attribution of markers of subjectivity and consciousness –
in short, voice – in the narrative situations of Pynchon’s novel.
From the perspective of a Pynchon scholar, the study of
voice in Pynchon’s fiction is long overdue. Jacqueline Smetak’s
observant but short article “Who’s Talking Here: Finding the
Voice in Gravity’s Rainbow” (1989) constitutes to date the most
cohesive account of the novel’s voices. In addition, McHale’s
(1992: ch. 4) narratologically oriented analysis of the second
person of Gravity’s Rainbow discusses several aspects of voice
attribution. The problematic has also been discussed in pass-
ing elsewhere, mostly in conjunction with various underlying
thematic interpretations (e.g. Black 1984: 26, 32; Duyfhuizen
1981: 14; 1991; Schaub 1981). However, the frequent illusion
of the mingling of narrator’s and characters’ voices has not
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generally aroused interest as such. From a narratological point
of view, by contrast, the problem of voice attribution has come
under extensive discussion. In the literature of FID30 the ap-
parent mixing of voices has been frequently described as dual
voice (DV), following Roy Pascal’s (1978) seminal study un-
der the same name.
The present attempt takes its cue from both the intuitive
assumption of the complexity of the voices of Gravity’s Rain-
bow and recent developments in the narratological descrip-
tion of speech and thought representation. As always in this
study, then, two intellectual contexts inform the following
analysis: the peculiarities of Pynchon’s fiction, and narrative
theory. The two contexts approach each other in Fludernik’s
(1993) theoretical study The Fictions of Language and the
Languages of Fiction31. Surprisingly, Fludernik’s massive study
includes a fairly detailed account of the speech and thought
representation in Gravity’s Rainbow. While Fludernik by no
means concentrates on Gravity’s Rainbow, the novel furnishes
her work with a handful of examples, most importantly re-
garding the problematic of voice.
Fludernik (1993: e.g. 401) rightly assesses Gravity’s Rain-
bow as a problematic case for the study of FID, owing to the
novel’s eccentric narrative strategies. Indeed, the nature of the
novel’s speech and thought representation is difficult or down-
right impossible to judge by employing the conventional tri-
partite model of indirect discourse (ID), FID, direct discourse
(DD): frequently, the text does not give clear formal evidence
for distinguishing sequences of, for instance, ID from FID
(Fludernik 1993: 309–310). The reader has to rely on contex-
tual clues, even on pure intuition, in order to make such judg-
ments. The problem is reflected in the task of discriminating
between the narrator’s and the characters’ voices in potential
sequences of double-voiced narration (Fludernik 1993: 329,
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331; cf. 326, 330). For Fludernik, the voices of Gravity’s Rain-
bow present themselves as fundamentally indeterminate. This
is by no means the whole story, however. In the course of this
discussion I will explicate some of the ways in which Pynchon’s
novel in addition, and by contrast, makes itself more accu-
rately interpretable in this respect, despite its apparent inde-
terminacy. The aim is to expose two opposing ‘currents’ un-
derlying both the representation of speech and thought and the
narratorial sequences of Gravity’s Rainbow, one of which frus-
trates the reader in the pursuit of definite attribution of voices,
and one which sensitizes the reader in the search for subtle
interpretive clues.
I will begin with a discussion of Fludernik’s revision of
the theory of FID, concentrating on Fludernik’s account of DV.
This is followed by an analysis of the phenomena in Gravity’s
Rainbow in two sections: the first focuses on the occasionally
contradictory interplay of formal and contextual clues in the
interpretation of voices; the second examines the stylistic in-
stability of Gravity’s Rainbow’s narratorial passages and the
novel’s tendency to deconstruct character discourse. Then, in
conclusion, the potential theoretical ramifications of the tex-
tual analyses will be considered.
6.1. Towards a ’Natural’ FID
Fludernik approaches the problem of speech and thought rep-
resentation in a Wittgensteinian spirit: she presents a very de-
tailed linguistic and narratological analysis of FID and related
phenomena, only to question seriously the analyses’ relevance
in the new theoretical situation (see Jahn 1994). Fludernik pro-
pounds a conception of “schematic language representation”
based mainly on the frame theory of cognitive science
(Fludernik 1993: chs. 8 and 9), in other words, a conception of
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speech and thought representation within the framework of
Natural Narratology (Fludernik 1996). In Natural Narratology
the methodological presuppositions of the linguistic and
narratological analyses are no longer valid, and the findings
have to be reconsidered. Luckily, they need not be altogether
abandoned.
The question of double-voiced narration illustrates this.
Fludernik uses the metaphorical concept of voice throughout
the discussion of FID; in fact, she uses the traditional DV-
hypothesis (in conjunction with the concept of irony) to illus-
trate the pragmatic shortcomings of Ann Banfield’s (1982)
controversial account of univocal FID (see also McHale 1978:
254–255; 1983; Ron 1981: 31). The traditional DV hypoth-
esis is debunked relatively late in the study, in the terms pre-
sented below.
According to Fludernik, the sequences typically described
as DV do not in fact represent an actual mingling of narrative
voices; the voices of putative DV passages are linguistically
and contextually attributable either to the narrator or to a char-
acter. The illusion of two voices simultaneously present in the
narration is an effect on a higher interpretive level. (Fludernik
1993: 355–356.) Hence, notably, Fludernik never denies the
status of DV as an illusion evoked by the narrative, merely its
status as a determinable textual feature is denied. In light of
her schematic language representation, Fludernik presents an
interpretation of passages of DV in terms of their contextual
relevance within an established interpretive frame. In short,
the reader attributes by means of his or her “inferencing activ-
ity” the subjectivity markers of potentially double-voiced pas-
sages either to the narrator (the frame of TELLING) or to a char-
acter (the frame of EXPERIENCING). This attribution depends on
which option makes more sense in a given narrative situation.
(Fludernik 1993: 452; see also Herman 1997; cf. Hrushovski
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1979; O’Neill 1994: 102, 105–106; Toolan 1988: 127.) Ulti-
mately, the reader’s narrativization process judges passages
as reflecting the consciousness of either the narrator of a char-
acter. Thus, Fludernik defines voices as interpretive phenom-
ena (Fludernik 1993: e.g. 44032; see also Aczel 1998: 476–
478; 2001a: 609–612; Gibson 2001: 640–641; Fludernik 1996:
343–344; Herman 1995: 142; McHale 1978: 264; Ron 1981:
18). Hence the frames and contexts override the linguistics of
voices.
The Natural interpretation of the voices of narrative tran-
scends “mere amateurish impressionistic dabbling” (Fludernik
1993: 351) allegedly characteristic of more traditional ap-
proaches to the phenomenon. It does so by proceeding from
the position that narrative discourse is “a uniform one-lev-
elled linguistic entity which by its deictic evocation of alterity
– whether in form of direct discourse, indirect discourse, free
indirect discourse or Ansteckung [‘contagion’] – projects a level
of language which is not actually there but is implied and
manufactured by a kind of linguistic hallucination.” (Fludernik
1994: 453.) As a consequence of Fludernik’s move toward
frame theory, the results of linguistic or narratological analy-
ses lose their explanatory power; they function ‘merely’ as
contextually framed gestures toward a particular interpreta-
tion of a DV passage.
The interplay of formal and contextual indices will be-
come evident in the analysis of Gravity’s Rainbow; it is deci-
sive either by disorienting or supporting the reader in the in-
terpretation of the apparently double-voiced passages of the
novel. In terms of Natural Narratology, the formal and contex-
tual interpretive clues are either successful or deficient with
respect to the adoption of cognitive interpretive frames. In this
respect the following analysis will be deliberately illusionistic
in the sense that Fludernik (2001a) attributes to the word. The
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considerable strength of the Natural conception of voices can
be fully utilized only by juggling the general cognitive frame-
work of voice attribution with an illusionistic yet systematic
analysis of textual features (see Herman 1997: 1048–1049,
1057; Fludernik 1995; Fludernik 2001a: 622–623). I wholly
support the notion of the non-linguistic foundations of narra-
tive voices, dual or otherwise. The alternating or layered nar-
rative voices evoked by the text are ontologically akin to other
beings inferred by readers: implied authors and readers – or
stories and meanings, for that matter. Consequently, referring
to the exemplary sequences of Gravity’s Rainbow as DV does
not imply a commitment to a view of an actual ontological
duplicity of voices; DV is a shorthand expression for the po-
tential voice effects of the passages. The metaphor of voice
has to be stretched somewhat in order to accommodate the
impression of an underlying subjectivity in narratorial se-
quences; hopefully, it does not cease to be informative, how-
ever.
The concept of formal will be used in addition to linguis-
tic to refer to purely linguistic (most notably lexical and syn-
tactic) features of narrative. The concept of context is the most
problematic of the key concepts used. In the literature on FID
it has traditionally been used to refer both to the non-linguistic
features of a narrative situation (content of utterances, for in-
stance) and to formal features not included in a passage yet
relevant to its interpretation. Herman (1995: 144) describes
the ambiguity of the concept: “in discussions of represented
discourse, narrower usages of context are regularly and con-
fusingly interchanged with wider usages, precisely because
narrative theory has for the most part evolved in the absence
of any general theory of context, any pragmatics” (see also
Sternberg 2001: 142). This chapter will to some extent con-
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tribute to the confusion; the alternate uses of the concept will
be made explicit when necessary, however.
6.2. The Formal and the Contextual in Voice Attribution
6.2.1. A Colloquial Narrator?
In what follows, I will consider the narrator’s and characters’
voices in the representation of speech and thought, and, in
particular, the relationship between the formal and contextual
markers of subjectivity. Gravity’s Rainbow is, perhaps surpris-
ingly, relatively faithful to the novelistic conventions of evok-
ing the illusion of layered or alternating voices, despite the
fact that the novel includes a considerable number of situa-
tions in which the interpretation of potential DV passages re-
mains problematic. Pynchon’s text includes text-book exam-
ples of FID that conform to the tradition that the novel has so
often been regarded as transgressing against. I turn first to ex-
amine the narrator’s allegedly colloquial idiom in Gravity’s
Rainbow in order to demonstrate the extent to which the rep-
resentation of speech and thought in the novel functions in a
fairly conventional manner.
Frequently, Pynchon’s novel seems to obliterate the dif-
ference between the narratorial voice and the character-based
(or figural) discourse. Fludernik (1993: 329–331) refers to the
identification of the narrator’s and the characters’ idioms as
the origin of this confusion: “[T]here is a deliberate attempt to
erase the stylistic difference, the difference [...] between a neu-
tral narrative style and colloquial deviations from it”. In a simi-
lar vein, Michael Levine (2001: 122) discusses the unclear
distinction between idioms: “[T]he migrating vocabulary […]
indicates the permeability of the boundaries which otherwise
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enable both [Slothrop and narrator] to be identified as sepa-
rate characters”. This seems to be true of passages such as the
following, one of Fludernik’s examples:
Well: he guesses They have euchred Mexico into some Byzan-
tine exercise, probably to do with the Americans. Perhaps the
Russians. “The White Visitation,” being devoted to psycho-
logical warfare, harbors a few of each, a Behaviorist here, a
Pavlovian there. It’s none of Pirate’s business. But he notes
that with each film delivery, Roger’s enthusiasm grows. Un-
healthy, unhealthy; he has the sense of witnessing an addic-
tion. He feels that his friend, his provisional wartime friend, is
being used for something not quite decent. (GR 34–35)
In Fludernik’s (1993: 330) analysis, the voices of the whole
quotation are stylistically indeterminate in terms of the oppo-
sition narratorial / figural because of the colloquial idiomatic
features of the narrator’s discourse (cf. McHale 1992: 100).
However, Fludernik’s strategy of determining the general col-
loquial idiom of a narrating agent should be studied more
closely. The idiom of the novel’s narrator is judged as collo-
quial by a “comparison with other narratorial passages”. This
conclusion subsumes two linked presuppositions: first, that
the general nature of the narrator’s idiolect can be judged con-
textually; second, that the narrator’s (colloquial) idiom is more
or less stable. Both of these suppositions are problematic.
First, if we take seriously the claim that Pynchon’s novel
often denies the use of linguistic or stylistic grounds for voice
attribution, the idea of judging the narrator’s idiom contextu-
ally, i.e. in the light of other narratorial passages of the novel,
becomes logically dubious. In order to become convinced of
the overall colloquiality of the narrator, it would seem neces-
sary to study whether passages that are demonstrably both
narratorial and colloquial are characteristic of, or dominant
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in, the narration of Gravity’s Rainbow. Nothing of this sort has
been demonstrated so far.
The second presupposition concerning the relative stabil-
ity of the idiom of the narrator is even more troublesome,
though from a more practical point of view. The novel is noto-
rious for its obsession with appropriating a plethora of spoken
and written styles. Describing merely as “colloquial” the some-
times frantic rate at which the narration proceeds from one
pastiche of an idiom to another is an understatement, to say
the least. Moreover, on closer inspection it becomes evident
that even the most uncontroversially narratorial colloquial
passages are not alike. Gravity’s Rainbow displays a variety-
show of different colloquial idioms: the neutral “This Ludwig,
now, may not be completely Right in the Head” (GR 554); the
more mimetically conversational “Uh, x? well, what’s x?” (GR
84); the slick “what, a dialectical Tarot? Yes indeedyfoax!”
(GR 748); the stage (or radio?) show routine “Well, Captain –
yes you, Marine Captain Esberg from Pasadena – you have
just had, the Mystery Insight!” (GR 691); the hostile “When’s
the last time you felt intensely lukewarm? Eh?” (GR 677), and
so forth. The ‘telling situations’ evoked by the different regis-
ters of narratorial colloquiality are radically different, ranging
from the casual office atmosphere of PISCES to the various
peculiar stage situations. As a result, one is left with a typi-
cally Pynchonian paradox: Of course the narrator is colloquial.
Of course the narrator is not colloquial. The latter option re-
fers to the critical usefulness of the category of narratorial
colloquiality.
Curiously, Fludernik’s (1993: 330) final interpretation of
the above Prentice-passage does not really support (or rely
on) the conclusion of general colloquiality of the narrator of
Gravity’s Rainbow33. Her initial remark “[t]he Pynchon quo-
tation [...] appears to be more authorial than one might per-
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haps have guessed at first sight” is not at all supported by the
actual analysis. In fact, Fludernik almost immediately after-
wards argues convincingly that the contextual markers of the
passage foreground the figural (i.e. Pirate Prentice’s) voice and
thus invite a free indirect reading. However, Fludernik deems
even the contextual markers inadequate in the interpretation
of the last two sentences of the passage: “[P]uzzlement per-
sists on account of the colloquial phrases unhealthy, unhealthy;
addiction; not quite decent. This, as one can conclude from a
comparison with other narratorial passages, can be narratorial
as well as figural [...], and it is not even possible to align pro-
visional wartime friend with the narrator’s perspective, since
Pirate himself may just possibly be aware of the fragility of
wartime friendships.” (Fludernik 1993: 330.) Perhaps the di-
lemma is solvable by examining the textual surroundings of
the Pynchon quotation? Immediately after the previously
quoted passage one reads:
What can he do? If Mexico wanted to talk about it he could
find a way, security or not. His reluctance is not Pirate’s own
over the machinery of Operation Black Wing. It looks more
like shame. Wasn’t Mexico’s face tonight, as he took the enve-
lope, averted? eyes boxing the corners of the room at top speed,
a pornography customer’s reflex... hmm. Knowing Bloat, per-
haps that’s what it is, young lady gamming well set-up young
man, several poses – more wholesome than anything this war’s
ever photographed... life, at least...
This excerpt definitely invites a figural reading: the whole
passage is justifiably interpreted as a representation of
Prentice’s meditation on Mexico’s peculiar situation. Sentences
more vaguely related to Pirate’s idiom or thought processes
are “referentially linked” (Ehrlich 1990: e.g. 49, 53; see also
Oltean 1993: 701–703) to sequences containing highly idi-
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omatic material. The consistency of character-attributable DV
before and after the indeterminate sentences can be used as a
contextual clue in the interpretation of the Pirate-excerpt as a
whole. Moreover, this interpretation is supported by Fludernik’s
frame-theoretical model: the principle of cognitive obstination
is beautifully at play in the figural reading of the whole pas-
sage. According to Fludernik’s concept, the “[s]ubjective ele-
ments have to be aligned to a consciousness, the most obvious
candidates being the last consciousness introduced” (Fludernik
1993: 451; see also Stanzel 1984: 54–55). This reasoning would
justifiably conclude in a view of consistent figural voice in the
passage.
Hence, the interpretation of the Prentice-sequence neither
supports nor relies on the view of a generally colloquial narra-
tor. The formal and contextual indices of subjectivity in the
excerpt were found to complement each other in a figural in-
terpretation. Again, this is not to deny the narrator’s frequent
colloquiality. Consider, for instance, the relationship between
the narrator’s and Pirate Prentice’s voices in the following:
No, they are making believe to be narodnik, but I know, they
are of Iasi, of Codreanu, his men, men of the League, they...
they kill for him – they have oath! They try to kill me...
Transylvanian Magyars, they know spells... at night they whis-
per... Well, hrrump, heh, heh, here comes Pirate’s Condition
creeping over him again, when he’s least expecting it as usual
– might as well mention here that much of what the dossiers
call Pirate Prentice is a strange talent for – well, for getting
inside the fantasies of others [...]. (GR 11–12)
The two first sentences of the quotation are shortly after-
wards indirectly attributed to a Rumanian royalist in exile
whose fantasies Pirate has taken to manage in his capacity as a
“fantasist-surrogate”. This makes it logical to attribute the rep-
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resented paranoid thought to him, or to his provisionally
adopted alter ego. The subsequent lexical and onomatopoetic
markers of subjectivity, by contrast, cannot be Prentice’s; they
belong to the narrator, who is at the time the only conscious-
ness available for voice attribution. The sequence creates the
illusion that the narrator takes over while Prentice becomes
involuntarily immersed in his dutiful hallucinations which are
described at length later on (GR 12–13). In fact, the scene
evoke a feeling of hesitation (cf. Fludernik 1993: 335), and
the narrator seems not altogether comfortable about having to
report Pirate’s strange abilities and assignments.
Interpreting the scene in this way makes tangible the thor-
oughly illusionistic strategy of narrative analysis. Voices in
fiction are attributed both by examining their diegetic context
and by studying their linguistic markers. The impression of a
clearly personalized narrator, at times conscious of the strange-
ness of the story being told, is a symptom of the anthropomor-
phic critical tendency noted by Culler (1988: 206): “[W]e ex-
plain textual details by adducing narrators and explain narra-
tors by adducing qualities of real people” (see also Diengott
1987; Stanzel 1990: 811–813; Fludernik 1996: 47; 2001a: 622–
623). This interpretation of the colloquial features of the nar-
rator’s discourse does not, however, corroborate the view of
the general and stable colloquiality of the narrator: quite the
opposite. Rather, it provides a plausible natural explanation
for the local display of conversational style. This naturaliza-
tion of the narrative voice in mimetic terms does not, how-
ever, in any way produce a consistent realistic image of a nar-
rator; it merely provides am interpretive means to get through
the passage in question. Gravity’s Rainbow evokes illusions
of anthropomorphic narrative agents strategically and pro-
visionally – only to disintegrate them later. Consequently, gen-
eralizations about both the narrator’s and the characters’ voices
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in Gravity’s Rainbow are rarely legitimate or helpful in the
analysis of the novel.
6.2.2. Long-Distance Linking
The discussion of the first Prentice-example suggests that wid-
ening the window of observation even slightly, say, to include
the immediate textual surroundings of a passage, can have a
decisive effect on the interpretation of narrative voices. En-
couraged, I will now turn to probe further the extent of the
contextual connectedness of the voices of Gravity’s Rainbow.
Frequently, the novel responds well to the efforts of a pedantic
reader. The idiosyncratic or dialectal features of character dis-
course are potential vehicles for distant linking. A particular-
ity of Roger Mexico’s (jealous) speech, set in a frustrated dog-
chasing scene with Edward Pointsman, serves as an example:
[Jessica Swanlake:] “I’ve lost my mind. I ought to be cuddling
someplace with Beaver this very minute, and here instead I’m
with this gillie or something, this spiritualist, statistician, what
are you anyway –” “Cuddling?” Roger has a tendency to scream.
“Cuddling?” (GR 43)
The slapstick pursuit of the dog resumes and goes on for a
while, after which the reader is presented with the following:
   “For pity’s sake,” Pointsman thumping after him back into
the wreckage. “Don’t frighten him Mexico, this isn’t Kenya or
something, we need him as close to normative, you know, as
possible.”
   Normative? Normative?
   “Roger,” calls Roger, giving him short-long-short with the
flash.
   “Jessica,” murmurs Jessica, tiptoeing behind them. (GR 44)
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The immediate context of Mexico’s chase does not pro-
vide any clues about the attribution of “Normative? Norma-
tive?”. Perhaps it should be read as the narrator’s passing medi-
tation on the concept of normativity? Only a retrospective con-
sideration of a specific trait in Mexico’s speech34, clearly
marked by the narrator in the previous excerpt, points toward
a figural reading. This makes it plausible to interpret the pas-
sage as internal monologue. Thus, “Normative? Normative?”
is best interpreted as an antagonistic statement that Mexico
would have wanted to scream aloud but is instead forced to
utter only internally. Mexico is allowed only an affirmative
response, which in turn gets ridiculed by Jessica Swanlake.
This interpretation, moreover, is in accord with the thematic
content of the scene: the failed attempt at dognapping suc-
cinctly illustrates the problems of both Mexico’s professional
situation and his love life. Mexico’s inclination to display tem-
per is also briefly touched upon elsewhere in the novel (e.g.
GR 634).
The interpretation of the previous example relied princi-
pally on the formal features of discourse. Distant contextual
connections based on the content of putative utterances or
thoughts are equally possible, however. Pirate Prentice fur-
nishes us with yet another complex case of subjectivity attri-
bution. Near the novel’s beginning the reader is presented with
a description of London on a winter morning:
The sun is still below horizon. The day feels like rain, but for
now the air is uncommonly clear. The great power station, and
the gasworks beyond, stand precisely: crystals grown in morn-
ing’s beaker, stacks, vents, towers, plumbing, gnarled emissions
of steam and smoke […] (GR 6)
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Stylistically, the passage is mostly unmarked, albeit
Prentice is a probable focalizer of the scenic description. The
second sentence, with its conversational feels like rain and for
now, only vaguely evokes an impression of a consciousness
affecting the narration: no distinguishable voice emerges. This
conclusion is supported by the more conspicuously formally
marked passages of Prentice’s free indirect thought presented
shortly afterwards (GR 6–7). This interpretation is, however,
shown to be dubious in the light of later contextual evidence.
Five pages later, the ever-fascinating problematic of weather
is returned to, again in conjunction with Prentice. This time,
the impression of a subjectivity affecting the narration is
stronger:
He’s driven out, away, east over Vauxhall Bridge in a dented
green Lagonda by his batman, a Corporal Wayne. The morning
seems to grow colder the higher the sun rises. Clouds begin to
gather after all. A crew of American sappers spills into the
road […]. (GR 11)
Military slang expressions such as batman35or sappers at
least moderately motivate a figural reading. Remarkably, “af-
ter all” refers to the observation of the “uncommon clearness”
of the sky presented five pages earlier. The vague impression
of Prentice’s subjectivity underlying the first quotation is thus
retroactively confirmed. The web of connections between the
scenes is not limited to this: Prentice’s phrase “incoming
mail”36, referring to a message apparently delivered to him in
a German V-2 rocket, is also conspicuously present in both.
The subtlety of the markers of subjectivity in the scenes does
not, however, warrant a free indirect reading. The passages
would be more adequately described as contextually linked
instances of internal focalization37 that evoke a figural subjec-
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tivity. Separately, the Prentice-passages above do not consti-
tute clear cases of figural voice: the subjectivity markers are
vague in both, moderate at best. Interestingly, the remote link-
ing strengthens the figural reading of both of the linked se-
quences. In other words, once the reader makes the connec-
tion between indeterminate instances, even subtle markers of
subjectivity suffice. The observation corroborates Ehrlich’s
(1990) view of FID (and, it seems, voice in general) as a dis-
tinct textual unit with the power to sustain itself over ambigu-
ous sequences of the narrative text. It is safe to assume, how-
ever, that cases such as the above are probably not what Ehrlich
had in mind. Proposing, like Ehrlich, an intersentential way to
analyze FID, McHale characterizes the reading process in what
he terms an integrational model,
whereby sentences give rise to interpretive reconstructions
which in turn affect the interpretation of subsequent and even,
retrospectively, of preceding sentences, and so on, a global pic-
ture of the text’s meaning and intentionality being continually
built, unbuilt, and rebuilt at every point. (McHale 1983: 39;
quoted in Jahn 1997: 460.)
Obviously, the key notion in the above is the possibility of
a retroactive determining of the meaning and structural func-
tion of a particular textual sequence38. In Pynchon, it seems,
the reader has to delay his or her voice attributions, or at least
be prepared to alter them to accommodate later evidence (see
Perry 1979: 58–61). The thing to note in the examples above
is the subtlety with which the links between passages are es-
tablished. It is at least in part this vague yet discernible inter-
nal cohesion that evokes the “feeling of connectedness” that
Gravity’s Rainbow is famous for (e.g. Moore 1987; Cooper
1983:177, 198; Seed 1988: 207). While far from clear as ex-
amples of speech and thought representation, links like these
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provide a mesh of textual connections which functions, al-
most subliminally, by evoking readerly experiences of déjà-vu
that turn out to be more than déjà-vu. In Natural terms, the
retroactive voice-attribution entails shuffling between frames
of TELLING and EXPERIENCING. Constantly re-adjusting the in-
terpretive framework, the reader learns an important lesson in
the art of reading Pynchon: to be prepared to reconsider inter-
pretive conclusions. Let me slowly gravitate toward yet an-
other lesson by examining more troublesome cases of voice
attribution.
6.2.3. Indeterminate Speech and Thought
As demonstrated above, apparently stylistically undifferenti-
ated and chaotic sequences of potential DV can, on closer in-
spection, turn out to permit justified and fairly conventional
figural or narratorial interpretations. Furthermore, the contex-
tual clues of subjectivity attribution were found to link even
distant sequences together effectively. However, the previously
noted intuitive insight that the novel’s speech and thought rep-
resentation is indeterminate cannot be denied: there must be
unsolvably fuzzy cases of voice attribution in the novel. Con-
sider the effect of the voices in the sequence depicting a weekly
briefing by Brigadier Pudding:
On he goes, gabbing, gabbing, recipes for preparing beets in a
hundred tasty ways, or such cucurbitaceous improbabilities as
Ernest Pudding’s Gourd Surprise – yes, there is something sa-
distic about recipes with “Surprise” in the title, chap who’s
hungry wants to just eat you know, not be Surprised really, just
wants to bite into (sigh) the old potato, and be reasonably sure
there’s nothing inside but potato you see [...]. (GR 80)
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The passage has both lexical (gabbing, chap, the old po-
tato), and syntactic markers (you know, you see) of English
colloquial idiom, along with “cucurbitaceous improbabilities”
that can perhaps be interpreted as belonging to the humorous
vocabulary of an educated Englishman. The only problem is
that none is directly identified by the text. The last character
‘on stage’ in terms of speech and thought representation is
Pudding himself, who is logically ruled out as the source of
the remarks. The next to last to speak is the Hungarian refugee
Géza Rózsavölgyi, an even more unlikely choice considering
his heavy Finno-Ugric accent.
The sequence gives enough formal clues to suggest figural
reading, but deficient formal or contextual evidence to attribute
the discernible voice to a particular character. A reasonable
solution seems to be to attribute the material evoking subjec-
tivity to a prototypical, ‘generic’, member of the audience of
Pudding’s ramblings. The interpretation is supported, in addi-
tion, by a subsequent comment on the audience itself, suppos-
edly presented from the perspective of a member of the audi-
ence: “as if we have a parliament of some kind here” (GR 80).
Regarding the precise attribution of subjectivity, the sequence
remains necessarily vague. Depending on one’s taste in
narratological concepts, the phenomenon could be categorized
in various ways. First, the sequence recalls the concepts of
indefinite direct and indirect discourse introduced by Herman
(1995: 177) to refer to cases which “present discourse attrib-
utable not to an individual character but rather to a collec-
tive”. By way of analogy, the passage above could be described
as an instance of indefinite FID. On the other hand, Fludernik’s
(1996: 182) account of reflectorization offers an alternative
interpretation. From this perspective, the excerpt would be read
as “the narrator’s […] ironic mimicry of typicalized story-in-
ternal opinions.” However, the sequence is not distinctly ironic;
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thus it constitutes, in Fludernik’s nomenclature, an instance of
consonant reflectorization. Finally, in terms of Genette’s
focalization, the passage could be considered as inhabiting the
gray area between zero-focalization and internal focalization
(see 8.4.2), as indeterminably locatable internal focalization.
The vagueness of the above excerpt is not, however, of
real importance in terms of the more general problem of dis-
criminating between the narrator’s and the characters’ voices.
The formal and contextual markers were clear enough to make
the reader “hear” a figural voice, however unidentified it fi-
nally remained. It takes surprisingly little to establish an even
more radically indeterminate voice effects. After a dramatic
dialogue between the behaviorist Pointsman and Brigadier
Pudding, the narrator describes Slothrop’s presumed personal
history as a guinea-pig of psychological testing. Some collo-
quial features are incorporated in the narrator’s discourse:
But a hardon, that’s either there, or it isn’t. Binary, elegant. The
job of observing can even be done by a student.
   Unconditioned stimulus = stroking penis with antiseptic cot-
ton swab.
   Unconditioned response = hardon.
   Conditioned stimulus = x.
   Conditioned response = hardon whenever x is present, strok-
ing is no longer necessary, all you need is that x.
   Uh, x? well, what’s x? Why, it’s the famous “Mystery Stimu-
lus” that’s fascinated generations of behavioral-psychology stu-
dents, is what it is. (GR 84)
In this case, the linguistic features of the quotation imply
only the narrator’s conversational manner, rather low-key at
that: later on, the infant Slothrop is referred to as “the little
sucker”. The only character contextually available for subjec-
tivity attribution is Edward Pointsman. However, Pointsman,
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whose idiolect is elsewhere portrayed as restrained and schol-
arly, is not a plausible candidate. The colloquial expressions
involved in the scene would seem to be necessarily attributed
to the narrator, consequently barring a figural interpretation.
However, a fair amount of confusion is introduced, as the nar-
rator shortly afterwards refers to Pointsman: “‘[...] We cannot
therefore judge the degree of extinction only by the magnitude
of the reflex or its absence, since there can still be a silent
extinction beyond the zero.’ Italics are Mr. Pointsman’s.” (GR
85.) The behaviorist’s sudden re-appearance in the ‘credit lines’
of the story of Slothrop’s alleged conditioning makes it diffi-
cult to omit the possibility of viewing the whole sequence,
including the controversial colloquial material, as Pointsman’s
meditation on the psychological oddity. Disturbingly, the for-
mal markers of subjectivity and the contextual evidence point
toward opposite interpretations of the passage. If one chooses
to disregard the retroactive contextual clue, the sequence ceases
to be an instance of double-voiced narration and instead turns
into an example of the colloquial idiom of the narrator (cf.
6.2.1). If, on the other hand, one relies on contextual evidence,
the passage is a rather indeterminate case of figural voice.
Duyfhuizen (1981: 13) seems to opt for the latter choice: he
interprets the last sentence of the quotation as an indication of
“the very act” of Pointsman’s reading of Pavlov’s text. Ac-
cording to this reasoning, the passage as a whole would be
attributed to Pointsman. To my mind, the text of Gravity’s
Rainbow does not provide sufficient information to make this
judgment.
In cases like this the anthropomorphic illusions of narra-
tive agents cease to be effective, and the inferential ingenuity
of the reader is consequently impaired. When both the formal
and the contextual clues for subjectivity attribution fail to pro-
vide sufficient evidence, the reader is left alone with his or her
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exquisite indecision. A similar tension between contextual and
formal markers of subjectivity plagues the next example, re-
sulting in indeterminate voice attribution. The excerpt seems
to exhibit some narratorial hesitation, as in the example (6.2.1)
involving Pirate Prentice’s assignments as a fantasist-surro-
gate. This time, the apparent cause for hesitation is the strange-
ness of one of Slothrop’s many amorous performances:
Now something, oh, kind of funny happens here. Not that
Slothrop is really aware of it now, while it’s going on – but
later on, it will occur to him that he was – this may sound odd,
but he was somehow, actually, well, inside his own cock. If you
can imagine such a thing. (GR 470)
The passage is apt once again to elicit a competition be-
tween the narratorial and figural frames. On the one hand, the
hesitant style reminiscent of the previous Prentice-example
suggests a narratorial reading. On the other, the conspicuous
“it will occur to him” invites one to attribute the subsequent
conversational features to Slothrop. Moreover, tense might be
seen as playing an essential role in the interpretation of the
passage: after the parenthetical reference to Slothrop, the nar-
ration shifts from the present to the past tense, as if Slothrop
was recounting the situation afterwards (see also Smetak 1989:
101; Duyfhuizen 1991: par. 13). If this formal clue taken into
consideration, at least the markers of subjectivity in the later
part of the excerpt would be attributed to Slothrop. This inter-
pretation is somewhat vaguely supported by context: Slothrop’s
voice persists during the remainder of the scene. Neither
narratorial nor figural interpretation seem completely satis-
factory, however. The reader is once again left with an over-
abundance of interpretive suggestions.
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To summarize: Gravity’s Rainbow proliferates contradic-
tory passages in which it is often impossible to arrive at a jus-
tifiable voice attribution. Pynchon’s novel not only habitually
obliterates the stylistic difference in DV; sometimes the con-
textual grounds for discrimination are denied as well. The ef-
fect is not one of blatant flouting of the co-operative principle,
however. The voices that ultimately remain indeterminate are
‘disguised’ as normal cases of DV. In other words, the ‘perfect
paranoiac’ whom the novel has trained to follow the most
improbable clues is thus invited to exercise his or her ingenu-
ity, blissfully unaware of the interpretive culs-de-sac just around
the corner.
6.3. De-Stabilizing Idioms
6.3.1. Uncle Charles Overdrive
The above discussions suggest that Gravity’s Rainbow exhib-
its a paradoxical attitude toward voices: on the one hand, the
novel rewards a careful reader by presenting very subtle clues
toward an interpretation of indeterminably ‘voiced’ passages;
on the other, it is equally apt to make a plausible attribution of
voices impossible by presenting formal and contextual mark-
ers of subjectivity that invite contradictory interpretations. I
turn now to consider in more detail the latter, deconstructive
tendency. In what follows, Pynchon’s novel is shown to effec-
tively de-stabilize idioms of both the narrator and characters,
sometimes to the extent of making them seem deliberately ar-
tificial and implausible.
The narratorial sequences of Gravity’s Rainbow are char-
acterized by a variety of stances, guises, and idioms the nov-
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el’s narrative agent provisionally adopts. George Levine is not
exaggerating:
There is, obviously, no simple way to characterize Pynchon’s
prose. […] It is deliberately unstable, parodic, various, ency-
clopedic, fragmented […] Though capable of traditional deco-
rum, it is characteristically indecorous in its refusal to be locked
into a mode. […] It is almost impossible to locate the narrator,
who refuses to protect us with his own disgust, or with ironies
that don’t cancel each other out. (Levine 1976: 118–119; see
also Cooper 1983: 189–201)
In order to analyze this narratorial stream of imitations
and appropriations with the narratological armature, I will
evoke the concept of the Uncle Charles Principle. Christened
by Hugh Kenner (1978) after a character in Portrait of the
Artist as a Young Man, the Uncle Charles Principle (UCP) is
normally used in reference to the migration of characters’ sup-
posed verbal qualities into the narrator’s discourse (e.g
Fludernik 1993: 332–338). Stanzel (1984; 1990) has used for
this purpose the concept of Ansteckung, best translated as ‘con-
tagion’. Since various concepts have been introduced to de-
scribe different aspects of the illusion of blending narratorial
and figural discourses – FID, focalization, reflectorization,
‘contagion’ – UCP evades Ockham’s razor only if it is defined
rather narrowly. Here is Kenner’s (1978: 18) definition of UCP:
“the narrative idiom need not be the narrator’s”. This is hope-
lessly vague. Later on, however, Kenner proposes a more in-
teresting definition: the “Uncle Charles Principle entails writ-
ing about someone much as that someone would choose to be
written about” (Kenner 1978: 21). This definition is simulta-
neously usefully narrow and frighteningly broad. Let me first
turn to the narrow sense, UCP as the intrusion of a character’s
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supposed verbal traits into narratorial discourse in situations
which do not involve speech and thought representation.
This definition makes UCP distinguishable from FID
proper (cf. McHale 1992: 273n.5): UCP refers to cases that
would be characterized as FID, if they involved the represen-
tation of speech or thought. Moreover, of course, UCP may
function as a formal clue toward judging a passage as inter-
nally focalized. Examples of the character-related ‘contagion’
abound in Gravity’s Rainbow; the novel makes use of UCP
flexibly and often. The narrator’s dynamic linguistic identity
surfaces most explicitly in the novel’s final one hundred or so
pages, in the novel’s allegedly “anti-paranoid” (Slade 1974:
240) phase. This is the narrator, introducing the super-hero
rescue team of the Floundering Four:
Rescue team will consist of Myrtle Miraculous flyin’ in here in
shoulderpadded maroon dress, the curlers still up in her hair
and a tough frown fer dragging her outa Slumberland [...]
Maximilian, high square pomaded head and a superthin
mustache come zooming here out of his “front” job, suave
manager of the club Oogabooga, where Beacon Street aristoc-
racy rubs elbows ev’ry night with Roxbury winos ‘n’
dopefiends, yeah hi Tyrone, heah Ah is! H’lo Moitle baby,
hyeah, hyeah, hyeah. (GR 675)
In this short passage, the narrator’s style transforms from
the neutral/official “will consist of”, via Myrtle’s dialectal “fer
dragging her outa Slumberland”, to Maximilian’s slick hip-
ster idiom. Immediately afterwards, the style for a while be-
comes noticeably more bookish as the narrator turns to char-
acterize Marcel, the most cerebral member of the four
superheroes, at length:
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Marcel, a mechanical chessplayer dating back to the Second
Empire, actually build a century ago for the great conjuror
Robert-Houdin, very serious-looking French refugee kid, funny
haircut with the ears perfectly outlined in hair that starts abruptly
a quarter-inch strip of bare plastic skin away, black patent-shiny
hair, hornrim glasses, a rather remote manner [...]. (GR 675)
While the latter quotation by no means exemplifies the
narrator’s maximally elevated style (funny and kid suggest
slight colloquiality), it still illustrates the dynamic of UCP quite
adequately: the character who at the moment is the subject of
narration, or ‘on stage’, has an effect on the narrator’s style.
For a realistic anthropomorphic narratorial agent this is obvi-
ously impossible. In terms of reading experience, however,
the instance of UCP does not constitute a drastic violation of
narrative conventions (for the simple reason that UCP is a
narrative convention; see Fludernik 1993: 333). True to its
tendency of using conventions to their logical limits, however,
Pynchon’s novel occasionally applies UCP to the point of ut-
ter silliness. This happens, for instance, in an episode of mod-
ern-day piracy involving, among others, Frau Gnahb and her
son Otto. As Frau Gnahb steers her pirate boat to the side of
the continuously partying ship Anubis, Otto’s presence infil-
trates all layers of narratorial discourse and affects the sup-
posedly onomatopoetic representation of sound effects:
 “OTTO! slams her boat into the Anubis, a most godawful
earsplitting Otto...” (GR 529; see also 651.)
The choice of “OTTO!” as the clash of colliding vessels
is not without thematic motivation; the troublesome relation-
ship between the insecure adolescent and his dominating
mother looms behind the scene and is dealt at length else-
where in the novel. (According to this reasoning, in fact, the
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instance of UCP might actually relate to Frau Gnahb and her
supposed mental disposition.) The ludicrous effect which the
Gnahbs have on the scene steers us toward the broader defini-
tion of UCP. Let me now return to Kenner. It seems that the
full anti-mimetic potential of Kenner’s concept is yet to be
discovered. This is evident when he discusses the
‘Eumaeus’episode of Ulysses. According to Kenner, Bloom’s
presence as the subject of narration affects it “as if for these
fifty pages he held the pen”. This is visible, for instance, in the
representation of speech; Bloom is the only character speak-
ing with polysyllables, while other characters talk realistically.
The impression is as if Bloom “could reserve the most stylish
lines for himself”39. (Kenner 1978: 38; see also Perry 1979.)
Understood in this way, UCP ceases to be mere ‘contagion’
between narrator’s and character’s discourses. Instead, it be-
comes a structural principle potentially affecting the narration
in general. Paradoxically, Kenner’s proposal is at the same
time radically anti-mimetic and thoroughly illusionistic (in
Fludernik’s sense). It is anti-mimetic insofar as it explodes the
notion of a realistic narrator persona, though insisting on a
narrating instance40. On the other hand, it is illusionistic in the
sense that it bestows on a character the power and responsibil-
ity to determine the form and content of narration in many
ways. It seems that there is room for two UCPs: one is ‘realist’
and pertains to issues of idiomatic ‘contagion’ between char-
acters and the narrator (the narrow definition); the other is ‘anti-
realist’ and goes beyond idiom appropriation to potentially
involve a wholesale re-formation of narrative. However un-
natural and anti-mimetic, UCP is a vehicle of naturalization;
it allows the reader to attribute narrative anomalies to charac-
ters’ individual traits.
Clearly, the narrow and more realist definition of UCP –
the intrusion of a character’s idiom into the narration – is more
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useful in terms of general narratology. However, in the anti-
realist narratologies of Pynchon and Joyce, the broad defini-
tion can be put to interesting uses. There is a difference, how-
ever. While Kenner’s examples of Joyce’s UCP are relatively
moderate and require meticulous close-reading, Gravity’s Rain-
bow includes some rather conspicuous instances. Some of the
most blatant formal peculiarities invite interpretation as UCP.
The following constitutes an example of this.
The tenth episode of the novel begins with a pair of seem-
ingly meaningless letters, the first addressed to “The Kenosha
Kid”, the second to “Tyrone Slothrop, Esq”. Immediately af-
ter the letters the reader, without any explanation, is provided
with several miniature sociodramas set in different diegetic
contexts. The only thing connecting the scenes is the phrase:
“You never did the Kenosha Kid”. Finally, an explanation is
provided:
These changes on the text “You never did the Kenosha Kid”
are occupying Slothrop’s awareness as the doctor leans in out
of the white overhead to wake him and begin the session. The
needle slips without pain into the vein just outboard of the hol-
low of the crook of his elbow: 10% Sodium Amytal, one cc at
a time, as needed.
Hence, the forays from standard prose format are retro-
spectively revealed as Slothrop’s dreams or hallucinations in-
duced by the chemical trance. After a couple of further exer-
cises on the “Kenosha Kid”, the narration turns to describe at
length Slothrop’s creative reminiscence of a night at the
Roseland Ballroom, his dive into the toilet and so forth (see
4.3). For present purposes, the most significant lesson to learn
from this scene is that there seem to be no restrictions in
Pynchon’s UCP. All of the aspects of the narration, including
the choice of the basic format of the narration, are liable to be
155
influenced by the character’s presence as the subject of narra-
tion.
Uncle Charles lurks behind some of the musical scenes of
the novel, as well. The “Loonies on Leave” musical scene
serves as an example. After his escape from the Casino
Hermann Goering, Slothrop begins his pursuit of rocket intel-
ligence in the cafés of Zürich. Before coming across any inter-
esting information and prior to meeting either of the spies,
Mario Schweitar (GR 260) or Francisco Squalidozzi (GR 263),
Slothrop evidently confronts a number of less plausible spies
and agents. This “first wave of corporate spies” (GR 259) is
presented in the form of a musical stage-show “Loonies on
Leave” that involves dancing, audience participation (provided
that Slothrop is considered to be part of the audience), and a
chorus line that is “divided not into the conventional Boys and
Girls but into Keepers and Nuts”. The scene is easily attribut-
able to Slothrop and his strange situation and disposition, even
though the ultimate reason for utilizing the format of musical
remains a mystery.41
Mere consideration of the characters’ potential influence
on the narratorial voice is insufficient in the case of Gravity’s
Rainbow. The diegetic context is also decisive in terms of the
narrator’s stylistic choices. An example of this is the frequently
discussed church scene, where Mexico and Jessica Swanlake
attend an Advent vesper. After a description of the event, the
narrator turns to discuss at length the struggle on the British
home front in all its crude reality. The context of the narration,
the ceremonial situation, seems somehow to affect the style of
narration:
listen: this is the War’s evensong, the War’s canonical hour,
and the night is real. Black greatcoats crowd together, empty
hoods full of dense, church-interior shadows. Over the coast
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the Wrens are working late, down inside cold and gutted shells,
their torches are newborn stars in the tidal evening. [...] In the
pipefitters’ sheds, icicled, rattling when the gales are in the
Straits, here’s thousands of old used toothpaste tubes [...], thou-
sands of somber man-mornings made tolerable [..]. (GR 130)
Or is it the context? Jacqueline Smetak (1989: 96) at-
tributes the elevated style of the passage to Mexico, a “poetic
and deeply pained” young man. Thomas Schaub (1981: 124–
126) hears in the episode the meditative oratory of a voice
identifiable with the narrator (see also McHale 1992: ch. 4). I
am more inclined to accept Schaub’s interpretation than
Smetak’s; to my mind, the Vesper-episode does not provide
enough evidence to be judged as Mexico’s meditation on the
war. The narrator’s reverent style is maintained, even though
it proceeds to describe the quite mundane process of recycling
metal for the purposes of the war industry. Thus the immedi-
ate diegetic context seems to override the subject of the dis-
course in determining the idiom of the narrator. Shortly after
the quoted passage the narrator turns to metaphysical consid-
erations of war. In this complex sequence the narration oscil-
lates between everyday glimpses of wartime life and a more
serious contemplation of war and its consequences. The
diegetic situation, the Advent vesper, envelops the narrator’s
meditation and has a unique effect on its style. The contrast
between the presented reality of war and ceremony is at its
most blatant in the description of the members of the male
choir, a group of “piss-swollen men suffering from acute lower
backs and all-day hangovers, wishing death on officers they
truly hate […] out here performing for strangers, give you this
evensong, climaxing now with its rising fragment of some
ancient scale, voices overlapping three and fourfold, up, echo-
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ing filling the entire hollow of the church […] – praise be to
God!” (GR 136.)
It is easy to see that the narration of Gravity’s Rainbow
stretches the traditional understanding of UCP. Certainly the
narrator’s voice frequently acquires a particular tone like a
character ‘on stage’. However, the phenomenon goes far be-
yond mere appropriation of tone or idiom: all levels of narra-
tion are potential targets of UCP. In addition to character in-
fluence, the diegetic context can affect the idiom of the narra-
tor. These observations prompt one to reformulate Pynchon’s
UCP: any feature of the diegetic situation can affect any as-
pect of narration. In all likelihood, this is not what Kenner
had in mind, though it might also turn out to be true about
Ulysses. Perhaps we should re-christen the broad definition of
UCP as the Kenosha Kid Principle.
The Kenosha Kid Principle (KKP) is, like UCP, a vehicle
of naturalization. It elevates the local diegetic situation into
the position of determining the structural properties of narra-
tive. As such, it is arguably more flexible and useful than glo-
bal interpretive strategies such as “Gravity’s Rainbow is a film”,
or “Gravity’s Rainbow is a Menippea”, or “Gravity’s Rainbow
is a dream/hallucination”, or “Gravity’s Rainbow is a
poststructuralist text”. However, the newly established princi-
ple is, still, a naturalizing strategy and consequently cannot
explain away all irregularities of the narrative voice. Some
features of the narrative voice are not recuperable in terms of
the diegetic situation or personage. I will consider the fallibil-
ity of the narrator and the apparent splitting of the narrator’s
voice.
While the narrator of Gravity’s Rainbow generally is pre-
sented as an infallible stylistic genius, there are sequences that
seem to require a certain amount of narratorial blundering to
be most effective. The narrator utilizes both technological jar-
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gon and religious or mystic vocabulary in the episode “Some
Characteristics of Imipolex G”:
Imipolex G is the first plastic that is actually erectile. Under
suitable stimuli, the chains grow cross-links, which stiffen the
molecule and increase intermolecular attraction so that this
Peculiar Polymer runs far outside the known phase diagrams,
from limp rubbery amorphous to amazing perfect tessellation,
hardness, brilliant transparency [...] (slowly gleaming in the
Void. Silver and black. Curvewarped reflections of stars flow-
ing across, down the full length of, round and round in merid-
ians exact as the meridians of acupuncture. What are the stars
but points in the body of God where we insert the healing nee-
dles of our terror and longing? [...]) (GR 699)
The beginning of the excerpt is presumably a fair approxi-
mation of light chemistry jargon. The impression is, however,
betrayed by some unorthodox word choices: would a chem-
ist’s textbook really play with alliteration as in Peculiar Poly-
mer? Does not the word limp seem a bit crude in scientific
discourse, particularly as it is presented in juxtaposition with
the high-brow tessellation? The characterization of the plastic
is rendered even more dubious, of course, by the parenthetical
display of ‘polymer mysticism’. A final blow to academic cred-
ibility is administered by linking the pseudo-scientific gibber-
ish directly to the novel’s paranoid themes at the end of the
episode (GR 700). The ‘flaws’ in the narrator’s command of
the jargon of applied chemistry serve as warnings against an
innocent anthropomorphic interpretation of the episode. The
novel not only presents narratorial appropriations of styles but
it also plays with their failures. One ‘explanation’ for this has
been offered above (3.2): the novel’s strategy of making the
narrator trip and stumble to make the hierarchy of narrative
seem artificial. Passages such as the above do not call for natu-
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ralization. In fact, the only naturalization they allow is a naïve
reading that overlooks narrative quirks in order to extract the
thematic content of the text.
The most disconcerting cases involve an apparent split-
ting of the narratorial voice. The narrator’s extreme stylistic
variation is mostly horizontal and linear: sequences featuring
different narratorial masks alternate, sometimes very rapidly,
but usually in succession. The horizontal variation does not
allow the reader to construct a coherent and realistically sta-
ble teller figure for the whole narrative, but makes reasonably
sure that the narrator has only one voice at a time. The vertical
splitting of the narrator’s voice, by contrast, presents the reader
with brief sequences arguably featuring two competing
narratorial voices. This is clearly an explicit metafictional de-
vice: it reveals the ‘told’ nature of the narrative by drawing
attention to the context of narrating. Consider the following
excerpt, featuring Slothrop’s attempts to learn the V-2 rocket
by heart:
“Boundary-layer temperature T sub e, what is this? rises
exponentially till Brennschluss, around 70 mile range, a-and
then there’s a sharp cusp [...]. Stays pretty steady till re-entry,”
blablabla. The bridge music here, bright with xylophones, is
based on some old favorite that will comment, ironically but
gently, on what is transpiring – a tune such as “School Days,
School Days,” or “Come, Josephine, in My flying Machine”
[...] take your pick [...]. (GR 222–223)
The narrator turns from the (apparently boring) represen-
tation of character discourse to the description of the scene as
a theatrical performance or a movie, complete with “bridge
music”. As a result, the reader has to accept that the narrator
simultaneously tells the story and presents a commentary on
it. This is at best a partial interpretation, however: immedi-
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ately after the passage above the narrator naturalizes the musi-
cal accompaniment of the scene by presenting “a number of
musicians in the corner groaning and shaking their heads [...].
Bad gig, bad gig...” (see also GR 538, 713). There is a ludi-
crous possibility that the playing of the “bridge music” actu-
ally transpires in the world of the novel (constituting diegetic
music). Thus, the metafictive effect of the dual narratorial voice
is fleeting at best.
This vertical split in the narrator’s voice can also serve as
a vehicle for implicit narratorial self-criticism. Describing at
length the achievements of the architects Albert Speer and Etzel
Ölsch, the narrator’s voice splits in a way to suggest that at
least a part of the narratorial agent feels it has become overly
excited or unhinged: “Imagine his astonishment on finding
that the parabola was also the shape of the path intended for
the rocket through space. (What he actually said was, ‘Oh,
that’s nice.’)”. For a moment, the narrator’s voice seems to
consist both of an enthusiastic paranoid and a down-to-earth
reporter of facts (see Cooper 1983: 199).
To conclude, I will discuss yet another instance of divided
narratorial voice, a surprisingly serious one. Levine (1976: 132–
133) discusses the narrator’s voice with reference to a scene
depicting Pökler’s journey through the prison camp Dora.
Levine aptly calls the following Pynchon’s “high seriousness”:
The odors of shit, death, sweat, sickness, mildew, piss, the
breathing of Dora, wrapped him as he crept in staring at the
naked corpses being carried out now that America was so close,
to be stacked in front of the crematoriums, the men’s penises
hanging, their toes clustering white and round as pearls… each
face so perfect, so individual, the lips stretched back into
deathgrins, a whole silent audience caught at the punch line of
the joke. […]
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   Where it was darkest and smelled the worst, Pökler found a
woman lying, a random woman. He sat for half an hour hold-
ing her bone hand. She was breathing. Before he left, he took
off his gold wedding ring and put it on the woman’s thin finger,
curling her hand to keep it from sliding off. If she lived, the
ring would be good for a few meals, or a blanket, or a night
indoors, or a ride home… (GR 432–433)
In Levine’s (1976: 132) view, the passage attests to the
“high magic of lowness”, despite the “Pynchonian tricks to
short-circuit solemnities”. Subtly, the sequence seems to merge
two competing narratorial voices. On the one hand, we have a
detached and naturalistic observer capable of appreciating the
analogy between decomposing prisoner corpses and an audi-
ence, and associating the toes of the dead with pearls. On the
other hand, the horrendous graphic descriptions such as “pe-
nises dangling” are juxtaposed with quite differently toned
“each face so perfect, so individual”, not to mention the beau-
tiful second paragraph of the quotation, of which only the last
sentence is attributable to Pökler’s subjective voice. This ex-
ample points toward a hitherto undiscussed function of
narratorial heteroglossia in Gravity’s Rainbow. The narrator’s
unstable identity as a ludic “trickster”, apt to play with read-
ers’ expectations and narrative conventions alike, can para-
doxically be a source of solemnity. In cases such as the above,
precisely the elusive ventriloquist acts of the narrator make it
capable of producing “high-serious” passages – at least provi-
sionally.
With the last example we are again knee-deep in anthro-
pomorphic interpretive strategies. Despite Gravity’s Rainbow’s
best efforts to de-naturalize any idea of a narrator persona, the
reader spares no effort to will it back, even as a split voice
belonging to a split personality.
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6.3.2. Deconstructing Character Discourse
 In the previous section, I analyzed the ways in which
Pynchon’s novel disrupts the notion of an idiomatically stable
narratorial voice. In what follows, I will discuss the novel’s
similar tendencies with respect to character discourse. While
characters do not generally perform ventriloquist stunts akin
to those of the narrator, the consistency and credibility of their
voices are frequently undermined. As a result, the idiomatic
indeterminacy of the narrator is not the only variable in voice
attribution. The idiom of Slothrop, the most complex charac-
ter in the novel, is often portrayed as generally casual and heav-
ily colloquial:
“Who’s pretending?” lighting a cigarette, shaking his forelock
through the smoke, “jeepers, Tantivy, listen I don’t want to upset
you but... I mean I’m four years overdue’s what it is, it could
happen any time, the next second, right, just suddenly... shit...
just zero, just nothing... and...” (GR 25)
In addition, Slothrop’s speech and thought frequently
embraces both military and adolescent slang. Slothrop is defi-
nitely not presented as particularly talented, or considerate, in
terms of matching linguistic registers to communicative situa-
tions (e.g. GR 207, 263, 500). Nevertheless, Slothrop’s idi-
omatic inertia and oral communication, at times bordering on
the incomprehensible, are frequently juxtaposed with remark-
ably elevated passages of thought representation. Immediately
after the above quotation the reader is treated to the following
free indirect thought:
It’s nothing he can see or lay hands on – sudden gases, a vio-
lence upon the air and no trace afterward... a Word, spoken
with no warning into your ear, and then silence forever. Be-
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yond its invisibility [...] here is its real horror, mocking, prom-
ising him death with German and precise confidence, laughing
down all of Tantivy’s decencies... no, no bullet with fins, Ace...
not the Word, the one Word that rips apart the day... (GR 25)
The end of the passage very effectively evokes Slothrop’s
subjectivity by juxtaposing Slothrop’s ‘real’ spoken idiom with
the stylistically more refined part, inviting a reading as a pe-
culiar internal dialogue (see also GR 225; Levine 1999). The
serious tone and thematic of the sequence are echoed in nu-
merous contexts throughout the novel, often attributable to
Slothrop (e.g. GR 29, 225, 472, 510), but to other characters
as well: for instance, Katje Borgesius (GR 97) and Enzian (GR
520). The contrast between the spoken idiom and the presented
thoughts is most noticeable in Slothrop’s case, however. The
observation that passages such as the above can and should be
contextually attributed to characters does not make them in
any way standard. There are layers of unnaturalness here.
First, the discrepancy between Slothrop’s speech and
thought is quite sufficient to interfere with the construction of
a distinction between character discourses. Second, it is very
troubling that nearly all of the major characters in the novel
appear to have the inner lives of mystics and also tremendous
capacities for elevated inner speech. Combined, these obser-
vations are enough to de-naturalize the notion of consistent
character idioms42, and not very subtly. Of course, the prob-
lem of character discourses is linked with the general overlap
of character identities observed, among others, by Duyfhuizen
(1991: 27): “characters in GR are semiotic systems as much as
they are represented entities produced by characterological
reading. Moreover, they are constructs produced by other char-
acters”. The general elevatedness of thought is apt to discour-
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age a realist interpretation of passages of character discourse,
thus challenging characterological reading.
The novel de-naturalizes characters’ discourse in purely
formal ways, too. On a miniature scale, Slothrop’s stutter on
the word a-and (sometimes also o-or) produces the same ef-
fect. When inspected more closely, the apparent personal de-
ficiency of oral skills turns out to be very contagious; also
Roger Mexico, Richard M. Zhlubb and the narrator are
plagued by it. The frequently altered spelling of the third per-
son singular verb form, sez, is more discriminating in this re-
spect; it is found only in the discourses of the narrator, Slothrop,
and Thomas Pynchon (see e.g. 1984; also Levine 2001: 122;
McHale 1992: 100), perhaps suggesting an affinity among the
three?
The idioms of the puzzling “specialists” that occasionally
intrude into the narration of Gravity’s Rainbow provides a fi-
nal example of the gross and hilarious de-naturalization of
character discourse. This is at its most explicit in the follow-
ing, apparently verbatim, quotation:
“It is experienced,” writes Shetzline in his classic study [of the
drug Oneirine], “in a subjective sense … uh … well. Put it this
way. It’s like stuffing wedges of silver sponge, right, into, your
brain!” (GR 389)
Sequences such as the above contribute to the novel’s
project of making scientific and scholarly efforts look laugh-
able (see e.g. GR 77, 275, 353). In addition, they represent the
novel’s strategy of transgressing against the conventions of
discourse presentation at its most explicit. The reader is urged
now to appreciate the difference between the above cases of
frolicsome play, and the previously analyzed instances of sub-
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tle clues leading to precise voice attribution. Paranoia takes
you only so far, as every student of Pynchon knows.
After dwelling on the novel’s somewhat dismaying strat-
egy of frustrating readers’ attempts to distinguish between
character discourses, it is perhaps uplifting to conclude with a
passage that looks as if it is about to deconstruct the dichotomy
narratorial/figural, but instead turns into a mere splitting of a
character discourse. Consider the following passage, in which
the Hungarian emigrant-scientist Rózsavölgyi becomes the
unfortunate target of Roger Mexico’s fury:
   “I say,” offers Rózsavölgyi […]
   “You say what,” Roger has been screaming for a while.
   “I say,” sez Rózsavölgyi, again.
   “You say ‘I say’? Is that it? Then you should have said, ‘I say,
“I say”’”
   “I did.”
   “No, no, – you said, ‘I say’ once, is what you –”
   “A-ha! But I said it again. I-said it …twice.”
   “But that was after I asked you the question – you can’t tell
me the two ‘I say’s were both part of the same statement,” un-
less, “that’s asking me to be unreasonably,” unless it’s really
true that, “credulous, and around you that’s a form of,” that
we’re the same person, and that the whole exchange was ONE
SINGLE THOUGHT yaaaggghhh and that means, “insanity,
Rózsavölgyi –” (GR 634)
McHoul and Wills interpret the passage in a clever way
by observing a collapse of narrative hierarchy insofar as “the
narrator’s ‘own’ speech-quote marks are dropped and inter-
rupted, threatening the very separation between speakers, and
between them and the narrator.” As a result, “the text […] is
becoming flat as the levels of use and mention, serious and
parasitic, normal and citational disappear” and the reader is
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left with “only material marks on the page”. (McHoul and Wills
1990: 53.) Now, this is a post-rhetorical interpretation; what
would a rhetorical one be like?
Interestingly, McHoul and Wills seem to proceed from the
assumption that anything outside quotation marks is narratorial.
Granted, this is the unmarked case; however, considering the
way in which Pynchon’s novel misuses typographical conven-
tions, this is far from self-evident. No reader of Gravity’s Rain-
bow would on page 634 expect such a convention to be in
effect. In fact, the probable reading strategy for the passage is
to try to read everything in the last sentence as Mexico’s direct
speech. As I understand it, this is how McHoul and Wills (ibid.)
finally interpret the sequence. But, of course, it does not add
up; the passage does not make sense in this way.
It would seem, by contrast, that dropping quotation marks
here serves the simple purpose of distinguishing between char-
acter speech and thought. According to this interpretation, the
passage actually includes two direct discourses, Mexico’s ut-
tered and unuttered speech. As has been discussed above
(6.2.2), the novel also juggles with Mexico’s internal/external
speech elsewhere. The present case is quite ordinary in all re-
spects, except for the simultaneous presentation. Both build
on the dialogue; the point of divergence is the first “unless”.
“Unless” and “that” are repeated, perhaps to create the illu-
sion of the simultaneity of the processes of speech and thought:
Speech:
“But that was after I asked you the question – you can’t tell me
the two ‘I say’s were both part of the same statement, that’s
asking me to be unreasonably credulous, and around you that’s
a form of insanity, Rózsavölgyi –”
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Speech/thought/speech:
“But that was after I asked you the question – you can’t tell me
the two ‘I say’s were both part of the same statement,” unless
it’s really true that we’re the same person, and that the whole
exchange was ONE SINGLE THOUGHT yaaaggghhh and that
means, “insanity, Rózsavölgyi –”
A mimetic, logocentric interpretation, to be sure – it does
have some appeal, however.
6.4. Voices, Frames, and Textual Analysis
Not surprisingly, the novel provides a fairly accurate meta-
phoric representation of the simultaneous subtlety and
deconstructiveness of its vocal qualities. It is inscribed in an
analysis of a particular rendition of the “suppressed quartet
from the Haydn Op. 76”. The voices of Gravity’s Rainbow, in
musical terms:
The viola is a ghost, grainy-brown, translucent, sighing in and
out of the other Voices. Dynamic shifts abound. Imperceptible
lifts, platooning notes together preparing for changes in loud-
ness, what the Germans call “breath-pauses,” skitter among the
phrases. Perhaps tonight it is due to the playing of Gustav and
Andre, but after a while the listener starts actually hearing the
pauses instead of the notes – his ear gets tickled the way your
eye does staring at a recco map until bomb craters flip inside
out to become muffins risen above the tin, or ridges fold to
valleys, sea and land flicker across quicksilver – so the silences
dance in this quartet. A-and wait’ll those kazoos come on! (GR
713)
Discussing the multiplicity of voices in Gravity’s Rain-
bow, one must at least provisionally suppress obvious insights
about the novel’s narration in order to be able to hear the “im-
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perceptible lifts” and “changes in loudness” of the narrative
voices. The subtle and often remote contextual clues linking
the passages of dual voice narration indeed make the reader at
times “hear the pauses instead of the notes”; sometimes the
connections between the voices are as important as the voices
themselves. Nonetheless, the novel betrays its refined craft by
unveiling the artificiality of both narrator’s and characters’
discourses – the kazoos!
What is the meaning of Pynchon’s voices? Perhaps they
serve a political purpose? This is what Smetak (1989: 101)
argues. According to her view, the multiple voices try to make
readers respect the true complexity of things. This seems plau-
sible enough. From an alternate point of view, Fludernik (1993:
331–332) attaches a political significance to the democracy of
voices that refuse to be organized into a hierarchy and thus
produce a true Bakhtinian polyphony. For present purposes, it
is enough to note the patently Pynchonian attitude of “approach
and avoid” (V. 55) toward the convention of narrative voice.
Again, the familiar deconstructive logic looms behind the text,
stretching narrative conventions and narratological concepts
alike.
The point of departure for this discussion was Fludernik’s
frame-theoretical account of speech and thought representa-
tion. Gravity’s Rainbow supports Fludernik’s holistic account
in many ways. The novel underscores the status of narrative
voices as interpretive phenomena by forcing readers to alter-
nate between interpretive frames. It cunningly leads readers
into interpretive culs-de-sac that make tangible the processes
of inference that are involved in the reading of double-voiced
narration. It illustrates the artificial nature of all speech and
thought representation by blatantly de-naturalizing the narra-
tor’s and characters’ discourses alike.
169
The analysis also demonstrated the virtues of more tradi-
tional narratological scrutiny. While the cognitive schemata
of Natural Narratology provide a plausible explanation for the
attribution of narrative voices, they do not provide sufficient
tools for narrative analysis. This is not a flaw; cognitive
narratology programmatically builds on the reader’s capacity
to infer meanings, voices and worlds from a text. The process
of inference can be made at least partially visible by examin-
ing both the formal and contextual clues the reader is likely to
use in his or her interpretive task. This is, with some reserva-
tions, the way in which Fludernik proceeds in providing tex-
tual evidence for Natural Narratology. Fludernik even goes so
far as to characterize Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology as a
“last-ditch effort to make linguistics meaningful within a wider
narratological and critical arena” (Fludernik 1996: 373). This
sums up the ethos of both of Fludernik’s groundbreaking stud-
ies (1993, 1996), the simultaneous construction of a holistic
theory of narrativity and reliance on meticulous textual analy-
sis.
In the light of the above analysis it is fitting to revisit
Fludernik’s distinction between illusionistic and theo-
retico-analytical approaches to fiction (ch. 7). This discussion
has openly endorsed an illusionistic approach in its reliance
on a communicational model of narrative, and by assuming
the pseudo-existence of the various textual agents that that
model entails. In a sense, then, this chapter has willingly
“repeat[ed] the readers’ interpretive moves on a theoretical
level” (Fludernik 2001a: 623) and been unwary of the “ever-
present danger” of “slipp[ing] from abstract terms to person-
alized narrative instances” (Fludernik 1996: 197). It has be-
come abundantly clear, however, that there is no other way to
analyze and interpret the voices echoing in the novel. In Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow, the formal markers of voice attribution are hope-
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lessly deficient. However, whereas Fludernik is content to
designate the voices of Gravity’s Rainbow as fundamentally
indeterminate, it has been argued that a deliberate emphasis
on contextual, even thematic, information can still provide
satisfactory analyses of many passages. The interpretive clues
that the novel’s narration (at least provisionally!) provides the
reader are not merely intersentential idiomatic linkages or con-
textual attributions of expressive textual elements. Coming to
terms with the heteroglossia of the novel is possible only
through a fundamentally illusionistic yet rigorous textual analy-
sis
The variety of ways in which Gravity’s Rainbow makes
the attribution of narrative voices simultaneously possible and
impossible poses significant challenges to narratology. None-
theless, narratology is the only form of scholarly activity that
has even a meager chance of producing good analytical re-
sults. While one cannot definitely describe the voice qualities
of Gravity’s Rainbow with the mixed bag approach of tradi-
tional narratology tentatively married to Natural Narratology,
one certainly can produce useful probabilistic readings.
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7. Narratology and the Worlds of
Fiction
The preceding theoretical and practical assessments of cogni-
tive narratology suggest that new narratological models are
still inescapably tied to the structuralist tradition of narrative
analysis. The analysis of the voices of Gravity’s Rainbow has
demonstrated, furthermore, that this linkage is nothing to be
worried about. From the purview of Pynchon criticism, the
juxtaposition of Natural Narratology and Gravity’s Rainbow
has illustrated, once again, the novel’s tendency to creatively
undercut all kinds of theoretical conceptions of narrative, ho-
listic or featurist. The following two chapters will consist of a
theoretical discussion of possible world narratology, and a
theorypractical (Phelan and Rabinowitz 1994) attempt at its
application.
Marie-Laure Ryan’s study Possible Worlds, Artificial In-
telligence, and Narrative Theory (1991) is to date arguably
the most significant attempt to build a comprehensive
narratological theory utilizing the insights provided by possi-
ble world semantics. While theorists such as Pavel (e.g. 1986)
and Dolezel (e.g. 1998) have produced influential theories of
narrative semantics and fictional worlds, their works have not
specifically aimed at the development of sophisticated
narratological tools of textual analysis. Ryan (1991) not only
reinterprets the semantics of fiction, but also propounds alter-
native accounts of the structural make-up of narrative litera-
ture in the framework of possible worlds. In this respect, her
strategy of incorporating possible world semantics to literary
study is diametrically opposed to Ronen’s (1996): Ryan does
not merely utilize possible worlds as a broad interpretive meta-
phor, or acknowledge the shared philosophical presuppositions
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of modal semantics and literary theory. Instead, she “makes it
literary” by creating a version of possible world semantics
suited for the analysis of fictional worlds.
In what follows I will discuss in some detail Ryan’s con-
tributions to solving traditional narratological problems with
the apparatus of possible world semantics. In particular, I will
explicate Ryan’s views of narrativity, tellability, and unreli-
able narration. Along with Ryan’s analysis of the fictional uni-
verse, the topic of unreliable narration will be returned to in
chapter 8. Furthermore, Ryan’s views of the make-believe na-
ture of fiction and the concepts of narrativity and tellability
will be revisited in chapter 9.The most fundamental insight of
Ryan’s account of fictional universes is the concept of fictional
recentering. Reflecting the difference between real and fic-
tional systems of possible worlds, fictional recentering shifts
the center of the narrative universe from the actual world (AW)
to the world presented as actual in the narrative, the textual
actual world (TAW):
For the duration of our immersion in a work of fiction, the
realm of possibilities is thus recentered around the sphere which
the narrator presents as the actual world. This recentering pushes
the reader into a new system of actuality and possibility. As a
traveler to this system, the reader of fiction discovers not only
a new actual world [TAW], but a variety of APWs [later to be
identified as textual APWs] revolving around it. (Ryan 1991:
22.)
The concept of fictional recentering is the basis of Ryan’s
(13, 28–29) intensional/illocutionary approach to fictional
worlds. In this account, fiction is interpreted as a pretended
embedded communication in a “fictional game” no different
from games of make-believe. In short: as readers of fictional
narratives, we are invited to pretend that the text is an utter-
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ance of a narrator to a narratee, both of whom are members of
the fictional world, or the author’s substitute speaker and sub-
stitute hearer in Ryan’s nomenclature. (Ryan 1991: 23, 75–
76.) Thus Ryan describes fictional communication, with im-
portant amendments, in Searlean terms, as pretend speech acts.
The bold project of propounding a comprehensive descrip-
tion of “voices and worlds” of fiction in the framework of
speech act theory and possible world semantics prompts Ryan
(1991: ch. 4) to invent anew the categories of traditional
narratology. Since Ryan bases her account on the theory of
fiction as pretend speech acts, the terminology she proposes
only partially overlaps with the concepts used in the ‘fictional
communication’ model of Genette. For the most part, this is
to the advantage of Ryan’s conception; frequently, it provides
more nuanced interpretations of the communicative structure
of narratives. Before examining the analytical input of Ryan’s
theory, permit me to discuss her accounts of the linked prob-
lems of narrativity and tellability.
From the perspective of the intensional/illocutionary theory
of fiction, being a narrative means “bringing a universe into
life, and conveying to the reader that at the center of this uni-
verse resides an actual world where individuals exist and where
events take place”. In addition to this requirement, Ryan con-
tends that narratives have to be rooted in history and must
represent temporal relations. These considerations of
narrativehood do not wholly separate fictionality and
narrativity. Fictionality, for Ryan, is a special case of narrativity,
one in which the fictional recentering of the projected narra-
tive universe is obligatory. (Ryan 1991: 259.)
Discussing the problem of narrativity further, however,
Ryan gravitates toward an account of narrativity as a purely
interpretive concept. In this later definition, narrativity relies
on the reader’s ability to infer a “rationalized sequence” from
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the text: “The rationalized sequence is the plot of the text, and
a text is narrative to the extent that it invites its reader to inter-
pret is by organizing its contents in a narrative network [...] A
mere numeration of physical events, without statements of
mental events or of logical connections, can be read as narra-
tive text if the reader is able to supply the missing links and
nodes”. (Ryan 1991: 265; see also Kearns 1999: 40.) In an
ingenious move, faced with the apparently non-essential and
elusive nature of narrativity, Ryan (ibid.) proposes a distinc-
tion between literal and figural narrativity in order to explain
the possibility on “extrapolating narrative structures from both
narrative and nonnarrative discourse”. The notion of figural
narrativity underlies “the efforts to find a dramatic develop-
ment in the fragment ‘Ithaca’ of Ulysses”. (Ryan 1991: 265–
266; see also Ryan 1992b.)
However, even figural narrativity has its limits, according
to Ryan (1991: 267; Ryan 1992b), narrativity is “exploded” in
the anti-narrative “collages of the postmodern novel: underly-
ing the text is a proliferation of incomplete narrative graphs
which tease the reader with the promise of an intelligibility
never to be achieved”. Interestingly, Ryan’s view of narrativity
is reminiscent of the experiential interpretation proposed in
Fludernik’s Natural Narratology (see ch. 2.2; Fludernik 1996).
First, almost trivially, Ryan’s notion of “narrativity as uni-
verse-projecting” is largely compatible with Fludernik’s view
that narrativity is the result of a “ruling consciousness” re-
flected in a text. We should, after all, recall that Ryan consid-
ers fiction a game of make-believe involving the reader’s pos-
tulation of a substitute speaker and a substitute hearer in a
pretend speech act. Thus the texts that Ryan’s model judges as
narratives by definition allow for an experiential reading à la
Fludernik, as well.
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Second, more interestingly, both Fludernik’s and Ryan’s
accounts of narrativity ultimately resort to the postulation of
an event structure underlying the (potential) narrative discourse.
As was argued in chapter 5, Fludernik does this by stretching
the explanatory potential of the experiential model of narrativity
too thin. Ryan, by contrast, proposes a composite definition of
narrativity: some texts provide formal indices of their
narrativity and therefore are literally narrative; some texts rely
on the readers’ ability to infer stories on the basis of what
objectively seems to be a nonnarrative text. This train of
thought, finally, leads Ryan to a rather pragmatic and relativ-
istic view of narrativity: “As an interpretive structure,
narrativity is not a discrete category like fictionality but a model
admitting various degrees of realization” (Ryan 1991: 266).
Bluntly, then, in the truly marginal cases of narrativity such as
the ‘Ithaca’-episode of Ulysses, both Fludernik and Ryan turn
to story, either inferred or recognized by the reader, as the core
of narrativity.
Possible world semantics is not the only “non-literary”
theoretical framework evoked in Ryan’s study. She also pro-
poses a detailed account of plot-grammar utilizing concepts
of the theory of artificial intelligence and computer program-
ming (Ryan 1991: chs. 8–11). Ryan’s discussion of the con-
cept of tellability is particularly interesting, synthesizing as it
does the theories of artificial intelligence and possible world
semantics. For Ryan, tellability is linked to the notion of nar-
rative “point”, the motivation behind the production and re-
ception of narratives:
Some configurations of facts present an intrinsic “tellability”
which precedes their textualization. This is why some stories
exist in numerous versions, survive translation, and transcend
cultural boundaries. (Ryan 1991: 148.)
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Tellability is therefore to be distinguished from narrativity:
while narrativity, for Ryan, concerns the question “what con-
stitutes a story?”, tellability seeks to answer “what is a good
story like?” Following this reasoning, Ryan insists that
tellability is principally a plot-structural category: the proper-
ties of performance (narrative discourse, for instance) are not
of the utmost importance in determining the tellability of a
particular sequence of facts. This is not to say that the per-
formance of a plot potentially has no bearing on the amount of
perceived tellability: “a good joke can fall flat because of poor
telling”. (Ryan 1991: 149.) The contrast between the plot-struc-
tural tellability of a sequence and its blatantly ‘untelling’ per-
formance is reflected in the reading experience of Gravity’s
Rainbow, as will be demonstrated in chapter 9, focusing on
game as a narratological metaphor.
For Ryan, the most crucial formal index of tellability is
the diversification of possible worlds of the narrative universe.
Since “conflicts are necessary to narrative action and […] con-
flicts arise from incompatibilities between TAW and the pri-
vate worlds of characters”, the diversification of a narrative
universe forms the formal basis of tellability. In other words,
the more potential clashes between the TAW and the private
worlds of its inhabitants that a sequence involves, the more
tellable the configuration that it yields. Ryan describes the pri-
vate possible worlds (wish-worlds, belief-worlds, predictions
or the like) of characters as “purely virtual embedded narra-
tives” that underlie the plot and determine the amount of its
tellability by a simple algorithm: virtual narratives in, tellability
out. (Ryan 1991: 156.)
Ryan revisits the question of virtuality in literature and in
other arts in her study Narrative as Virtual Reality (2001). In
addition, as Ryan (1991: 166; see also Dolezel 1998: 150–
151) herself observes, the notion of the virtual in narrative
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echoes in the work of other narratological theorists. Of par-
ticular interest is the similarity between Ryan’s concept of
virtuality and Prince’s (1992: 30) notion of the disnarrated,
defined as “all the events that do not happen though they could
have and are nonetheless referred to (in a negative or hypo-
thetical mode) by the narrative text”. Ryan’s (1991: 166–169)
analysis of Prince’s notion of the disnarrated in the light of
virtual narration demonstrates a significant overlap between
the concepts. Both virtual narration and the disnarrated will
be returned to in the discussion of Herman’s (1994) account
of hypothetical focalization in the next chapter. So far, it has
become evident that Ryan’s possible world narratology pro-
vides novel interpretations of the central questions of narra-
tive theory. What then is the relationship between possible
world narratology and structuralist narratology in terms of the
tools of textual analysis?
 The intensional/illocutionary account of fiction falls back
on traditional narratological views, at least with respect to the
question of unreliable narration and the concept of the implied
author. During her discussion of speakers and hearers, Ryan
rarely uses the concept of the implied author (to the extent
that the concept does not even warrant an entry in the subject
index). Accordingly, the question of unreliable narration is
discussed relatively briefly. This is Ryan on the difference be-
tween impersonal and personal (first-person) narration:
Personal narrators may be unreliable; impersonal narrators may
not: since they are not individuated, the gap between the truth
and their declarations could not be justified on psychological
grounds. From this it follows that the declarations of personal
narrators stand in a variable relation to the facts of TAW/TRW
[textual reference world], while impersonal narrators have ab-
solute narrative authority: their declarations yield truths, either
directly or after a metaphorical or ironic transformations. […]
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Impersonal narrators can only relay the position of the implied
author. (Ryan 1991: 68.)
Judging from the preceding quotation, it would seem that
Ryan does not distinguish between an impersonal narrator (or
a non-individuated substitute speaker) and the implied author.
This interpretation is, moreover, supported by Ryan’s (1991:
e.g. 71) references to the sole function of an impersonal sub-
stitute speaker, namely that of “relieving the author of the re-
sponsibility of fulfilling the felicity conditions of the textual
utterances”. In a more traditional narratological view, by con-
trast, the implied author is the agent postulated with that re-
sponsibility in mind (e.g. Chatman 1990; Nelles 1997).
Dolezel (1998: 149) presents a somewhat more refined
discussion of the problem. Initially, he seems to concur with
Ryan in insisting on the difference between impersonal and
personal narrators (Er-form and Ich-form in his nomenclature);
in his view the authoritative impersonal narrator “cannot lie
or err”. The lot of a personal narrator, by contrast, is to “prove”
his or her reliability in order to be taken as a provider of fic-
tional facts (ibid. 154). However, Dolezel’s discussion of the
distinction quickly blurs the neat separation between the
narratorial types. He observes that in modern literature the
personal (homodiegetic) narrator is conventionalized to the
extent that it is possible to produce “first-person discourse[s]
with the semantic features and the performative force of the
authoritative Er-form” (Dolezel 1998: 156). Dolezel endorses
a strongly conventional and anti-mimetic attitude toward the
authentication of fictional worlds: the conventions of modern
fiction (at least since Proust) have taught readers to separate
the personal characteristics of homodiegetic narrators from
their world-creating credentials. As a result, we are relatively
comfortable with the fact that a homodiegetic narrator such as
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Marcel seems to know more than he realistically should. On
the other hand, we do not consider the fictional world created
by a blatantly unreliable narrator as fundamentally dubious.
Dolezel’s examples of this ‘conventionally authorized’ per-
sonal narration include both Nigel Williams’s novel Star Turn
(1985) and Gravity’s Rainbow – the first is narrated by an
overtly unreliable homodiegetic narrator, the second by a
prominent yet anonymous heterodiegetic narrator.
This comparison is very revealing. Not only have the con-
ventions of modern fiction taught us to consider homodiegetic
narrators as authoritatively (almost) equivalent to
heterodiegetic narratives; they also suggest, conversely, that
we take the propositions made by heterodiegetic narrators with
a grain of salt. Thus, to turn Dolezel’s (1998: 154) initial argu-
ment upside down, it seems that all narrators should be made
to “earn” their credibility. Just as no narrator is utterly unreli-
able merely by being homodiegetic, no narrator receives its
(or his or her) “authentication authority by fiat”.
Discussing the process of authentication of the TAW, i.e.
the “what the case is” of the narrative universe, Ryan (1991:
113) briefly analyzes Kesey’s One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest
in order to demonstrate that in the case of personal (and overtly
unreliable) narration the reader has to “sort out, among the
narrator’s assertions, those which yield objective facts and
those which yield only the narrator’s beliefs”. After all, not
everything an unreliable narrator states is false. Consequently,
Ryan (ibid.) concludes that there is a potential discrepancy
between the facts of the TAW and the version of TAW pre-
sented by the narrator, the narratorial actual world (NAW).
But, notably, Ryan is here analyzing personal unreliable
narration; she does not explicitly state whether the above stipu-
lation of the implied author is applicable to impersonal narra-
tion as well. Logically, Ryan’s analysis of the relationship be-
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tween a personal narrator and the implied author is analogous
to the case of impersonal narration. Moreover, if we are to
believe Dolezel, the difference in authenticity between per-
sonal and impersonal narration is dwindling as we speak.
Hence, just as an implied author (or ‘author’) is needed in
distinguishing between the fictionally true and false statements
of an unreliable personal narrator, it is also needed to distin-
guish between those of an unreliable impersonal narrator. The
mechanics of the hierarchical functioning, and the ontological
status of the implied author are similar in both cases. In nei-
ther case is the implied author to be considered as a real exist-
ent but only as a necessary logical function needed to make
sense of the dynamics of a text.
Inescapably, then, Ryan is drawn to the relatively tradi-
tional view that a logically stipulated higher agency, the im-
plied author, determines what part of the narrator’s discourse
is to be taken at face value and what is unreliable:
In fiction, the narrative actual world is determined by what the
author wants the reader to take as fact (or rather, the implied
author, since the authorial intent is always inferred on the basis
of the text.) Fictional role-playing opens the possibility for the
substitute speaker to assert facts and to be overridden by the
authorial projection of the factual domain. (Ryan 1991: 113.)
Uri Margolin (1991: 541) does not think so; according to
his view “there is no higher instance above the DN [discourse
of the narrator]”. Thus to present unreliable narrators, authors
have to situate the narrator inside a frame story or introduce
an editor figure that constitutes a higher authority than the
narrator. In a sense, Margolin’s position is quite defensible;
again, there certainly is no room for an implied author as a
communicative agent. To evoke once again Fludernik’s dis-
tinction between the theoretical level of narratology and the
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illusionistic level of reading experience, one could perhaps
with good reason consider the implied author a definitely illu-
sionistic entity. It is however, hard to describe unreliable
heterodiegetic narration without its ghostly presence.
The case of unreliable narration can be considered as an
area of overlap between the traditional structuralist model of
narratology and Ryan’s version of possible world narratology.
In a manner reminiscent of Fludernik’s Natural Narratology,
Ryan’s intensional/illocutionary approach to fiction provides
a significant rethinking of narrative theory, however without
being able to escape some of the thorniest traditional prob-
lems that do not allow easy solutions in any theoretical con-
text whatever.
To conclude: Ryan’s discussions of narrativity, tellability,
and unreliable narration illustrate the manner in which theo-
rists seek to apply the concepts borrowed from modal seman-
tics, along with other disciplines, to re interpret questions of
literary theory. In some cases, such as the problems of
narrativity and unreliable narration, possible world narratology
furnishes narratology with novel ways to articulate old ques-
tions; in others, such as the question of tellability and virtual
narration, it goes further by providing convincing new answers,
as well. Most importantly, possible world narratology is an
organized and adaptable analytic framework with which to
approach both the fictionally real and fictionally virtual in nar-
rative. The next chapter will utilize possible world narratology
to further survey the virtual, the hypothetical, and the doubtful
in narrative.
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8. Potential Perspectives:
Hypothetical Focalization and
Pynchon
One of the most vexed concepts of narratological theory,
focalization has been the subject of lively critical discussion.
The main targets for celebration and criticism alike have been
Genette’s classic formulations in Narrative Discourse (1980/
1972). Similarly, the work of the earliest narratologists to re-
assess Genette’s concept, such as Bal (1997/1985), Chatman
(1978, 1990), and Rimmon-Kenan (1983), has provoked a lot
of controversy. Consequently, the theory of focalization has,
in a piecemeal fashion, been revised in order to make it truer
to its object, narrative discourse. By no means has it been al-
tered beyond recognition, however (e.g. Edmiston 1989; Nelles
1990; 1997; 2001).
Precisely the fact that the concept during its history has
not undergone fundamental transformations has inspired some
theorists to project their ingenuity, not toward ever more com-
plicated revisions of the Genettean focalization, but toward an
altogether new interpretation of the phenomenon. Indications
of this tendency are found in the work of Jahn (1996), Herman
(1994) and Fludernik (1996; 2001c). Narratological work based
on both cognitive science (Fludernik, Jahn) and possible world
semantics (Herman) has contributed to the discussion of the
problem of focalization.
In this chapter I intend to discuss some of the characteris-
tics of a new conception of focalization, one that David Herman
has sketched out in an article titled “Hypothetical Focalization”
(1994; a revised version in Herman 2002: ch. 8). The perspec-
tive is both practical and theoretical; theoretical overtones are
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inevitable, since the fresh start on focalization has not yet
yielded a comprehensive conceptual apparatus. This chapter
is not actually a practical application of a specific method of
describing focalization; it is more a meditation on what an
alternative account would accomplish, were it chosen. An
important part of this chapter will be a tentative sketch of a
more comprehensive account of focalization based on
Herman’s idea of hypothetical focalization.
Discussing the account of hypothetical focalization vis-à-
vis Pynchon’s novel implies an underlying assumption about
the capabilities of a successful theory of focalization: it ought
to be able to come to terms with experimental fiction. In fact,
Herman’s conception seems to anticipate its being tested in
the context of non-traditional postmodernist fiction, as will be
seen below. An additional reason for assessing Herman’s con-
ception of focalization in the context of Gravity’s Rainbow is
the lack of any comprehensive account of the phenomenon in
the novel.
As has been demonstrated in preceding discussions, Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow exemplifies convention-breaking fiction in many
ways: most importantly, it hosts a vast repertoire of non-tradi-
tional features of narration. Yet, I would argue, it is not too
obvious an example, or a deliberate limit-case for narrative
theory. Pynchon’s novel pushes the analytic concepts far
enough to make them bend, yet lacks the heart to break them
altogether. One of the main attractions of Gravity’s Rainbow
as exemplary material is its dynamic way of varying the modes
of narration and using conventional narrative techniques for
novel purposes. This has definite consequences for the study
of its perspectival characteristics in the light of possible world
semantics.
Exposing myself to accusations of traditionalism, I will
now and again in this chapter invoke the Genettean frame-
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work of focalization as a comparison structure of sorts. It is
against this ‘orthodox’ model that I observe the features and
capabilities of the alternative account. I refer the reader to ex-
isting literature for detailed information about the corrections
and additions proposed over the years to Genette’s original
theory (Nelles 1990 and Jahn 1996 include comprehensive
surveys). These will be taken into account as supplementary
parts of the Genettean scheme. Because of the fundamental
differences between the traditional conception of focalization
and one proposed for cognitive narratology, I will not attempt
to incorporate the perspectives of Fludernik and Jahn into the
construction of ‘possible world focalization’. Instead, I will
only briefly comment on how the question of hypothetical
focalization might be approached in the context of cognitive
narratology.
In the first section, I summarize the relevant aspects of
Herman’s hypothetical focalization. Two sections, encompass-
ing analyses of hypothetical focalization in Gravity’s Rain-
bow, follow this brief overview. The textual analysis is fol-
lowed by another theoretical section involving a critique of
Herman’s model, and a sketch of a proposal for its extension.
In conclusion, I discuss the implications of hypothetical
focalization and its possible extensions for practical criticism
and the interpretation of narrative.
8.1. Focalization on the Continuum of Doubt
Herman’s point of departure for investigating the notion of
focalization is the marginal phenomenon of hypothetical
focalization. Roughly, the concept refers to representation of
a virtual perspective in a narrative, a perspective in which the
perceiver or the act of perception cannot be assumed to be
part of the fictional world. In other words, hypothetical
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focalization “entails the use of hypotheses, framed by the nar-
rator or a character, about what might be or have been seen or
perceived – if only there were someone who could have adopted
the requisite perspective on situations and events at issue”
(Herman 1994: 231; cf. Prince 2001: 45). Thus, hypothetical
focalization belongs to the domain of Ryan’s (1991) virtual
narration.
The concept of hypothetical focalization (HF), as well as
Herman’s discussion of narratology in general, is rooted in the
tradition of model-theoretical, i.e. possible world, semantics.
In these terms, HF can be described as a special case of incon-
gruence between the narrative’s expressed and reference worlds
(Herman 1994: 246). Herman follows William Frawley in his
terminology: the reference world of fictional narrative corre-
sponds to Pavel’s (1986) fictional world, Dolezel’s (1979: 196)
primary narrative world and Ryan’s (1991) textual actual
world. The expressed world is the world asserted by the text.
Consequently, the expressed world can either faithfully repre-
sent the reference world or a particular possible world. A point
worth stressing is that this definition of focalization makes
HF a relatively inconspicuous subspecies of focalization. In
fact, Herman performs an almost deconstructionist act by ex-
posing the implicit ‘hypotheticality’ of all focalization (Herman
1994: 246), as will be demonstrated below. This is in some
degree of contrast to the status of HF as an almost overlooked
anomaly within the Genettean paradigm.
Focalization can be hypothetical in a number of ways.
Herman makes a distinction between two main kinds: direct
and indirect HF. The distinguishing feature is the explicitness
of the perspectival agent: HF is direct if a “counterfactual wit-
ness” (Herman 1994: 237) is explicitly pointed out in the nar-
ration. On the other hand, HF is indirect if no virtual holder of
perspective is specified. In the latter case, the reader has to
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“infer the presence or at least functioning of HF, if the scenes
and descriptions falling under this heading are to go through –
to make sense – at all” (ibid. 242).
Another axis in the description of HF is that of the
‘strength’ of the phenomenon. With the aid of this metaphor
Herman points to the expressed ontological status of the agents
of focalization; focalizers (focalizors in Herman’s nomencla-
ture based on Bal’s). A strong case requires both the focalizer
and the act of focalization to be virtual. By contrast, a weak
case allows for the focalizer to be an actual entity in the refer-
ence world of the narrative, insisting only on the virtuality of
the act of focalization (Herman 244).
What makes Herman’s conception of HF more than a novel
interpretation of a marginal narrative phenomenon is that the
model-theoretical tools used in its description are arguably
applicable to all kinds of focalization. According to Herman’s
thesis, all focalization can be defined as the narrative expres-
sion of congruence (or incongruence) between the narrative’s
expressed and reference worlds. Thus Genette’s zero
focalization is rewritten as “maximal congruence between the
expressed world and the reference world of the narrative” and
internal focalization as “belief context anchored in a particu-
lar possible world” (Herman 1994: 246). Herman (ibid.) is
not, however, very specific about the description of Genette’s
external focalization: “The expressed world when focalized
internally features different degrees of doubt, which figures
even more prominently in [...] external focalization”.
Types of focalization, then, are re-defined according to
the degree of ontological doubtfulness that they convey. This
definition of focalization furnishes the critic with the obvious
advantage of discarding the “quasi-primitive” (Herman 1994:
233, 244) dichotomy of external/internal altogether. With a
theory of focalization amplified from the discussion of HF it
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seems possible to analyze focalization with a flexibility previ-
ously unheard of.
As if the above implications of HF for the concept of
focalization in general were not enough, Herman proposes ten-
tatively that HF functions as an important formal clue to ge-
neric distinctions: “[C]areful description of the stronger and
weaker versions of both direct and indirect HF may ultimately
help us capture, in turn, the differentiae specificae of novelis-
tic genres”, and later on: “[A]mong the repertoire of narrative
devices typically exploited by texts that question or resist the
norms and presuppositions of realistic genres, HF may upon
further investigation prove to be a particularly important tech-
nique” (Herman 1994: 239). Both the alleged flexibility and
descriptive force of Herman’s concept of focalization and HF’s
tentative status as a prime indication of narrative
experimentality more than justify testing the ideas through an
analysis of Gravity’s Rainbow.
8.2. Pynchonian Hypotheses
Approaching HF and its implications first specifically, and then
in more general terms, I will in this section consider some of
the occurrences of HF in Gravity’s Rainbow. First, however, I
will present an explanatory note on the novel’s overall atti-
tude toward narrative worlds.
As has been demonstrated in Pynchon criticism, one of
the essential narrative techniques of Gravity’s Rainbow is play
with the worlds of fiction. Indeed, whole plotlines can be in-
terpreted as canceling themselves out in a process that McHale
(1992: 69–71) has called “retroactive world-making and
unmaking”. The novel is filled with sequences (and thus with
subworlds) whose ontological status is uncertain and fictional
beings whose existence in the reference world of the novel is
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dubious. In other words, substantial parts of the narrative of
Gravity’s Rainbow prove to be virtual in Ryan’ sense.
From a certain perspective, this ontological ambiguity is
a specific feature of Gravity’s Rainbow. However, play with
worlds is widely understood to be a prominent trait in the
postmodernist tradition. An account of focalization utilizing
possible-world semantics should therefore be able to come to
terms with subtly differing varieties of manipulation in the
representation of worlds.
It might, therefore, be useful to distinguish provisionally
between global (or macrostructural) and local (or microstruc-
tural) varieties of incongruence within the expressed world
and the reference world of the narrative. The global variant
would, then, refer to situations in which a relatively lengthy
sequence is judged ontologically dubious by contextual43 evi-
dence. Local, by contrast, would denote a more textually lim-
ited discrepancy between the world of fiction and its subworlds,
HF being a representative case of the localized variety of
noncongruence. In the latter case, it could be assumed, the
inter-world discrepancy is mainly established with reference
to grammatical factors. The problem of interpreting local in-
congruence between worlds will be revisited during the fol-
lowing discussion of problematic cases of HF in Gravity’s
Rainbow.
Herman’s four-part scheme of HF will be used as a sche-
matic guide to the analysis of occurrences of the phenomenon:
Strong Weak
Direct HF A a
Indirect HF B b
The table above yields four types of HF to be found in
Pynchon’s narrative, here ingeniously symbolized as A, a, B
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and b. I will limit this discussion to occurrences of direct hy-
pothetical focalization, strong and weak. Herman’s four-part
scheme will be reconsidered below.
Gravity’s Rainbow contains few, if any, prototypical in-
stances of type A, in which the narration would explicitly iden-
tify a counterfactual focalizing agent. Perhaps the following
could, at a pinch, serve as an example, though it is far from
being a standard case. It has been taken from a episode titled
“Shit’n’Shinola”:
A stranger to the English language, a German dopefiend such
as Säure, not knowing either word, might see “Shit” as a comi-
cal interjection, one a lawyer in a bowler hat [...] might smiling
use, “Schitt, Herr Bummer” [...] or Schitt! down comes a car-
toon guillotine on one black & white politician, head bouncing
downhill, lines to indicate amusing little spherical vortex pat-
terns, and you thought yes, like to see that all right, yes cut it
off, one less rodent, schitt ja! (GR 687)
The modal auxiliary might provides a grammatical ground
for a HF-interpretation. Moreover, the directness of HF is es-
tablished by designating the focalizer as “a stranger to the
English language / a German dopefiend”. Interestingly, the verb
see is used metaphorically, in the meaning of ‘understand’ or
‘interpret’. Nevertheless, the cognitive activity of the focalizer
is shown to be hypothetical. This brings about an important
feature of HF: it encompasses both perceptual and cognitive
focalization.
Representative of the playfulness of Pynchon’s novel, the
discussion of the possible ramifications of a German under-
standing of the expression goes on for about a page, becoming
increasingly serious. Curiously, the whole sequence is logi-
cally subordinate to the above occurrence of HF. The excerpt
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demonstrates in a condensed form the “speculation-upon-
speculation” technique so characteristic of Gravity’s Rainbow.
The next example represents a problematic case, if not an
outright puzzle:
From overhead, from a German camera-angle, it occurs to
Webley Silvernail, this lab here is also a maze, i’n’t it now...
behaviorists run these aisles of tables and consoles just like
rats’n’mice, but who watches from above, who notes their re-
sponses? (GR 229)
Two textual features warrant an interpretation of this pas-
sage as involving direct strong HF. First, the counterfactuality
of the act of focalization is achieved by embedding focalization
in the thought of a character. This interpretation is supported
by the speculative “occurs to”, and the dialectal “i’n’t it now”
and “rats’n’mice”. Second, the directness of HF is (somewhat
artificially) established in the last two clauses of the quota-
tion: the focalizer is more or less explicitly identified through
the interrogative pronoun who. Describing the above passage
as an instance of HF would rely purely on interpretation of
contextual evidence and not on grammatical features. Never-
theless, the quotation does exhibit a fair amount of hypotheti-
cal perception. In order not to get ahead of myself, I will now
turn to clearer instances in an another category.
The weaker version of the direct hypothetical focalization
(type a), a situation in which an actual person or entity in the
reference world is the agent of a non-verifiable, yet possible,
focalization, is relatively frequent in Gravity’s Rainbow. In fact,
the novel makes use of the variant of HF in very subtle ways,
making the most of the technique. In a sense, Gravity’s Rain-
bow exhibits a strong attachment to the convention: creating
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radical ontological uncertainty is not generally the aim of the
novel’s use of weak direct HF44.
This morning it looks like what Vikings must have seen, sail-
ing this great water-meadow south, clear to Byzantium, all east-
ern Europe their open sea. (GR 549)
Direct HF – the Vikings are pointed out as the focalizers;
weak HF – only the act of seeing is in doubt. (It is assumed
that the Vikings in fact were present in the past of the refer-
ence world of the narrative). Although the HF in this case seems
to be a simple representation of a hypothetical visual percep-
tion, the last clause of the quotation is apt to introduce an ideo-
logical twist. The excerpt is followed by a description of the
movements of nationalities across the zone of occupied Ger-
many (GR 549–550). The Viking-HF is thus used as a meta-
phor referring to the state of postwar Germany (see also GR
567). Hypothetical focalization, then, serves as a vehicle for
ideological speculation and illustration.
Weak HF is shown in Pynchon to be equally adept at con-
veying hypotheses about higher mental processes. This is to
be expected, of course, since the weak direct variety is in a
way the most realistic variant of HF: it is by definition attrib-
uted to a character with supposedly normal psychological ca-
pacities. Hence, speculation about mental life is not in any
way strange. Neither the focalizer nor the act of perception is
hypothetical in the following:
It must astonish her, Nora-so-heartless, Cherrycoke kneeling,
stirring her silks, between his hands old history flowing in eddy-
currents. (GR 150)
Only the psychological condition of being astonished is
in doubt. The example calls for a more subtle conception of
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HF: the focalization is not, as a whole, hypothetical, only a
certain (emotive) part of it. The obvious point of comparison
here is Rimmon-Kenan’s concept of facet (77–82; cf. Herman
1994: 249n.10). Indeed, defining focalization as representing
a belief-context associated with a particular possible world
does not in principle limit the range of expressed perceptual,
cognitive or emotional features (or facets) of focalization in
any way (cf. Toolan 1988: 72–76).
More generally, Herman draws tentative lines of corre-
spondence between HF and the representation of mental acts:
“Given the vast importance of hypothesis and contrary-to-fact
speculation in our mental lives, we might predict that HF will
be found to play an especially important role in texts with a
high concentration of interior monologue” (1994: 242). Inte-
rior monologue is of course used and abused extensively in
Pynchon’s novel. The conditional structure of the next exam-
ple brings about its hypothetical nature. This occurrence of
HF is closely tied to the novel’s thematic content; it introduces
the narrative’s peculiar obsession with the reversed nature of
the V-2 -rocket blast.
   He takes some time lighting a cigarette. He won’t hear the
thing come in. It travels faster than the speed of sound. The
first news you get of it is the blast. Then, if you’re still around,
you hear the sound of it coming in.
   What if it should hit exactly – ahh, no – for a split second
you’d have to feel the very point, with the terrible mass above,
strike the top of the skull....(GR 7)
The quotation involves the use of the speculative condi-
tional for two separate HF’s. In the first one, for the focalization
to be actual, the rocket has to blast elsewhere, missing the
hypothetical focalizer. The second, by contrast, insists on a
bull’s-eye for the (very short) focalization to be in congruence
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with the reference world. This rapid turn of direction in HF
supports Herman’s supposition about the frequent use and
effectivity of HF in representing the trails of speculative
thought. In Gravity’s Rainbow, however, the use of HF and
related narrative techniques to express speculation is not lim-
ited to representation of a characters’ thought. In fact, the rep-
resentation of narratorial speculation is one of the key ele-
ments in creating disparity between the expressed world and
the reference world, as will be discussed below.
A secondary effect, hypothetical focalization can be used
to signal recurring activity (see Herman 1994: 240–241). In
addition to being a stunning example of the subtlety of textual
clues that can point toward HF-interpretation, the next exam-
ple also exhibits the ambiguity achieved by second-person
narration45.
One by one men step into this perfectly black rectangle of night
and disappear. Gone, the war taking them, the man behind al-
ready presenting his ticket. [...] Soldiers, sailors, marines, air-
men. One by one, gone. Those who happen to be smoking might
last an instant longer, weak little coal swinging in orange arc
once, twice – no more. You sit, half-turned to watch them, your
soiled sleepy darling beginning to complain, and it’s no use –
how can your lusts fit inside this same white frame with so
much, such endless, departure? (GR 51)
At first glance there is nothing doubtful about this vivid
representation of vision. The only thing formally signaling the
hypotheticality of at least some part of the focalization is the
auxiliary might. By referring to the possibility of seeing “coal
swinging in a yellow arc” the whole focalization is made to
some extent non-verisimilar. The effect is not one of negation,
however. In fact, the HF gives the passage an air of typicality,
say, “on a typical night watching the soldiers depart, you might
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see a little longer the ones who happen to be smoking”. Moreo-
ver, this interpretation is corroborated by an earlier passage
depicting the same scene: “You have waited in these places in
the early mornings, synced in to the on-whitening of the inte-
rior, you know the Arrivals schedule by heart, by hollow heart.”
(GR 50): nevertheless, the auxiliary might is all that is needed
to create incongruence between the possible world represented
in the focalization and the reference world of the narrative.
8.3. HF and Related Doubtfulness in Gravity’s Rainbow
Gravity’s Rainbow includes quite a few instances where the
nature of focalization is difficult to judge. I will now turn to
examine these problematic cases of HF as well as expressions
of ontological doubt akin to HF, at least in spirit. Instances
such as those discussed below could perhaps be more safely
interpreted as examples of Prince’s disnarration, defined as
“all the events that do not happen though they could have and
are nonetheless referred to (in a negative or hypothetical mode)
by the narrative text” (Prince 1992: 30). Nevertheless, the
perspectival features of the events qualify them as less clearly
marked cases of HF (see Herman 1994: 247n.4; Dolezel 1998:
150–151; Ryan 1991: 166). Consider the instance of HF in the
following passage:
   When he wakes she is gone, completely, most of her never-
worn clothes still in the closet, blisters and a little wax on his
fingers, and one cigarette, stubbed out before its time in an
exasperated fishhook... She never wasted cigarettes. She must
have sat, smoking, watching him while he slept... until some-
thing, he’ll never be asking her what, triggered her, made it
impossible to stay till cigarette’s end. (GR 226)
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The second sentence with its modal auxiliary gives the
sequence an air of great probability. Nevertheless, the act of
focalization is only hypothesized, one cannot be sure if “she”
(Katje Borgesius) really watched “him” (Slothrop) sleep. To
be literal, of course, one cannot be sure that Katje even sat
there. However, the alleged focalizer has left behind evidence
(the prematurely stubbed cigarette) that makes the act of
focalization seem more doubtful than the focalizer’s presence.
The contextual evidence provided by the text suggests that the
hypotheticality achieved by the auxiliary must applies prima-
rily to the act of focalization. The contextual evidence of the
passage, arguably, overrides the grammatical indication of
doubt.
The thing to consider next in more detail, then, is the rela-
tionship between the grammatical and contextual markers of
the hypotheticality of the focalization. The following example
seems rather straightforward, describing the aftermath of an
erotic scene:
[S]miling quietly, unplugged at last, she returns the unstiffening
hawk to its cold bachelor nest but kneels still a bit longer in the
closet of this moment, the drafty, white-lit moment, some piece
by Ernesto Lecuona, “Siboney” perhaps, now reaching them
down corridors long as the sealanes back to the green shoals,
slime stone battlements, and palm evenings of Cuba... a Victo-
rian pose, her cheek against his leg, his high-veined hand against
her face. But no one saw them, then or ever. (GR 169)
The whole sequence describing the pose struck by Maude
Chilkes and Edward Pointsman constitutes what Genette would
call zero focalization. The narrator moves freely in time, space
and, interestingly, through the history of art in order to achieve
the illusion of a “Victorian pose”. The last sentence of the
excerpt, however, is apt to turn everything inside out. The
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elaborately described scene turns out to be something a wit-
ness would have seen, had one been present. Thus the sight of
the couple is retroactively designated as HF, or in this case
actually impossible focalization.
If we were to accept this, we would have to allow for a
fairly wide variety of textual markers of HF. In the passage
above, there are no grammatical markers (auxiliaries, condi-
tional phrases or the like) to act as clues of hypotheticality.
Only the later contextual evidence suggests a complete incon-
gruence between the expressed world and the reference world
of the narrative. Furthermore, this interpretation subsumes two
options: 1) only the perception of the amorous couple is hypo-
thetical (that is, attributed to someone who could have been
watching but was not), and 2) both the perception and the cog-
nitive activity (judgment as Victorian, references to art) ac-
companying it are hypothetical (that is, attributed to a coun-
terfactual witness). Option 1 seems to lead into complicated
questions about the origins of the commentary, were it not
identified with the hypothetical focalizer. Option 2 is not easy
to grasp, either. If no one saw the couple and meditated on the
nature of their pose, the sequence logically erases itself. The
perceptions and thoughts are attributed to no one. This is remi-
niscent of the effect of what Lubomír Dolezel (1988: 491) has
called self-voiding fictional worlds. The excerpt also qualifies
as an instance of Brian Richardson’s (2001) denarration.
The hypothesis-eliciting situations of Pynchon’s novel do
not resort to contextual markers of doubt in a haphazard way.
A significant amount of the text’s epistemic indeterminacy is
achieved by asking questions. Often the questions are more or
less self-evidently deemed to remain unanswered, and thus
function as rhetorical questions. As a consequence, they cre-
ate ontological doubt. While the question-form certainly is a
grammatical feature of the text, it is not a very prototypical
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marker of HF. In the following excerpt the hypothetical ask-
ing of questions is exhibited in a particularly exaggerated and
condensed manner:
The true king only dies a mock death. […] Will he show up
under the Star, slyly genuflecting with the other kings as this
winter solstice draws on us? Bring to the serai gifts of tung-
sten, cordite, high-octane? Will the child gaze up from his
ground of golden straw then, gaze into the eyes of the old king
who bends long and unfurling overhead, leans to proffer his
gift, will the eyes meet, and what message, what possible greet-
ing or entente will flow between the king and the infant prince?
Is the baby smiling, or is it just gas? Which do you want it to
be? (GR 131)
The multiple acts of inquiring build layers of doubt into
the scene. It could be rewritten in a skeletal conditional form:
“IF the king came, and IF the child gazed into his eyes and IF
their eyes met, what message would flow between the king
and the infant?” Thus the infant’s act of focalization is at least
doubly hypothetical. The problem of interpreting the last sen-
tence of the quotation has been a mainstay in Pynchon-criti-
cism (see McHale 1992: ch. 8; Levine 1999). Sadly, describ-
ing the scene as HF does not solve the problem of whom the
“you” refers to. What the example does show, however, is once
again that the HF-interpretation can rely on a number of con-
textual markers as well as grammatical markers used in spe-
cific ways in order to invoke ontological doubt.
An extreme case of the question-induced feeling of
hypotheticality is the lengthy and ontologically uncertain in-
terlocution between Russian officer/agent Vaslav Tchitcherine
and the “Verbindungsmann” Wimpe (GR 344–349, 701–703).
The whole scene springs from an assumption: “Certainly he
could have known Wimpe.” (GR 344), after which the sup-
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posed conversation is represented in a fairly normal manner.
Its ambiguous ontological status is maintained, however, by
intrusive questions:
How could they have failed to be observed? […] What did
Tchitcherine have to say? Was Tchitcherine there at all? sitting
back in the dingy room while the lift cables slapped and creaked
through the walls, and down the street, rarely enough to matter,
a droshky rattled whip-snapping over these black old cobbles?
[…] How far, in the eyes of those who would send him to Cen-
tral Asia, was too far: would his simple presence in these rooms
have gotten him death automatically… or was there still, even
at this stage of things, enough slack to let him reply? (GR 344–
345, see also 349)
Remarkably, the third question of the excerpt merges with
the focalization that it simultaneously makes doubtful. This is
disturbing: the narration goes on pedantically despite its ob-
ject’s unlikely status. Capable of rendering whole scenes as
well as individual perceptions hypothetical, rhetorical ques-
tions are a powerful vehicle of doubt in Gravity’s Rainbow
(see Herman 1995: 131–133).
8.4. Genettean Focalization Re-Hypothesized
In this section I will outline a more comprehensive account of
focalization on the basis of the implications of hypothetical
focalization discussed do far. In other words, I will try to make
more explicit the possible characteristics of a theory of
focalization based on possible-world semantics. In addition,
lines of comparison will be drawn to Genette’s conception of
focalization. During the discussion, I will refer to troublesome
Pynchon examples for support and illustration.
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First, Herman relies mainly on grammatically marked cases
of ontological incongruity. The use of modal auxiliaries, con-
ditional phrases, modal adverbs and similar forms is presented
as the standard method of achieving doubt (e.g. 237, 239, 242
cf. 243; cf. 1995: 131–133; Margolin 1999: 146). The exam-
ples from Gravity’s Rainbow, deviant yet illustrative, call for a
wider perspective to be analyzable at all. Especially the use of
contextual evidence in conjunction with the grammatical fea-
tures of the text makes HF a flexible and useful interpretive
tool.
Second, Herman’s four-part scheme of HF, despite its el-
egance, strives for too much symmetry and strict distinctions
between types. The dichotomies direct/indirect and strong/
weak would be closer to the reality of texts if envisioned as
continuous parameters labeled explicitness46 and verisimilitude,
for example.
On the scale of explicitness, the most direct version of HF
would be the point of maximum explicitness. Indirect HF
would be positioned somewhere between maximum explicit-
ness and maximum implicitness. Accordingly, on the scale of
verisimilitude, the strongest version of HF would be positioned
at the point of minimal verisimilitude and the weaker variants
somewhere between maximum and minimum. Why should
we replace categories with continua?
The function of explicitness: While it is true that in a read-
ing experience the focalizer usually either can or cannot be
identified, there is a great variance in the amount of certainty
with which the distinction is drawn in the text. Directly nam-
ing the focalizer “Slothrop” would be the most explicit case,
while describing the focalizer as a “a plump American lieu-
tenant standing nearby” would leave a little more room for
doubt. To approach the other end of the scale, there really is
only a slight difference between the explicitness of, for in-
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stance, the made-up examples “anyone sitting on the park bench
would have considered the house pretty” and “viewed from
the park bench, the house would have been considered pretty.”
Yet in the categorical scheme the former would be a repre-
sentative of direct HF and the latter of indirect HF.
The function of verisimilitude: again, it is true that the
reader usually deems the focalizer either actual or counterfac-
tual in relation to the reference world of the narrative. How-
ever, as suggested above, the textual clues informing this dis-
tinction can be plentiful, or few and far between. Consider the
following examples:
(1) A passerby might have seen the robbery; sadly, no one
was around.
(2) A passerby might have seen the robbery; the police are
still searching for witnesses.
(3) A passerby might have seen the robbery; they are in-
terviewing one at the moment.
Example 1 is definite about the counterfactuality of the
focalizer. In contrast, example 2 gives no clue whether there
was a witness or not: the counterfactuality or actuality of the
hypothetical focalizer cannot be determined. Example 3 is a
case of maximum verisimilitude. The usefulness of
redescribing the directness and strength of HF as continuous
functions will come more evident as I turn to speculate on
HF’s implications for focalization in general.
Let me begin by examining the implications of HF for
internal focalization. As mentioned earlier, Herman discards
the controversial dichotomy external/internal by positing types
of focalization on a continuum of epistemic modalities. He
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rewrites internal focalization as a “belief context anchored in
a particular possible world” (Herman 1994: 246), which seems
to describe the phenomenon well. He goes on (ibid.) to de-
scribe the traditional trio of fixed, variable and multiple inter-
nal focalization with similar success.
By interpreting internal focalization as tied to belief con-
texts associated with specific possible worlds, Herman invites
his reader to designate HF a special case of internal focalization,
provided one wants to stick to the traditional nomenclature.
According to this view, the incongruity between the expressed
world and the reference world in HF differs only in degree
from that of internal focalization (Herman 1994: 246). With
HF thus established as fundamentally similar to internal
focalization, it is tempting to try to apply newly-found fea-
tures of HF to internal focalization.
Herman’s distinction between weak and strong varieties
of focalization seems logically inapplicable to non-hypotheti-
cal focalization. By contrast, direct and indirect internal
focalization seem to apply well. By analogy: in direct internal
focalization, the focalizer is explicitly identified as represent-
ing a belief-context anchored in a particular possible world. In
an indirect variant, the focalizer’s relationship to the refer-
ence world has to be inferred from the text without explicit
notification. Both options ring true. Let us be satisfied with
this for a moment, and turn to what Rimmon-Kenan calls ex-
ternal focalization and Genette zero focalization.
Herman rewrites zero focalization as “maximal congru-
ence between the expressed world and the reference world of
the narrative.” Since all focalization is in Herman’s model fun-
damentally alike, distinguishable only by the amount of
epistemic doubt, I will apply the distinctions of HF to zero
focalization, too.
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Again, by analogy: in direct zero focalization, the focalizer
is explicitly identified as representing the belief context of
maximal congruence to the reference world of the narrative.
In contrast, the indirect variety requires the reader to infer the
focalizer’s relationship to the belief context of the reference-
world. Again, both seem plausible. (Nothing prevents the
reader from disbelieving the pledge of truthfulness-to-fact in
direct zero focalization, however.) Nonetheless, there is a po-
tential problem: how should one distinguish between indirect
internal and indirect zero focalization?
There is indeed the possibility of a text involving
focalization that is so vague that it is impossible to judge it
either as zero focalization or internal focalization very subtly
attributed to a focalizer (see O’Neill 93–95). In other words, it
is undecidable whether the focalization represents the belief
context of a particular possible world or whether it represents
the belief context of the reference-world. Consider the fol-
lowing passage from Gravity’s Rainbow:
Teddy Bloat is mincing bananas with a great isosceles knife,
from beneath whose nervous blade Pirate with one hand shov-
els the blonde mash into waffle batter resilient with fresh hens’
eggs, for which Osbie Feel has exchanged an equal number of
golf balls, these being even rarer this winter than real eggs,
other hand blending the fruit in, not overvigorously, with a wire
whisk, whilst surly Osbie himself, sucking frequently at a half-
pint milk bottle filled with Vat 69 and water, tends to the ba-
nanas in the skillet and broiler. Near the exit to the blue patio,
DeCoverley Pox and Joaquin Stick stand by a concrete
scale-model of the Jungfrau, [...] socking the slopes of the fa-
mous mountain with red rubber hot-water bags full of ice cubes
[...]. With their night’s growths of beard, matted hair, blood-
shot eyes, miasmata of foul breath, DeCoverley and Joaquin
are wasted gods urging on a tardy glacier. (GR 9)
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Is the sequence focalized internally or is it an instance of
zero focalization? On the one hand, contextual evidence points
vaguely toward Osbie Feel: the narration focuses for a while
on his habitus (“surly”) and personal characteristics (consump-
tion of Vat 69 and water). One could, then, interpret especially
the last sentence of the quotation as an observation motivated
by Feel’s eccentric personality or his present condition / state
of mind. On the other hand, the whole “Banana breakfast”
scene could be assumed to be zero focalized; the narrator is
known to interpret events in idiosyncratic ways, as well.
Replacing the opposition direct/indirect in internal and zero
focalization with continua of explicitness allows for more sub-
tle variations. In other words, I propose to extend the amend-
ment made earlier to the description of HF, applying it to the
description of all focalization. This makes more explicable
the instances of undecidable focalization, seemingly hovering
between zero and internal focalization.
The final category in Genette’s focalization triad is exter-
nal focalization. This could be described as a special category
of zero focalization, in which the focalizer is anchored in the
belief context of the reference-world without access to the
belief contexts corresponding to the possible worlds of char-
acters’ beliefs, wishes, desires, and intentions.
From the vantage-point of possible world semantics,
focalization is the expression of varying degrees of incongru-
ence between the expressed world and the reference world of
the narrative. It is, in principle, a continuous parameter.47
 In practice, however, the cases of what used to be called
internal focalization are character-bound: the partial discrep-
ancies between the expressed world and the reference world
are attributed to fictional persons (or beings, see GR 42; also
Nelles 2001). Genette’s prefocalization – the focalization of a
homodiegetic narrator – is thus an instance of constant dis-
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crepancy between the expressed world and the reference world
(Genette 1988: 78; see Edmiston 1989: 731–732). Accord-
ingly, focalization implying maximal congruence between the
expressed and the reference world is in practice attributed to
the narrator. The conventions of narrative literature seem to
open the back door for the dichotomy of outside/inside, even
in first-person narration, as William Edmiston (1989: 739–
740) has demonstrated.
The case of unreliable narration constitutes a counter-ex-
ample, however. As has been discussed above, the expressed
world of an unreliable narrator (Ryan’s narratorial actual world
NAW) potentially differs from the reference world (Ryan’s
TAW). The focalization of a heterodiegetic unreliable narra-
tor is thus both zero focalization and also involves a discrep-
ancy between the expressed world and the reference world of
the narrative.
Narratorial slant, proposed by Chatman as a more theo-
retically sound alternative to narrator-focalization, is apt to
open a new can of worms in terms of incongruence between
the expressed world and the reference world. According to
Chatman (1990), narratorial focalization is impossible because
the narrator, unlike the characters, does not perceive the events
of the story; the narrator’s function is to narrate the events.
Chatman’s solution is to replace Genette’s zero focalization
with the concept of narratorial slant and internal focalization
with the concept of filter. Chatman’s slant is thus not a per-
ceptual point of view but the narratorial attitude toward the
story. This invites one to conclude that all narrators are (more
or less) biased and thus slightly ‘unreliable’. To utilize Ryan’s
(1991; see chapter 7) terminology, Chatman’s notion of
narratorial slant underscores the potential difference between
TAW and NAW. Thus Chatman’s account of focalization (if
he were to use the term) would therefore be augmented by
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Herman’s continuum of ontological doubt (see Herman 2002:
ch. 8).
Zero focalization could, finally, be termed free focalization
(following Nelles 1990: 369). This would emphasize the fact
that in zero focalization the focalizer indeed represents the
belief-context of the reference world and is not limited to a
particular possible world. Genette’s external focalization would
be a contradictory category in this respect, however: free
focalization with limited or no access to the belief-contexts of
possible worlds.
The above discussion of HF has demonstrated that possi-
ble world narratology provides a useful theoretical context for
rethinking the perspectival concepts of fiction. Indeed, by fol-
lowing Herman in considering all focalization as potentially
‘hypothetical’ or doubtful in varying degrees, the emphasis of
the preceding analysis has shifted from HF to more general
considerations of focalization. Let me now briefly return to
the problem of HF proper vis-à-vis cognitive narratology. There
is a local affinity between Fludernik’s concept of figuralization
and HF. Figuralization, defined as the “evocation of a deictic
center of subjectivity in a reflector-mode narrative that has no
ruling figural consciousness attached to it” (Fludernik 1996:
197), can be used to provide an alternate description for at
least some of the cases of HF discussed above. In fact, one of
Fludernik’s examples of figuralization includes HF:
It looked as though the sea had beaten up softly in the darkness,
as though one immense wave had come rippling, rippling –
how far? Perhaps if you had waked up in the middle of the
night you might have seen a big fish flicking in at the window
and gone again. (Katherine Mansfield, At the Bay: 441; quoted
in Fludernik 1996: 200, italics are Fludernik’s.)
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The main difference between the interpretation of the pas-
sage as HF and reading it as figuralization lies in the assumed
consistency of viewpoint. From the basically Genettean van-
tage point of HF, only the last sentence constitutes HF: it has
grammatical and contextual indices of doubt. The beginning
of the sequence could well be interpreted as zero focalization.
By contrast, in the more holistic interpretive frame of Natural
Narratology, the whole sequence – ostensibly the whole text –
is to be attributed to the “empty deictic centre” of figuralization.
According to Fludernik, this vacuum of subjectivity is then
filled by the reader who projects his or her perspective into the
scene. This local interpretive divergence is a miniature
scale-model of the fundamental difference between “top-down”
and “bottom-up” narratology. While the structuralist impulse
is to analyze bottom-level textual phenomena, the cognitivist
approach  seeks to attribute the processing of narratives into
larger interpretive frames.
8.5. HF, Generic Distinctions, and Narratological
Criticism
In the course of this discussion, I have tested Herman’s con-
cept of hypothetical focalization in practice. Furthermore, I
have speculated about the implications of his thesis that HF
is, from the perspective of possible-world semantics, similar
to all focalization. Let me now discuss Herman’s (1994: 239,
242, 245) suggestions about the potential genre-distinguish-
ing features of HF.
Herman (1994: 245) designates HF tentatively as “the for-
mal correlative of skepticism, detachment, even paranoia.”
Continuing, he remarks that “HF helps put the actual in the
service of the virtual, formally marking doubts about whether
we can determine, in every case, where we stand in a world
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we only thought we knew.” The findings of the examination
of HF in the context of Pynchon’s novel provide ample sup-
port for this claim. Obsessed with all kinds of speculation,
Gravity’s Rainbow indeed capitalizes on the potentiality and
doubtfulness, even on the impossibility of its characters’ and
narrator’s perceptions and mental processes.
In fact, drawing on Herman’s interpretation of Kafka, one
could presumably argue that Gravity’s Rainbow blurs the dis-
tinction between the reference world and possible worlds al-
together, creating “radical semantic indeterminacy” (1995: 129;
see also Ryan 1999: 119). In fact, the statement that “the refer-
ence world of the novel is at times impossible to distinguish
from subordinate possible worlds” is a commonplace of the
Pynchon industry, merely recast in terms of possible-world
semantics. Nevertheless, stipulating at least provisionally a
primary fictional world (TAW) above all the numerous possi-
ble ones helps in the interpretation of the local cases of ex-
pressed doubt and hypothesis.
The preceding inquiry has made it evident that HF is by
no means an isolated device in the production of ontological
doubt. Gravity’s Rainbow proliferates tactics of doubt, for ex-
ample by rendering logically impossible a scene it purport-
edly narrates as actual (e.g. GR 169). However, Pynchon’s
novel does not utilize ‘pure’ HF to the extent that it is dis-
played in, say, the first few pages of Beckett’s Molloy (1955),
or the opening of Hawkes’ Lime Twig (1961), in which the
marginal phenomenon indeed is a routinely used and thus a
“formal correlative of detachment.” The description of the
numerous instances of epistemic doubt in Gravity’s Rainbow
thus demands more than analysis of the grammatical markers
of HF. In this respect, it is easy to join Herman (1994: 246) in
calling for “pooling the resources of linguistics, philosophy
and the theory of narrative” (see also Margolin 1999: 164).
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While macrostructural ontological indeterminacy has indeed
been shown to be a central trait of Gravity’s Rainbow, HF and
related phenomena emphasize the more localized instances of
inter-world incongruence. They invite the critic to scrutinize
the text for evidence for and against hypotheticality from the
complementary perspectives of text-linguistics, possible world
semantics, and structuralist narratology.
Above, I have sketched out a speculative account of a ty-
pology of focalization amplified from HF. While a concept of
focalization based on possible-world semantics rids itself of
the dichotomy external/internal, it is doubtful that this will
figure prominently in narratological criticism. Attributing the
belief-context maximally congruent with the reference world
of the narrative to the narrating agent is – at the very least – a
strong convention. In practice, this procedure re-introduces
the opposition. However, extending to a description of all
focalization the category of directness (the function of explic-
itness in my proposed revision) might further enhance the de-
scriptive power of the concept of focalization.
While the analysis of both the macrostructural and the lo-
cal varieties of ontological doubt illustrates the viability of
possible world semantics as an analytical frame for Gravity’s
Rainbow, it again became evident that Pynchon’s fiction refuses
to function merely as an illustration of the concepts of narra-
tive theory. The complex cases of HF in Gravity’s Rainbow
suggest that one should retain a moderately skeptic view of
the categories and concepts under consideration. In other
words, Pynchon’s novel insists on making visible the conven-
tional and relative nature of all concepts of literary analysis
and interpretation. This conclusion will become even more
evident as I turn in the next chapter to discuss Gravity’s Rain-
bow from the perspective of ludic narratology.
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9. Playing Pynchon: The Immersive
and Ludic Gravity’s Rainbow
Possible world semantics and the cognitive study of narrative
do not constitute an obvious “fellowship of interests” (GR 164).
This chapter seeks to provide an example of a complementary
relationship between the approaches. Below, I will discuss yet
another potential source of new narratological ideas, namely
ludology, the study of games. Both cognitive and possible world
narratology will be found useful in assessing the theoretical
and practical input of the ludological concepts. Conversely,
metaphors originating in the domain of game studies serve as
potential extensions of both traditional narratology and its re-
cent rivals.
Intuitively, playing games and reading narrative literature
seem to have something in common. The contents of the inau-
gural issue of Game Studies (July 2001), a journal devoted to
the study of computer games, illustrates this: many articles
concern themselves with the relationship between games and
narratives. Is storytelling or the inference of stories involved
in the act of playing games? Are the concepts of the study of
narrative applicable to the study of games? The articles’ an-
swers to the latter question vary from Ryan’s (2001c) cautious
“maybe” to Markku Eskelinen’s (2001) emphatic “definitely
not”.
This chapter will attempt to come to terms with the con-
cepts of narrative and game in a more literary context by
analyzing the intuitive (and almost trivial) observation that
Pynchon’s novel invites both highly immersive ‘reading for
the world’ and playful ‘reading as a game’. Most important, in
the course of the analysis, a tentative typology of textual games
will be sketched. The discussion below could be character-
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ized as narratological sharpshooting: the goal is to provide a
set of tools for the analysis of experimental, playful fiction. It
is argued, moreover, that Gravity’s Rainbow does not present
its world-eliciting and ludic features as necessarily opposing
each other. In an apparent contradiction, these features over-
lap in the interpretation of the novel.
The principal impetus for the discussion is Ryan’s view of
narrative and interactivity as represented in her recent mono-
graph Narrative as Virtual Reality (2001b). Throughout her
study, Ryan utilizes narratology, possible world semantics,
cognitive psychology, and theories of artificial intelligence and
virtual reality in order to examine the immersive and interac-
tive characteristics of various cultural phenomena, ranging
from baroque architecture to hypertext fiction. In terms of aes-
thetic theory, the most significant of Ryan’s claims is that the
ultimate goal of art is a synthesis of immersion and interactivity
(Ryan 2001b: 12). She cites children’s plays of make-believe
and the as yet technologically unavailable experiences of com-
puter-based virtual reality as putative examples of a synthesis
of this kind. The range of the examples reflects the scope of
Ryan’s account: interactivity and immersiveness are discussed
with reference to a truly comprehensive collection of cultural
products.
While Ryan’s general aesthetic insight should be borne in
mind during the discussion, this chapter will concentrate prin-
cipally on the more literary part of her study. In particular,
what follows is a meditation on the metaphorical use of the
concept of game in narrative theory and the practical study of
literature. Ryan’s thesis about the interactive and immersive
characteristics actualized in total art can perhaps serve as a
yardstick, relative to which the figural synthesis of
immersiveness and interactivity in literature can be measured.
The reading of Gravity’s Rainbow presented below suggests
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that printed literature has relatively good chances of at least
simulating the effect of Ryan’s total art.
In a recent article Ryan discusses narratologists’ tendency
to adopt metaphors from other fields of research. She demon-
strates that the vocabulary of narratology consists to a signifi-
cant extent of metaphors drawn, for instance, from geometry,
optics, the cinema, and sexuality. For Ryan, this is a welcome
development: “Thinking is analogical as much as it is logical,
and it is by recycling words and extending their scope that
language and thought can map new territory” (Ryan 1999: 114–
115). In the light of Ryan’s statements, it seems fitting to
analyze her use of the metaphors world and game as concepts
of literary theory. Moreover, Ryan’s view of the importance of
the metaphorical expansion of the conceptual toolkit of
narratology encourages one to develop her ideas further, or
rather, to develop ideas which Ryan leaves undeveloped, to
my mind prematurely.
Ryan’s account of the immersive and interactive qualities
of narrative will be briefly summarized in the first section.
The next follows discussions of several theoretical and practi-
cal questions arising mainly from Ryan’s conception of the
typology of textual games. In particular, issues pertaining to
the limitation of the metaphor game in the study of literature,
and the opposition of the readerly attitudes text as world / text
as game are of interest in the attempt to operationalize the
metaphor game as a narratological concept. The problems are
discussed in detail with reference to the immersive and/or ludic
features of Gravity’s Rainbow. In conclusion, the potential
narratological implications of the tentative encounter between
ludology and various kinds of narratology will be explicated.
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9.1. Starter Terms: Worlds and Games of Fiction
In terms of positive ideological connotations, there is no com-
petition between the concepts of immersion and interactivity.
One could well argue that at the heart of the recent craze for
interactivity lies a desire for a literalized metaphor. Being able
to point-and-click, we no longer have to talk figurally about
participating in the production of meaning, or about filling the
gaps of literary texts. Ryan (2001b: 6–9) acknowledges this
and refers to the heavily-exploited analogies that have been
drawn between electronic texts and postmodernist thought.
Interactivity has, according to Ryan (ibid. 8), been “hyped as a
panacea for evils ranging from social disempowerment to writ-
er’s block”, and the hypertext genre considered as “an instru-
ment of liberation from some of the most notorious bêtes noires
of postmodern thought: linear logic, logocentrism, arbores-
cent hierarchical structures, and repressive forms of power”.
However, before turning to hypertext and other non-meta-
phorically interactive forms of art, Ryan discusses at length
the opposition of the metaphors text as world / text as game in
printed literature, and, respectively, textual immersion and
interactivity. Ryan presents interpretations of the phenomenon
of immersion from various disciplines: cognitive psychology,
possible world semantics, and phenomenology.
In terms of possible world semantics, as discussed previ-
ously (chapter 2.3), immersion in a fictional world involves
fictional recentering, a re-organization of the fictional universe
around the possible world stipulated as the ‘actual’ by the text
(TAW). Ryan (2001b: 103) uses space travel as a metaphor to
illustrate this process; in the process of reading fiction, the
reader is transported into the stipulated ‘real’ world of a vir-
tual universe: “Insofar as fictional worlds are, objectively
speaking, non-actual possible worlds, it takes recentering to
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experience them as actual – an experience that forms the basic
condition for immersive reading” (Ryan 2001b: 103).
From the perspective of cognitive psychology and the phe-
nomenology of reading, the immersive transportation to the
counterfactually actual world of fiction has been variously
described as being “lost in a book” (Nell 1988, quoted in Ryan
2001b: 96), or experiencing “mental simulation” (Walton 1997,
quoted in Ryan 2001b: 110–114). To be borne in mind is Ryan’s
acknowledgment of the fact that mere willing suspension of
disbelief is not always all that is needed in immersive reading:
“immersion can also be a result of a process that involves an
element of struggle and discovery […] it is through hard work
that we reach the stage of effortless performance. The most
forbidding textual worlds may thus afford the ‘easy’ pleasures
of immersion, once the reader has put in the necessary con-
centration.” (Ryan 2001b: 97.) While this insight is corrobo-
rated by the following discussion of the opposition of the meta-
phors world and game, it is to some extent at odds with Ryan’s
conception of the dynamic of reading playful texts.
As one might expect, Ryan’s discussion of the notion text
as game emphasizes even more strongly the participatory na-
ture of reading. She presents a diachronic glimpse into the
history of the metaphor, referring to the nineteenth-century
realist novel as the epitome of textual world-building. After
its heyday, “a process of shrinking, fissuring, splitting, and
multiplying worlds within a larger textual universe reduced
big worlds to little worlds or dismantled them into heteroge-
neous fragments. Their scattered remnants could no longer
build a coherent imaginary space and time, but they provided
the perfect material for play.” (Ryan 2001b: 176.) The histori-
cal accuracy of the above analysis is beside the point; most
important, it sums up eloquently the basic idea of considering
literature as a game to be played. In the course of this discus-
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sion it will be argued, however, that fictional play, understood
more flexibly, is not merely a simple antithesis to “build[ing]
a coherent imaginary space and time”.
Postmodernist fiction is relevant to Ryan’s discussion of
both immersion and interactivity. In terms of the former it is a
marginal case: postmodernist novels tend to deliberately re-
sist immersion. At the most extreme, they have “conducted a
daring and dangerous exploration of the limit between world
aesthetics and game aesthetics, for there is everything to lose
– in terms of readership – if the limit is transgressed” (Ryan
2001b: 353). Beyond the limit, they are figural examples of
the textual games. This attribution is manifest, for instance, in
the fact that canonized features of postmodernist fiction (and
postmodernist thought in general) loom behind the features
Ryan (2001b: 192) ascribes to game as a literary metaphor:
opaque language, reflexive and illusion-refusing attitudes of
the reader, emphasis on arbitrary formal constraints, and so
forth.
The most striking feature of Ryan’s account is the con-
trast that she establishes between the metaphors game/world.
She describes the process of reading a text ‘for the world’ as a
fundamentally different activity from reading ‘as a game’. In
an anti-essentialist vein, however, Ryan contends that textual
features do not definitely exclude either of the reading atti-
tudes; nearly all texts can conceivably be read either way. This
obviously corroborates Ryan’s account of narrativity. As has
been discussed above (Chapter 7), narrativity in Ryan’s
intensional/illocutionary approach to fiction is ultimately an
interpretive concept. Accordingly, there are no objective means
of distinguishing between ludic and immersive texts48. The
decisive difference between immersive and ludic literature
therefore resides in the reader’s attitude to the texts. Ryan’s
strongest argument concerns the dynamic between the two
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readerly stances: a text cannot be read both immersively and
interactively at the same time. Play and immersion are sequen-
tial phenomena; they may follow each other, as the reader os-
cillates between the attitudes, but never overlap. (Ryan 2001b:
199.)
The text of Gravity’s Rainbow offers a challenge to Ryan’s
conception of literary worlds and games. It definitely repre-
sents canonized postmodernism and certainly is playful. How-
ever, it falls short of providing a clear-cut illustration of the
dichotomy text as world / text as game. Instead, it suggests
that one should renounce the strong opposition between the
metaphors in the study of literature. At the same time, it indi-
cates that the metaphor game, properly operationalized, con-
stitutes a viable concept for the textual study of narrative fic-
tion.
9.2. The Family of Textual Games
Ryan does not consider game an unproblematic concept in the
study of literary texts. Utilized as a broad metaphor, it almost
completely loses its explanatory potential. In more literal
senses, on the other hand, the concept of game is only very
marginally applicable to literary study. (Ryan 2001b: 178–181.)
In its most general and watered-down incarnation, the meta-
phor teaches us hardly anything interesting about literature:
“A good metaphor is supposed to provide an original perspec-
tive on its tenor, but we do not learn anything that we did not
know before by being told that reading literary texts, like play-
ing games, is for most people a pleasurable, nonutilitarian ac-
tivity” (Ryan 2001b: 181). Indeed, playing games and reading
literature have only very vague and uninteresting general simi-
larities; the concept of game seems to function best in literary
criticism as a metaphor used with caution. O’Neill (1994), by
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contrast, employs the notions of play and game in a very flex-
ible and broad way by adopting the ludic metaphors in his
narratological theory. He writes, among other things, about
the games of theory, and the games that authors can be consid-
ered as playing with readers. In this respect, O’Neill’s use of
the metaphors has little bearing on this discussion. In the ab-
sence of a significant fundamental similarity between games
and narratives, Ryan (2001b: 182–191) proceeds to examine
“local similarities” between literary texts and different kinds
of games with the aid of a four-category model originally con-
ceived by Roger Caillois (1961). Below is a summary Ryan’s
(2001b: 182–183) account of the typology:
Agon. Games based on competition (sports, board games,
TV quiz games).
Alea. Games of chance (roulette, lottery).
Mimicry. Games of imitation and make-believe.
Ilinx. Transgressions of boundaries, metamorphosis, re-
versal of established categories, and temporary chaos (drug
experiences, masquerades, amusement parks scary rides).
Cutting across the above categories, Caillois (1961: 13,
27–35) in addition presents a continuum between the concepts
paidia and ludus. The former designates the “frolicsome and
impulsive exuberance” of free play, the latter the strictly rule-
governed and disciplined play of institutionalized games.
As may be expected, Ryan finds resemblances between
certain types of extreme literary experimentation and particu-
lar game types: the combinatorial text-games of OuLiPo as
well as John Cayley’s algorithm-produced poetry turn out to
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have affinities with alea; the hypertext novels can be viewed
as agon, presenting themselves to the reader as puzzles to be
solved. Ryan’s example of the latter is Michael Joyce’s ‘clas-
sic’ hypertext novel Afternoon: A Story (1989). The competi-
tive aspect of agon is, in addition, particularly well represented
in Stuart Moulthrop’s hypertext novel Hegirascope (1997).
By setting temporal limitations for reading, Hegirascope forces
the reader to compete against the computer’s clock. To this
list of examples of text as game one could well add the even
more obviously ludic texts that Ryan (2001b: 180) calls
“metonymic” and “narrowly metaphorical” literary applica-
tions of games of alea: for instance, I Ching and Calvino’s
Castle of Crossed Destinies, respectively. Hence, The ‘gen-
res’ of agon and alea seem relatively well represented at least
in the margins of literary experimentation. However, the per-
ceived similarities between types of games and types of litera-
ture become more problematic in Ryan’s discussion of mim-
icry and ilinx. Both categories threaten to make the typology
problematic as a conceptual scheme of literary study. Mimicry
will be discussed in detail later in this section; let me first turn
to the relations among ilinx, alea, and agon.
The ethos of ilinx seems suitable enough for the
postmodernist frame of mind. Ryan (2001b: 186) acknowl-
edges this, contending that “[m]ore than any other category in
Caillois’s typology, ilinx expresses the aesthetics, sensibility,
and conception of language in the postmodern age”. One can-
not avoid again finding the canonical features of literary
postmodernism in Ryan’s (2001b: 186) characterization of the
category. Among others, figural displacements, puns, disrup-
tions of syntax, transgressions of ontological boundaries are
included. Thus ilinx seems to have a distinguished (not to
mention fashionable) “locally similar” counterpart in the lit-
erary realm. This seems too good to be true.
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Indeed, the similarity between games of ilinx and the aes-
thetics of literary postmodernism is logically troublesome be-
cause of the resulting indeterminacy of ilinx. It could be ar-
gued that Ryan (2001b: 186) in part creates the strong resem-
blance between the game category and postmodernism, for
instance, by associating the literary ilinx with Bakhtin’s con-
cept of the carnivalesque and thus with anything transgres-
sive. This re-fashioning makes ilinx a plausible local game-
counterpart for aesthetic postmodernism, but reduces the de-
scriptive power of the typology.
In Caillois’s original formulation, ilinx is defined in con-
siderably more restricted manner, as the pursuit of vertigo and
“surrendering to a kind of spasm, seizure, or shock which de-
stroys reality with sovereign brusqueness” (Caillois 1961: 23).
I think that Ryan extends the descriptive span of ilinx too far.
Most important, the over-extension of the game category has
detrimental pragmatic ramifications. This effect of conceptual
broadening is evident in Ryan’s (2001b: 185–186) use of chil-
dren’s games of make-believe as examples of the free play
typical to ilinx; if broadened in this direction, ilinx occupies
the core territory of mimicry. Ryan’s definition of ilinx also
imposes itself on the domains of alea and agon. Are not “crea-
tive anarchy” and “destabilization of all structures” also char-
acteristic of alea? Similarly, the competitive features of ilinx,
the deciphering of puns, for instance, arguably also invite
agonistic reading/playing. Furthermore, Ryan’s concept of ilinx
is nearly indistinguishable from the notion of paidia; this is
evident in Ryan’s (2001b: 186–191) attribution of the
deconstructionist views of language and literature to paidia,
which she defines as “play defined as the subversion of rules”
(cf. Caillois’s definition above).
The broad conception of ilinx makes it incompatible with
the rest of the categories: its distinguishing principle no longer
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relates to the dominant function of play, as in the other types
(see Caillois 1961: 12). Instead, it is defined in terms of an
indeterminate set of formal characteristics more or less corre-
sponding to the established characteristics of postmodernism.
Thus ilinx ceases to be a functional member of Caillois’s fam-
ily of games and becomes the prime model for postmodernist
free play in both literature and language.
In general, Ryan does not regard Caillois’s typology of
games a particularly useful analytical aid for the study of nar-
rative. Despite demonstrating the previously mentioned affini-
ties between experimental literature and alea and agon, and
attributing the “postmodern sensibility” to ilinx, she is quick
to judge the categories trivial and problematic as interpretive
concepts. For instance, Ryan (2001b: 183) finds the applica-
tion of agon troublesome because of its inherent competitive
aspect: it is silly to consider reading literature as literally a
matter of winning and losing. Granted, a literal application of
Caillois’s typology to literary study hardly yields remarkable
results. Nevertheless, Ryan abandons too hastily the metaphori-
cal adaptation of textual games. In the light of Ryan’s defini-
tion of the category of ilinx, this is quite understandable:
privileging one member of the ‘family’ of textual games makes
the rest appear useless. In addition, as will be seen below, Ryan
does not discuss the category of mimicry as a variety of tex-
tual play. Adopting a significantly more ‘relaxed’ yet system-
atic attitude toward Caillois’s categories, I will in what fol-
lows present an emphatically metaphorical account of textual
games.
In an attempt to transform Caillois’s categories into terms
of narratological criticism, one has to first establish a division
of labor between the types. Let me again turn to ilinx: should
one limit the span of the concept and retain the descriptive
power of other members in Caillois’s typology, or make use of
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the broad conception of ilinx as a comprehensive analytic tool
for literary postmodernism? A textual analysis will help to
illustrate, and perhaps solve, the problem.
A quick glance at Pynchon criticism is enough to con-
vince one of the usefulness of the category. The vague meta-
phorical expression “Pynchon’s novel is a textual game”, re-
phrased as “Pynchon’s novel is a textual game of ilinx,” would
indeed seem more than acceptable. The novel certainly fea-
tures parody and absurdity and displays mixing of genres; it
definitely involves serious crossings of ontological bounda-
ries and heteroglossia – all items in Ryan’s (2001b: 186) list
of characteristics of ilinx. In terms of the novel’s thematic con-
tent, perhaps the most strikingly fitting trait of Ryan’s
postmodernist ilinx is the “treatment of identity as a plural,
changeable image”. This ludic element is both explicitly
thematized and implicitly inscribed in Gravity’s Rainbow.
The sometimes frantically changing external markers of
identity of the protagonist Tyrone Slothrop (aka Ian Scuffling,
Max Schlepzig, Rocketman, and Plechazunga) constitute a case
of an overt thematization of ilinx. The novel seems to cel-
ebrate the absurd ethos of the game by making Slothrop the
player (or perhaps the plaything) in a vicious game of identi-
ties. The ludicrousness of the rapidly changing identities con-
fuses Slothrop, newly-established as Rocketman, who is ex-
pected to perform heroic acts merely by virtue of “the act of
naming”:
Holding out a fat roll of 100s [Säure Bummer says], “You could
be back tomorrow. No job is too tough for Rocketman.”
   A day or two later, it will occur to Slothrop that what he
should have said at that point was, “But I wasn’t Rocketman,
until just a couple of hours ago.” But right now he is beguiled
at the prospect of 2.2 pounds of hashish and a million nearly-
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real marks. Nothing to walk away from, or fly or whatever it is,
right? (GR 371)
Slothrop’s ludicrous identity-drill does not necessarily
entail a playful attitude on the part of the reader, however; the
game is thematized by the text. The reader does not have to
“play the text” in order to acknowledge its ludicity. However,
Gravity’s Rainbow also involves more implicit play with iden-
tities. The characterization of Pynchon’s novel is also struc-
turally indeterminate; analogies and unclear allusions between
characters that logically should have no similarities or con-
nections force the reader into re-assessments of the ontologi-
cal status of Pynchon’s fictional personage. McHale (1992:
78–80; see also Duyfhuizen 1991) has referred to the phenom-
enon as “mapping” – moreover, the unnatural inter-personal
analogies are commented on in the novel itself. The psychic
medium Carroll Eventyr is particularly aware of the game: “If
there are analogies, here, if Eventyr does, somehow, map on
to Peter Sachsa, then does Nora Dodson-Truck become the
woman Sachsa loved, Leni Pökler?” (GR 218). The charac-
ters of the novel thus, once again, become tokens in a trans-
gressive game of mixed identities. Most important, however,
the analogous overlap of the identities of the characters of
Gravity’s Rainbow invites the reader to partake in the play.
Coming to terms with the characterization of the novel pre-
supposes playful involvement in the novel. The mapping be-
tween characters is thus a more concrete example of textual
gaming than Slothrop’s overtly changing identity. The novel
actualizes the game, and literalizes the metaphor of game, by
forcing the reader to adopt a playful, interactive attitude to-
ward reading.
According to Ryan’s account of Caillois’s typology of
games, the presupposed readerly attitude would thus beauti-
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fully exhibit the spirit of ilinx. In addition, this conclusion is
to some extent supported by Caillois’s concept of the category;
he considers changing identities and guises typical of an amal-
gamation of games of mimicry and ilinx (Caillois 1961: 87–
97). The above analysis of thematized and actualized games
of ilinx in Gravity’s Rainbow is, therefore, an example of a
relatively moderate application of the category. So far so good.
Disturbingly, however, it could be argued that almost all
of Pynchon’s structural or thematic particularities could be
analyzed in the manner presented above, were one to accept
the feature-matrix of Ryan’s ilinx. Again, if the game-type is
found to represent the sensibility of postmodernism in a near
one-to-one correspondence, the category threatens to become
redundant, and the metaphor of text as a game of ilinx almost
completely loses its meaning. Proceeding from this position,
one would expect that an analysis based on a more moderate
conception of the typology of games would yield more refined
results. Let us, therefore, tentatively define ilinx as a thematized
or actualized textual game that involves the pursuit of ‘narra-
tive vertigo’, induced by disorienting either the characters or
the reader, for instance, with transgressions of narrative con-
ventions such as clearly distinguishable character identities.
The following passage provides an example of actualized tex-
tual ilinx:
The story here tonight is a typical WW II romantic intrigue,
just another evening at Raoul’s place, involving a future opium
shipment’s being used by Tamara as security against a loan
from Italo, who in turn owes Waxwing for a Sherman tank his
friend Theophile is trying to smuggle into Palestine but must
raise a few thousand pounds for purposes of bribing across the
border, and so has put the tank up as collateral to borrow from
Tamara, who is using part of the loan from Italo to pay him.
But meantime the opium deal doesn’t look like it’s going to
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come through, because the middleman hasn’t been heard from
in several weeks, along with the money Tamara fronted him,
which she got from Raoul de la Perlimpinpin through Wax-
wing, who is now being pressured by Raoul for the money be-
cause Italo, decicing the tank belong to Tamara now, showed
up last night took it away to an Undisclosed Location a pay-
ment on his loan, thus causing Raoul to panic. Something like
that. (GR 247)
The sequence is the narrator’s condensed version of the
“romantic intrigue”, supposedly told to Slothrop by the
black-market agent Blodgett Waxwing. The flat yet complex
brevity of the narrator’s presentation creates the impression of
the reader sharing Slothrop’s perplexity before the compli-
cated story. There are two main strategies for coming to terms
with the passage. On the one hand, the reader can conscien-
tiously sort out the circular relationships among the agents of
the silly plot. This reading strategy would involve taking the
intrigue for real and trying to incorporate it into the story so
far. However, the emphasized habitualness of the presentation
(“Something like that”, “just another evening at Raoul’s place”)
is apt to the make the reader consider the passage as deliber-
ately playful, as inducing an enjoyable feeling of being con-
fused.
If the reader chooses (as the present reader always does)
to consider the passage an instance of textual ilinx, he or she
might be taken by surprise, since Tamara, the typical WW II
intrigue heroine, immediately afterwards crashes into Raoul’s
restaurant in the Sherman tank that is part of the plot. Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow thus delivers a rap on the knuckles to the ludic
reader by making the intrigue plot very real indeed. This un-
expected activity is very momentary, however. After having
provided a pretext for yet another carnivalistic stir at Raoul’s,
Tamara and her tank disappear, never to be mentioned again.
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The brief overlap of two intrigue plots (Slothrop’s and
Tamara’s) is likely to emphasize the ludicrousness of both.
What about other textual games?
Pynchon’s novel provides a variety of examples of the tex-
tual game of alea. As in the case of ilinx, it is possible to find
overt thematization of the game of chance, as well as more
implicit, structurally inscribed occurrences. The most conspicu-
ous and thoroughly discussed (both in the novel and in its criti-
cism) thematization is involved in the novel’s central dilemma
of randomly striking V-2 rockets. The fundamental dispute
between causally-minded Pavlovian Edward Pointsman and
the relativist statistician Roger Mexico concerns, in fact, pre-
cisely the question of whether the inhabitants of London were
during the rocket raids of 1944–45 involuntarily the tokens in
a game of alea or agon:
[Pointsman:]”But surely –”
   “Every square is just as likely to get hit again. The hits aren’t
clustering. Mean density is constant.” […]
   “But squares that have already had several hits, I mean –”
   “I’m sorry. That’s the Monte Carlo fallacy. No matter how
many have fallen inside a particular square, the odds remain
the same as they always were. Each hit is independent of all the
others. Bombs are not dogs. No link. No memory. No condi-
tioning.” (GR 56)
Pointsman’s perspective on the distribution on the rocket
hits points toward an interpretation of the bombing of London
as a game the rules of which are to be learned simply by ob-
serving the preceding ‘moves’ on the map. As a result, it would
be possible to beat the opponent by being one step ahead; this
reasoning points toward a game of agon. The enlightened
reader is, obviously, painfully aware of the hopelessness of
such an approach, and considers the phenomenon as a par-
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ticularly grim thematization of alea49. The exaggerated intel-
lectual clumsiness of Pointsman’s arguments further justifies
interpreting the passage as an overt thematization of textual
play (among other things).
As in the case of Slothrop’s changing identities, however,
the episode does not, as such, necessarily presuppose readerly
participation. The playing of the game is thematized and thus
internalized by the text itself; the reader is expected to be the
spectator, not the player. The reader is invited to take part in
the textual play in somewhat more concrete fashion, however,
in the episode depicting the drinking-game Prince.
I have argued earlier (4.3) that the scene is an embedded
metaphor that refers to the interpretation of the novel itself
and thus constitutes an enunciative mise-en-abyme. Reading
and interpreting the novel is like playing the game. In addition
to this function, the game illustrates both textual alea and agon.
“[E]verybody takes a number, a-and you start off the Prince of
Wales has lost his tails, no offense now, the numbers going
clockwise from that Prince, or whatever number he wants to
call out actually, he, that’s the Prince, six or anything, see, you
pick a Prince first, he starts it off, then that number two, or
whoever that Prince called, sez, but first he goes, the Prince
does, Wales, tails, two, sir” [...]
   “Yes yes but –” giving Slothrop the most odd look, “I mean
I’m not quite sure I really see, you know, the point to it all.
How does one win?”
   Ha! How does one win, indeed. “One doesn’t win,” easing
into it, thinking of Tantivy, one small impromptu counter-con-
spiracy here, “one loses. One by one. Whoever’s left is the win-
ner.” (GR 212)
The passage obviously thematizes the nature of games as
rule-governed activity, manifest in Dodson-Truck’s puzzlement
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in the face of the apparently senseless rules of Prince. Owing
to Slothrop’s cryptic presentation of the rules, the game hov-
ers between a game of alea and a game of agon. The game is
(counterfactually, one would argue50) presented as a highly
complicated intellectual challenge to the players, particularly
later on, when it switches to “rotating Prince”, and “it is im-
possible to tell who is making mistakes and who isn’t” (GR
213). The shift from the simple to the more indeterminate ver-
sion of the drinking game makes the rules complicated enough
to become, in practice, oblique. Consequently, the players move
from the domain of agon into that of alea.
This is a very literary shift; one thinks of the textual play
of Raymond Roussel – absolutely rule-governed, yet as good
as aleatory from the reader’s perspective51 because of the ob-
liqueness of the rules of the textual play (see Hutcheon 1980:
123–124; McHale 1987: 159–160; 1992: 184). Prince as an
enunciative mise-en-abyme not only suggests that interpreting
Gravity’s Rainbow is like playing a game; it frustrates the reader
further by implying that the ‘rules’ of the interpretive game
might be forever out of reach. The reader sets out to read the
novel as a textual game of agon – probably suspecting all the
while the possibility of its being a game of alea. The drinking-
game thus both thematizes and actualizes the game categories
of alea and agon by making the reader aware of the ludic fea-
tures of the scene, both on a thematic level and in his or her
actual reading process.
To summarize: how does one make the most of Caillois’s
typology of games in the interpretation of ludic literature?
Ryan’s conception of ilinx as postmodernist gaming par ex-
cellence proved to be overly comprehensive in the analysis of
the postmodernism of Pynchon. Ryan’s broad interpretation
of ilinx makes it difficult to consider the type a functional
member of the typology. Moreover, the rich interpretive po-
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tential of the interplay of the categories agon and alea in the
novel suggests retaining a relatively moderate view of the ty-
pology. As a result, ilinx, alea, and agon constitute a trio of
relatively distinct types of textual play. Furthermore, it seems
useful to distinguish between thematized and actualized tex-
tual play: the ludic element of a text may either be observed
on the story level or become ‘acted out’ by the reader (cf.
Hutcheon 1980). Jurij Lotman’s (1978) account of the theme
of the card game in Russian literature illustrates the interde-
pendence of the thematic and actualized interpretations of tex-
tual games. On the one hand, Lotman discusses different card
games as overt literary themes; on the other, he (ibid. 480–
485) considers ways in which the thematized card games af-
fect the structural aspects of narratives: the theme of the card
game as a “plot machine”.
Finally, Caillois’s continuum between ludus and paidia
can, in addition, be taken into account, should it provide inter-
pretive insights. In other words, the textual games either rep-
resent play as unrestricted activity (‘free play’) or more organ-
ized play ‘by the rules’. Having thus provisionally
operationalized three of Caillois’s game categories – agon,
alea, and ilinx – in terms of practical criticism, I will now set
out to examine the usefulness of the opposition between the
metaphors text as world / text as game, in the process also
discussing the hitherto undiscussed game type of mimicry.
As mentioned above, Ryan (2001b: 199) insists on a sharp
distinction between the realms of textual worlds and games:
“because an observer cannot simultaneously occupy two dif-
ferent points in space, the complementarity of the two meta-
phors also means that we cannot experience both dimensions
at the same time. We must therefore immerse and deimmerse
ourselves periodically in order to fulfill, and fully appreciate,
our dual role as members of the textual world and players of
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the textual game”. According to this logic, the reading of fic-
tion that invites both immersion and play is an experience akin
to enjoying optical tricks such as Gombrich’s duck/rabbit fig-
ure or, to evoke Pynchon’s metaphor, “staring at a recco map
until bomb craters flip inside out” (GR 713).
Ryan’s insistence on the stark distinction between the
immersive and interactive approaches to literature follows from
her conception of total art: the synthesis of immersion and
interactivity. Printed literature, far from attaining such a dis-
tant goal, is very good at eliciting immersion, somewhat able
to metaphorically evoke interactivity – and utterly unable to
synthesize the two perspectives. Perhaps the funniest of Ryan’s
illustrations of the sharp distinction between the alternatives
is one based on the operating systems of personal computers:
the text as game is like Macintosh (or Windows), whereas the
text as world is exemplified by MS-DOS. As Ryan (2001b:
197–198) herself notes, the attribution could go either way:
the text-based DOS is immersive to a hacker who is comfort-
able with the jargon of the operating system; the visual nature
of Mac appears more immersive to the naive user ready to
accept the WYSIWYG52 doctrine. Most important, it is not
possible to be immersed and remain aware of the materiality
of the screen simultaneously.
Despite the very persuasive juxtaposition of worldly vs.
ludic features in Ryan’s discussion, I find her account of the
opposition between the immersive and ludic approaches to lit-
erature too reductive. It very effectively corroborates Ryan’s
central notions of immersion and interactivity but proves to
be problematic in both theory and practice. To demonstrate
this, let me turn to mimicry. A fundamental typological issue
is virtually present in Ryan’s discussion of the category in the
literary realm. The problem is only virtual because Ryan does
not directly assess mimicry as a type of textual play:
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The importance of games of mimicry for the theory of
fictionality has been discussed in the previous chapters. Since
these games presuppose a world, they offer a potential recon-
ciliation of immersion and interactivity, and they transcend the
aesthetic ideals that literary theory of the past twenty years seeks
to express through the game metaphor. I do not, therefore, in-
clude mimicry in my discussion of the game aesthetics. (Ryan
2001b: 185)
True, Ryan comprehensively discusses the creation of fic-
tional worlds for immersive purposes in the first chapters of
her book; she does not, however, consider this activity as a
game that falls into the category of mimicry. In other words,
Ryan does not address (or make any use of) the remarkable
fact that the readerly strategy of immersive reading is embed-
ded in Caillois’s typology of games. This is an additional rea-
son for Ryan to dismiss prematurely the potentially useful ty-
pology of textual games. To be sure, Caillois’s description of
the game of mimicry suggests a strong affinity with Ryan’s
concept of immersion:
The rule of the game is unique: it consists in the actor’s fasci-
nating the spectator, while avoiding an error that might lead
the spectator to break the spell. The spectator must lend him-
self to the illusion without first challenging the decor, mask, or
artifice which for a given time he is asked to believe in as more
real than reality itself. (Caillois 1961: 22.)
This is a more or less accurate description of what Ryan’s
intensional/illocutionary theory of fiction considers as the core
of fictional ‘communication’, the fictional game of make-be-
lieve (see chapter 7). Hence, if one is to take seriously the
implications of Caillois’s typology, the opposition between text
as world / text as game is found to have no basis. Reading ‘for
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the world’ proves to be a subcategory of reading ‘as a game’,
instead of being its opposite counterpart.
Ryan (2001b: 185) is cautious for a good reason: textual
play conceived of at this level certainly goes above and be-
yond anything that is usually meant by the metaphor game in
literary study. It would therefore seem reasonable to discuss
textual play conceived of on this level separately from the
metaphorical domain of text as game in order to retain the
strict opposition of the metaphors of world/game in Ryan’s
formulation. This is, however, not the only alternative for com-
ing to terms with the question; I see no reason not to “tran-
scend the aesthetic ideals that literary theory of the past twenty
years seeks to express through the game metaphor”. In the
above textual analyses, as well as in Ryan’s discussion,
Caillois’s ‘family’ of games has proved to offer useful con-
cepts for the analysis of playful texts, in particular of experi-
mental fiction; thus it seems reasonable to explicate the rela-
tions between the members of the typology and thereby har-
ness its whole descriptive input to the uses of narrative analy-
sis.
As a result, instead of two interpretive options (game/
world) one would have four interrelated analytic concepts. In
what follows, I will further demonstrate the interpretive po-
tential of this scheme both by examining the relationships be-
tween the members of the typology and by explicating ways
in which it can be used to further refine Ryan’s concepts of
world/game and to alleviate the unnecessary contrast between
them.
9.3. Dynamics of Textual Play
The above analyses of Gravity’s Rainbow have demonstrated
that the four-part typology of games as such yields a relatively
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sophisticated system for the analysis of the ludic characteris-
tics of a text. Furthermore, the model is a system that involves
combination, interplay, and overlap of the game categories. In
fact, as mentioned earlier, Caillois (1961: 12) himself consid-
ers the categories to be distinguishable in terms of the relative
dominance of the “the role[s] of competition, chance, simula-
tion, or vertigo”. The dynamic among the members of the fam-
ily of textual games reflects this: texts are governed by a par-
ticular variety of textual play, though not so as to exclude char-
acteristics of other types.
Therefore, by analogy, the dominant game category of
Madame Bovary would be mimicry, with very few or none of
the characteristics of other types; the dominant game category
of Jacques the Fatalist is, similarly, mimicry, but with addi-
tional characteristics of agon (manifest in the ‘competitive’
relationship between the of the narrator and narratee); the domi-
nant game category of Mark Saporta’s novel-
as-a-deck-of-cards, Composition No. 1, is alea, with frequent
but nearly inconsequential characteristics of mimicry. And, as
has already been demonstrated, the dominant game category
of Gravity’s Rainbow is mimicry, with important characteris-
tics from all of the other types of textual games.
This interpretation of Caillois’s typology is apt to elimi-
nate the strict contrast between the worldly and ludic ap-
proaches to literature; Ryan’s dichotomy world/game is merely
a special case, albeit an essential one, of the many possible
“permutations’n’combinations” (GR 275) that the family of
textual games can generate. Again, the above discussion of
Gravity’s Rainbow illustrates the matter: the episodes of the
novel were found metaphorically to hover among the various
game-types, not merely between the two more general options
of world-evoking and playful reading of the text.
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While seemingly incompatible with Ryan’s conception of
the fundamentally separate activities of immersion and tex-
tual play, the above conception can be used to illustrate and
refine her position as well. Surveying the boundary between
literary immersion and interactivity, Ryan makes a distinction
between “medium-aware immersion” and radical textual play.
The former, she contends, is possible because “we can at the
same time, without radical change in perspective, enjoy the
imaginative presence of a fictional world and admire the vir-
tuosity of the stylistic performance that produces the sense of
its presence” (Ryan 2001b: 351). In the case of textual
interactivity or “hypermediacy” (Ryan’s examples are hypertext
fictions and Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler), by
contrast, the spell of immersion is broken, because “every time
the reader is called on to make a decision, the projector that
runs the ‘cinema of the mind’ comes to a halt [and] it takes a
while to get the projector running again” (ibid.).
For Ryan, the awareness of the medium is only partially
compatible with the notion of reading ‘for the world’: too much
medium-awareness, and the reader is no longer able to im-
merse himself/herself into the represented fictional world. The
obvious question is where to draw the line between subtle and
radical interactivity. In Ryan’s view the subtle medium-aware-
ness that does not yet efface immersion “grow[s] almost spon-
taneously out of the text, rather than being forced on the reader
by emphatic devices such as metafictional comments or em-
bedded mirror images” (Ryan 2001b: 352). It seems that the
acceptable amount of ludicity cannot be precisely measured,
or even described. Moreover, the expression “forced on the
reader” cannot but suggest an ideological motivation behind
the insistence on the strict world/game separation; reading for
the world is presented as the natural alternative in fiction, while
reading as a game is made necessary by “emphatic devices”.
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This is where the proposed application of the typology of tex-
tual games is useful. The gray area between immersive and
interactive texts can easily be analyzed in terms of the relative
dominance of textual games.
At its subtlest, an awareness of the medium of literature,
say, the appreciation of the author’s style in a typically well-
written realistic novel, would correspond to the basic dual
nature of all games of fictional make-believe, mimicry: the
reader is simultaneously aware of the evoked fictional world
and of the “spectrally present” (Ryan 2001b: 351) substance
of language. After all – to evoke Ryan’s (and Walton’s) favorite
illustration of make-believe – children immersed in a game of
baking mud-cakes rarely actually put the cakes in their mouths.
(Children eat dirt out of curiosity, without pretending that it is
anything else.) However, even in the case of primarily mi-
metic texts, the reader might confront textual puzzles (from
deciphering long sentences to sorting out interwoven plotlines)
that invite the application of reading tactics other than mere
participation in a game of fictional make-believe.
Furthermore, texts that present more challenging struc-
tural devices can be described as more conspicuously involv-
ing characteristics from other types of textual play. For in-
stance, in Calvino or Joyce’s Afternoon: A Story (or Ulysses,
for that matter!), the text involves characteristics of both the
categories of mimicry and agon, thus making the reader both
read ‘for the world’ and emphatically perceive the
mediatedness of the represented world. According to this in-
terpretation there is only a difference of degree between the
form of textual play Ryan calls “medium-aware immersion”
and radical textual interactivity. Arguably, this view reflects
the (almost) infinitely varied reality of literary texts better than
setting up an arbitrary boundary between “natural” and “forced”
medium-awareness – immersion and play, in other words.
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Replacing the dichotomy of world/game with a four-mem-
ber typology encourages one to further analyze the dynamic
among the categories. Two main interpretive alternatives arise:
the reader either oscillates among the different game catego-
ries, the perspectives remaining distinct, or applies multiple
perspectives to the text simultaneously. In the former the proc-
esses complement each other; in the latter there is only one
multi-perspectival process. The dynamic among the catego-
ries of textual games in Gravity’s Rainbow serves as a com-
plex illustration of Ryan’s notion of tellability, the fundamen-
tals of which have been discussed above (chapter 2.3).
In order to support of her notion of medium-aware im-
mersion, Ryan (2001b: 351) paraphrases Bob Witmer’s and
Michael Singer’s claim that “the mind is fully able to focus on
several objects at the same time if the focus on at least some
of these objects remains diffuse or backgrounded”. Can read-
ers, then, focus simultaneously on the ludic and the immersive
elements of a given text? In other words: how flexible are we
as readers/players? Let me turn to an episode of Gravity’s Rain-
bow in order to demonstrate the way in which the immersion
typical of mimicry and the problem-solving characteristic of
agon are interdependent parts of the process of the reading of
a complicated, yet tellable, literary text.
Fairly early on in the novel, shortly after the reader has for
the first time been familiarized with the problematic of
Slothrop’s erotic performances and the V-2 rocket strikes, the
novel treats the reader with a circular episode, set in Corydon
Throsp’s maisonette and spanning some twenty pages (GR 92–
113). It introduces the inscrutable Dutch double agent Katje
Borgesius, who is later to become one of Slothrop’s many sig-
nificant erotic conquests. The sequence depicts the secret film-
ing of Borgesius for the purposes of a Pavlovian conditioning
of one Octopus Grigori; thus it links up with the ‘Slothrop’s
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relationship to V- 2 strikes’ plotline. The episode consists of
embedded narrative levels that shift from one to another al-
most imperceptibly, prompting Weisenburger (1994) to desig-
nate the episode a manifestation of the “hyper-embedded nar-
ration” of Gravity’s Rainbow. Indeed, the sequence involves
no less than eight nested narrative levels, enough to make even
the most pedantic reader lose count.
The number of embedded narratives is not the most prob-
lematic feature of the scene, however; the shifts between the
levels are made in a series of mind-to-mind movements that
transgress the conventions of narrative embedding. Thus, for
example, Borgesius’ remembrance of Captain Blicero subtly
shifts into the description of Blicero’s thoughts about Gottfried,
his sado-masochistic partner/slave (GR 96; Weisenburger
1994: 77). This is just as impossible in real life as it is in con-
ventional realist fiction: the effect of the ‘illicit’ embedding is
alienating.
The complex and subversive nature of the episode is apt
to evoke a ludic attitude; the reader literally has to play the
text in order to comprehend it, even in the most basic sense of
figuring out the relationships among the narrative levels. The
game of agon programmed into the sequence is thus very ac-
tual: the reading process of a first-time reader is likely to con-
sist of a series of backtrackings and tentative conclusions typi-
cal of games involving problem-solving. However, an ‘ago-
nistic’ approach is not all that is required of the reader in order
to grasp the significance of the scene.
In addition to being an exercise in confused narrative hi-
erarchy, the episode presents in embryo many essential themes
and characters of Gravity’s Rainbow: the Hansel and Gretel
fairytale, sado-masochism, Captain Blicero, Gottfried, Enzian,
Rilke’s Duino Elegies, Octopus Grigori, and so forth (cf. “The
Story of Byron the Bulb” discussed in chapter 3.2). The “hyper-
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embedded” episode is overdetermined in terms of informa-
tion (supposedly53) relevant to the interpretation of the novel.
Presented early on, the episode functions by furnishing the
reader with a set of at best vaguely interconnected bits of knowl-
edge to be borne in mind for further use.
While providing a plethora of interpretive clues for the
reader, the Maisonette-episode is also essential to the progres-
sion of the novel’s plotlines. The passage is saturated with
narrative information; the sequence explodes the hitherto rela-
tively stable and confined “Allied intelligence activities in
London” plot into numerous interlinked plots, many of which
are to become central later on in the novel. The episode con-
stitutes not merely a game of agon to be played by the reader,
but also a source of thematic and narrative information neces-
sary for the construction of the peculiar fictional world of
Pynchon’s novel and thus a game of mimicry in potentia. The
condensed makings of a fictional world are, nevertheless, given
to the reader in the form of a narrative riddle: in order even to
make tentative sense of it, the reader has to engage in the tex-
tual play of agon.
In this respect, it is useful to recall Ryan’s account of
tellability. The Maisonette-episode exemplifies tellability by
its very playfulness. It exemplifies Ryan’s (1991: 155) princi-
ples of both functional polyvalence and the diversification of
possible worlds – both essential indices of tellability. This is
Ryan on functional polyvalence:
Narrative highlights are formed by events entering into several
distinct functional units [,] grouping[s] of states and events (not
necessarily adjacent) presenting special strategic significance
for the story as a whole. […] An example of functional polyva-
lence is the marriage of Oedipus and Jocasta. This particular
event functions as solution of a problem (the desire of Oedipus
for Jocasta); as fulfillment of a prediction; as violation of as
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interdiction (the prohibition of incest); and as an infraction jus-
tifying the punishment to come. The principle of functional
polyvalence is what accounts for the intrinsic elegance – and
consequently, for the tellability – of certain ways of solving
problems. (Ryan 1991: 155.)
Functional polyvalence seems self-evident: the episode as
a whole, as well as particular events in it, have multiple narra-
tive functions. This is not only a result of the multiply embed-
ded (or stacked, in Ryan’s reversed terminology; see also
Weisenburger 1994; Jahn 1999) ‘Matrushka’ narratives in-
volved in the passage. Observing merely the levels of
extradiegesis and first-level diegesis, one finds multiple func-
tions. On the extradiegetic level, the episode is a predictive
textual mise-en-abyme; for the Allied intelligence it is a part
of an elaborate scheme to study Slothrop’s rocket-reflex; for
Katje Borgesius it constitutes an act of self-contemplation; for
Pirate Prentice the episode involves coming to terms with both
Borgesius and his supposed54 haunting of Katje’s ancestor Frans
van den Groov; for Octopus Grigori it is a session of Pavlo-
vian conditioning; and for Osbie Feel, at the most mundane, it
constitutes merely a sequence of manufacturing and using vari-
ous kinds of drugs. Moreover, to explode the notion of func-
tional polyvalence altogether, one could add to the list the func-
tions the episode fulfills from the perspective of the embed-
ded plotlines: what it means for Captain Blicero, for Frans
van den Groov, for Gottfried, for Enzian and so on.
What about the diversification of possible worlds, accord-
ing to Ryan the most fundamental formal requirement of
tellability? Ryan describes the principle in the following man-
ner:
The demand for a diversified semantic universe also determines
what kinds of resolutions and outcomes present the greatest
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narrative interest. My contention is that tellability is rooted in
conceptual and logical complexity, and that the complexity of
a plot depends on an underlying system of purely virtual em-
bedded narratives [i.e.] story-like constructs contained in the
private worlds of characters. (Ryan 1991: 156; see also chapter
2.3)
In the light of the dizzying plurality of private possible
worlds of remembrance, imagined history, hallucination, and
make-believe generated during the episode, the principle seems
to be vigorously in play. The virtual private worlds of wishes
and expectations of both characters and agencies directly or
indirectly involved in the scene create a complicated constel-
lation of potential outcomes. According to Ryan’s conception,
therefore, the circular episode yields a very tellable configura-
tion (Ryan 1991: 157).
The passage seems to betray its tellability, however, since
it does not resolve any of the embedded plotlines it presents to
the reader. In short, nothing really significant ‘happens’ in the
Maisonette-episode. The conflicts between the private worlds
of the characters introduced to the reader are not solved dur-
ing the 20 pages of the sequence. In fact, many of the plotlines
remain without closure forever (the supposed haunting of Pi-
rate Prentice, or the fate of Captain Blicero, for instance).
For present purposes, the most crucial thing to note is the
interplay between the tellability and playfulness of the epi-
sode. Curiously, it seems that the playful and transgressive
narrative strategies of Gravity’s Rainbow allow it to include
embedded plot-sequences that dramatically enhance its
tellability. While certainly alienating the reader, the game of
embedded narratives in addition (and by contrast) seduces the
reader into digging deeper. As a result, the reader, definitely
aware of the medium, enjoys the very good story that is the
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surprising outcome of the radical textual play. The reader in
search of instant gratification is in for a disappointment, how-
ever. The long-distance linking strategy typical to Gravity’s
Rainbow (see chapter 6.2.2 above; McHale 1992) once more
reveals the condensed or ‘implicit’ tellability of the passage in
its totality only in retrospect. The thematic and structural rel-
evance of the episode can be fully appreciated only after re-
ceiving more narrative information. From very different per-
spectives (neo-Proppian function analysis and cognitive
narratology), both Emma Kafalenos (1999) and Jahn (1999:
186) emphasize the relationship between provisional,
processual, and final interpretation of a text. This is Kafalenos’s
view on the matter:
During the process of reading a narrative, I propose, we inter-
pret events according to two simultaneous procedures [:] we
interpret events as functions in relation to the configurations
we have established at the moment that the event is revealed to
us. The other procedure is the thought process that traditional
narratology has taught us to perceive: we construct a fabula by
arranging in chronological sequence all the events that the texts
we are reading reveals. (Kafalenos 1999: 57.)
Applying the principle of Kafalenos’s account to the read-
ing of the Maisonette episode, the reader simultaneously in-
terprets the events represented in the “hyper-embedded” nar-
ration with reference to the immediate situation of nested nar-
rative levels, and as contributing to the construction of the
overall fabula of the novel. To extrapolate in terms of the game
typology, it seems that playing the textual game of agon (i.e.
coming to terms with the complex embeddings) and playing
the game of fictional make-believe cannot be separated from
each other. In other words, the narrative world, the outcome of
the game of make-believe, is constituted just as much by the
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reader’s playful (or painful) attempts to fathom a particular
sequence, as it is by surrendering to immersion.
The above interpretation of the Maisonette-episode sug-
gests that the agonistic approach to Pynchon’s novel is not
merely a complementary alternative to reading it as a game of
make-believe. The reader is required to play the text in order
to become immersed in the bizarre world of illegitimate nar-
rative transitions in the first place. And once happily immersed,
he or she is likely to discover that the outcome of his or her
struggles, a more or less coherent fictional world, presents it-
self as yet another puzzle to be played with and, hopefully,
solved. In reading Gravity’s Rainbow, Ryan’s “projector of the
mind” is not only frequently interrupted by textual games. The
reader is, rather, the projectionist whose constant actions keep
the reel rolling. Playing the textual game does not hinder the
creation of fictional worlds; it is an activity required in order
for immersion in the first place. (The projectionist-metaphor
is obviously deficient: real-life projectionists generally lose
interest in watching the same movie over and over again. This
does not happen while reading Pynchon.)
Hume interprets the relationship between the immersive
and interactive qualities in a similar vein: “Pynchon’s realities
are assimilable only by those who mingle themselves with the
events at various levels, and they depend upon the reader/ac-
tor’s creative participation to become fully real. [...] The more
the reader is immersed in the text, especially during subse-
quent readings, the more participatory the relationship” (Hume
1987: 207–208).
As noted above, Ryan (2001b: 97) herself acknowledges
and describes a situation similar to this, and writes of immer-
sion as the “result of a process that involves an element of
struggle and discovery”. Nevertheless, the complicated inter-
play of different readerly strategies involved in the decipher-
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ment of a novel such as Gravity’s Rainbow cannot be satisfac-
torily analyzed within the confines of her dualistic world/game
account of fiction. While, in all fairness, it remains impossi-
ble to be certain about what happens in the psychological proc-
ess of reading/playing, the discussion presented above sug-
gests that insisting on a strict opposition of the notions of im-
mersion and play does not necessarily yield satisfactory inter-
pretive results. Rather, certain textual situations seem to in-
vite viewing immersion and (other kinds of ) textual play as
interdependent and overlapping processes.
In a prototypical literary situation, the reading as mimicry
clearly dominates the field of textual play, the other types serv-
ing as marginal or supplemental phenomena. The inevitable
difference of emphasis between the two fields does not make
Caillois’s typology any less useful for narratology, however. It
merely makes the application of the typology of games to lit-
erary study markedly different from the use that game studies
have for it.
This divergence of attitudes is reflected in a delicious pair
of statements from representatives of the disciplines. Accord-
ing to Eskelinen, “stories are just uninteresting ornaments or
gift-wrappings to games, and laying any emphasis on study-
ing these kinds of marketing tools is just a waste of time and
energy” (Eskelinen 2001: sec. 8 par.1). By contrast, from a
literary point of view, Ryan contends that interactivity is “a
supplemental feature tacked on to an art form that did very
well without it”. Disagreement of this magnitude cannot but
point toward a useful exchange of ideas.
9.4. Worlds, Frames, and Games
How does the approach to textual games outlined above relate
to the narratological conceptions of Fludernik’s Natural
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Narratology and Ryan’s possible world narratology? It seems
that strategically considering all reading potentially playful
extends both approaches.
For Fludernik (1996), a text is narrative to the extent that
it reflects the experience of a ruling consciousness. Fludernik
herself notes that this definition precludes considering certain
varieties of radical experimental fiction as narrative. Moreo-
ver, I have argued earlier (Chapter 5) that Fludernik’s account
runs into problems even before she acknowledges it, resorting
to a more traditional, story-based model. Consequently, the
problematic cases of a chapter of Towards a ‘Natural’
Narratology, aptly titled “Games with Tellers, Telling, and
Told”, prompt Fludernik to propose a search for models of
postmodern[ist] narrativity elsewhere. The typology of games
arguably provides one such model, on the levels of both cog-
nitive parameters and illusionistic textual analysis.
First, on a Natural level, Fludernik’s concept of narrativity
can be augmented with the interpretive notion of game in or-
der to make sense of the apparent non-sense of experimental
narratives. To be sure, this addition to Fludernik’s conception
of narrativity does not constitute a new basic cognitive pa-
rameter of natural storytelling; in Fludernik’s four-level sys-
tem of reading fiction (see Chapter 5), the interpretive notion
of textual games functions as part of the conscious
narrativization process on level IV. In other words, the reader
more or less consciously perceives the analogy between the
troublesome reading of a ludic text and games, and conse-
quently makes sense of the idiosyncrasies of the text with an
interpretive macro-frame of play. It is questionable, however,
whether one should continue to refer to this attribution as
“narrativization”. According to Fludernik’s expressed views
on narrativity, textual comprehension in terms of games is
clearly not a narrative experience. In cases like these one should
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perhaps turn to Culler’s (1978: 134) more general concept of
naturalization, to distinguish between narrativity proper and
other strategies according to which strange texts are “recuper-
ated or naturalized, brought within our ken”. The naturaliza-
tion of a text vis-à-vis the notion of game could, in effect, be
regarded as attributing the experience of reading to a ‘foreign’
cognitive frame. A ludic text could conceivably be compre-
hended by utilizing essentially nonnarrative natural cognitive
parameters (or scripts) of problem-solving, competition, or rid-
dle (see Jahn 1999: 180–181).
The possible integration (or rather agglutination) of
game-naturalization to Natural Narratology, however interest-
ing, has little to do with the analytical concepts proposed in
the course of this discussion. The typology of textual games
functions best on a purely conceptual (and illusionistic) level,
as a coherent set of metaphoric concepts with which to analyze
experimental works of literature. The obvious advantage of
the typology of textual games is its ability to come to terms
with fiction that transcends any notion of real-life storytelling.
The definition of narrativity in Ryan’s intensional/
illocutionary approach to possible world narratology is some-
what broader than Fludernik’s. It does not insist on the
experientiality reflected in a narrative but simply on plot or
“rationalized sequence” (Ryan 1991: 264–265; see also Ryan
1992b) inferred from a text. Nevertheless, discussing
postmodern[ist] literature, Ryan (1991: 267) introduces the
concept of anti-narrativity, a “rejection of plot as principle of
textual unification”. Ryan (ibid.) is not particularly worried
about the possible effects of this rejection on the conception
of narrativity: “it simply turns narrativity into an optional in-
gredient of the genre [of the postmodern novel].” The princi-
ples of narrativity remain intact.
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It is easy to see that the typology of textual games is an
extension of Ryan’s plot-oriented account of narrativity, even
though Ryan does not see a desperate need for such a supple-
ment. When the narrativizing hypothesis of an underlying event
structure (story, fabula) no longer seems convincing, the ty-
pology of textual games might still provide a viable frame for
intelligible reading.
9.5. Margins of Metaphoricity Revisited
The redefinition of the notion text as game that has been sug-
gested in the course of this chapter has powerful implications.
Most importantly, it significantly broadens the use of the meta-
phor: it invites one to consider most pieces of narrative litera-
ture as essentially ludic, because they, like games of mimicry,
“presuppose a world” (Ryan 2001b: 185). This seems to be
strongly at odds with the cautious use of the metaphor that
Ryan endorses. The limited practical use of the metaphor is
not necessarily incompatible with the more general notion of
the playfulness of all literature, however.
Ryan’s endorsement of a relatively limited conception of
the metaphor text as game is most evident in her discussion of
the alleged affinities between free play (or paidia) and the
poststructuralist view of language. According to Ryan, it is
tempting to broaden the metaphor to refer to the most funda-
mental levels of literary signification: “In the paradigm that
currently dominates literary studies, if literature is a game, it
is because language itself is one; and if literature is a game, it
is because its rules form a self-enclosed system that determines,
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rather than reflects, our experience of reality.” (Ryan 2001b:
187.) Ryan does not consider this reasoning sound: the reader
is not really playing a game while decoding linguistic struc-
tures. The free play involved in signification is not to be mis-
taken for the ludic activity of a reader faced with computer
games or hypertexts – or postmodernist novels. (Ryan 2001b:
190–191.) Ryan’s (2001b: 17) view that “postmodern narra-
tive deepens the reader’s involvement with the text by pro-
posing new reading strategies, or by drawing attention to the
construction of meaning [and] stand[ing] as the illustration of
a strong figural version of interactivity” suggests that a par-
ticular text is a game in a figural sense only if it is marked as
such. Ostensibly, if the reader is not aware of being faced with
a playful text, it makes no sense to use the metaphor game.
This conclusion is corroborated by the analyses of Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow: Pynchon’s text indeed “draws attention to the
construction of meaning”, for instance, by presenting
Pointsman’s and Mexico’s debate over rocket strikes, and thus
the thematization of alea and agon, as conspicuously signifi-
cant55. The ludic interpretation is supported by the text; it does
not stem from an all-encompassing statement about the ludicity
of all literary discourse. Similarly, the twistedly logical sys-
tem of the changing and overlapping character identities of
Gravity’s Rainbow markedly presents itself as a game of tex-
tual ilinx to be played by the reader.
In most cases, therefore, the metaphor game functions best
when the broad interpretation “literature is essentially play-
ful” and the poststructuralist contention “all signification in-
volves paidia” are subtly overlooked. Unlike Ryan, however,
I do not feel that there is a natural basis for either of these
exclusions; the pragmatic demands for analytic and interpre-
tive effectiveness make both sensible. It is trivial, superflu-
ous, and silly to talk about realistic novels as constituting games
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of mimicry, if nothing indicates that the typology of textual
games has consequences for their interpretation. Essentially
non-ludic narratives sensibly suggest reaching for Ockham’s
razor. As the above discussion of Gravity’s Rainbow illustrates,
however, there is no reason not to make use of the concepts
provided by the model of literary games if the textual situa-
tion invites it. This is what makes the typology of textual games
“narratological sharpshooting”. In the interpretation of Gravi-
ty’s Rainbow, considering mimicry as merely one among the
many possible textual games, for instance, is indeed a source
of novel insights.
The above critique of Ryan’s conceptions of both Caillois’s
typology and the opposition of the metaphors text as world /
text as game make explicit the conventional nature of literary
metaphors. Despite the fact that world-creating immersion and
ludic interactivity are real, observable, and to some extent re-
searchable psychological phenomena, the interpretation given
to the concepts in criticism also has a logic of its own. Ryan
bases her poetics of immersion and interactivity more firmly
on psychological and phenomenological interpretations in or-
der to come to terms with the experiential characteristics of
different forms of art. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of Ryan’s
study, the justification of the claim that total art consists of a
synthesis of immersion and interactivity, makes it natural for
her to choose to emphasize the distinction between the
immersive and ludic attitudes in the case of printed literature.
Setting its aim considerably lower, the present discussion
aims to make the most of game as a concept of literary criti-
cism. As a substitute for the dichotomy world/game, an appli-
cation of Caillois’s game typology has proved to provide a
more refined system for the analysis of immersion and other
varieties of textual games, thematized or actualized. This is
not to imply that the findings of cognitive psychology or pos-
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sible world semantics that Ryan utilizes in her account would
lose their explanatory (or at least descriptive) potential; the
most crucial difference lies in the interpretation they are given.
Ultimately, in dealing with metaphors one is left with the re-
sponsibility (and freedom) to choose the amount and variety
of conceptual metaphoricity that one finds most practical.
Again, the text of Gravity’s Rainbow succinctly illustrates the
situation. Emil “Säure” Bummer and Gustav the young
Weberian discuss music in the following terms:
   “You’re caught in tonality,” screams Gustav. “Trapped. To-
nality is a game. All of them are. You’re too old. You’ll never
move beyond the game, to the Row. The Row is enlighten-
ment.”
   “The Row is a game too.” Säure sits grinning with an ivory
spoon, shoveling incredible piles of cocaine into his nose [.]
“Sound is a game, if you’re capable of moving that far, you
adenoidal closet-visionary. That’s why I listen to Spohr, Rossini,
Spontini. I’m choosing my game, one full of light and kind-
ness.” (GR 622)
In the most general sense, in addition to exemplifying the
relevance of both cognitive psychology and possible world
semantics for the narratological analysis and interpretation of
literature, the preceding discussion implies a fruitful inter-
change between narratology and ludology. In this respect, the
metaphorical incorporation of the concepts of ludology par-
takes in the recent enthusiasm for literary interdisciplinarity,
most clearly exemplified by the explosive dissemination of
the ideas of cognitive science.
Herman is quick to praise such a development. For him,
the communication between research into the socio-cognitive
factors of play and fictional games of literature promises fresh
insights for the study of narrative and games alike: “just as
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research on social play can help integrate (fictional) storytell-
ing into a broader context of practices of make-believe […],
narrative analysts can help identify a fuller range of play
behaviors, and a richer repertoire of play-indexing cues, than
those hitherto recognized” (Herman 2001b: par. 20). There-
fore, while Eskelinen (2001) is perhaps rightly worried about
the alleged colonizing attitude of art criticism with its predi-
lection for ‘storifying’ and interpreting all cultural phenom-
ena, tentatively and metaphorically applying the concepts of
ludology to narratological criticism hardly constitutes a threat
to either discipline.
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10. Conclusion: Pynchon the
Narratologist?
In one respect, this study has disregarded its structuralist her-
itage (again, some would say burden): by considering ways in
which Pynchon’s fiction implicitly takes part in the discourse
of narrative theory, the preceding chapters have repeatedly
implied the notion of an individual aesthetic will that becomes
visible in the text, yet also transcends it. This is in stark con-
trast to orthodox structuralist (not to mention poststructuralist)
ideas about authorship and textuality. To play devil’s advo-
cate, one could claim that this study, for its part, contributes to
the myth of genius, or at least to the myth of the Author, that
has plagued Pynchon criticism from the very beginning. There-
fore, before attempting to pull together the threads of the above
interlocutions between Gravity’s Rainbow and narratology, I
feel compelled to address two questions that concern the au-
thor of that novel, Thomas Pynchon. Is he a genius? A
narratologist, perhaps?
True, the conclusions reached about the inscribed
narratological positions of Gravity’s Rainbow have not sim-
ply implied that the text and the text alone speaks (the study
has refrained from all kinds of authorial, or biographical, ex-
planation, though). Now, in terms of institutional aesthetics,
Gravity’s Rainbow is an instance in the ongoing implicit aes-
thetic discourse that constitutes the art world, no differently
from any other work of art. What causes it, nonetheless, to be
irresistible to consider Pynchon a genius is the fact that his
fiction simultaneously, and forcibly, contributes to theoretical
discussions of the novel on several fronts. Gravity’s Rainbow
is an exploration of the margins of the possible regarding both
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the specialized discourse of narratology and the more general
‘great tradition’ of the novel.
Furthermore, as has been amply demonstrated in Pynchon
criticism, Pynchon’s contribution to the art of the novel is not
merely the result of an implicit commentary on narrative con-
ventions. The thematic aspects of Pynchon’s novel, Pynchon’s
public figure, Pynchon lore, and Pynchon’s tremendous sig-
nificance for the study of literature must be taken into account
when assessing the true effect of the author and his works.
However, if Gravity’s Rainbow has in this study been consid-
ered a work of genius, this is so only in terms of its relevance
to literary criticism and theory. The genius of Pynchon is thus
determined by discourses: narratology, the aesthetics of the
novel, and so on.
The same conclusion is valid with respect to the question
of Pynchon’s status as a narratologist. The dismaying fact that
Pynchon is in reality probably no more a narratologist than the
author of these pages is a novelist – though who’s to know? –
in no way diminishes the valuable input of the narratology-in-
practice woven into his texts.
As was mentioned in the introduction, Pynchon’s
narratologies are emphatically plural. Gravity’s Rainbow sug-
gests many, often contradictory, views of its narrative func-
tioning. The incompatibility of many of the narratological con-
cepts considered in the course of the study thus prevents one
from seeking a truly detailed synthesis of the results of the
examination. As was promised in the introduction, however,
there are fundamental observations to be made about the rela-
tionships between Gravity’s Rainbow and the various
narratologies seeking to come to terms with the novel. Let me
discuss different aspects of these relationships separately. First,
a word on the relations of cognitive narratology, possible world
narratology, and Gravity’s Rainbow.
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A substantial part of this study – chapters 5–8 – has been
devoted to the theoretical and practical assessment of cogni-
tive narratology and possible world narratology. What con-
clusions can one draw from these discussions? In the chapters
devoted to the theoretical discussion of the approaches, I have
repeatedly emphasized the principal difference between pos-
sible world narratology and cognitive narratology, i.e. that of
analysis and explanation. To recapitulate: possible world
narratology provides the student of literature with novel ways
to look at, and think about, literature; cognitive narratology
provides an explanatory framework for its study. Now we are
in a position to assess this general distinction – is it reflected
in the practical applications of cognitive narratology and pos-
sible world narratology?
The analysis of the voices of Gravity’s Rainbow in chap-
ter 6 made use of Fludernik’s account of the cognitive sche-
mata, while utilizing fairly traditional tools of narrative analy-
sis. In a sense, the discussion sought to marry “illusionistic”
categories of structuralist narratology to the explanatory frame-
work of Natural Narratology. The attribution of narrative voices
was studied in terms of the reader’s strategy of utilizing either
the cognitive schema of TELLING (the narratorial voice), or
EXPERIENCING (figural voice). It was argued that the analysis of
the minutiae of voice attribution is possible only with the ar-
mature of illusionist narratology. To utilize Jahn’s (1997) ter-
minology, “top-down” (cognitivist) and “bottom-up” (struc-
turalist) approaches to texts were interpreted as complement-
ing each other. The study of the linguistic, contextual, and the-
matic characteristics of narrative provides clues about the prob-
able adoption of interpretive frames instead of functioning as
their definite indices. Again, however, this should not be a
source of despair for featurist students of narrative. Without
the featurist, “bottom-up” approach, an essential aspect of lit-
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erary study all but disappears into the black box. To be sure,
this mixed strategy of narrative analysis has potential prob-
lems. First, its relationship both to Natural Narratology and to
structuralist narratology might be considered ambiguous. If
the textual analysis utilizes traditional means of textual analy-
sis, why link it to Natural Narratology at all? Second, are not
the fundamental presuppositions of Natural and structuralist
narratology at odds with each other? Both questions can be
addressed by recalling the discussion of Fludernik’s distinc-
tion between theoretical and illusionistic approaches to liter-
ary analysis. Textual analysis in the context of Natural
Narratology is analysis of both textual features and readerly
illusions, while the cognitive schemata of Natural Narratology
provide the fundamental explanation for narrativity. ‘Apply-
ing’ Natural Narratology, one has to make explicit the differ-
ent functions and goals of the two. In this way one can enjoy
both the analytical details of featurist narratology and the
processual insights of holistic narratology.
The discussion of hypothetical focalization in chapter 8
recalls the role possible worlds play in modal semantics: the
analytic tool of the analysis of anomalous, problematic cases.
The analysis of the marginal narrative phenomenon of HF was
significantly augmented by viewing fictional narrative as a
constellation of possible worlds. However, the discussion of
HF is also symptomatic of the way the concept of possible
worlds has been domesticated in literary studies. In addition
to providing an analytic tool for HF, the possible world frame-
work was used to outline a comprehensive account of
focalization. For literary scholars, a possible world is not merely
an abstract structure provisionally stipulated in order to come
to terms with special cases such as HF. Quite the contrary, it is
the full-fledged imaginative world of fiction. While this inter-
pretation is not faithful to the philosophical origins of the con-
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cept of possible world, it is precisely its slightly heretical char-
acter that allows one to comprehensively reconceptualize the
issue of perspective in the framework of possible worlds.
Again, possible worlds have to be made literary if one wishes
to make use of them as literary concepts. The final analytical
input of the concept of focalization based on possible world
narratology remains to be assessed. Whatever the case, the
discussion demonstrated that the possible world approach pro-
vides new ways to conceive of the perspectival qualities of
narrative.
 In this study, cognitive narratology and possible world
narratology have generally been discussed separately. Is it pos-
sible to find areas of intellectual overlap? Despite the funda-
mental theoretical differences between cognitive narratology
and possible world narratology, Fludernik’s Natural
Narratology and Ryan’s intensional/illocutionary theory of fic-
tion were found to raise similar questions. In particular,
Fludernik’s and Ryan’s discussions of narrativity resemble each
other. This is not to suggest that their definitions of narrativity
were similar; it is, rather, the attitude toward the limit-cases of
narrativity that creates the affinity. Fludernik (1996), it should
be remembered, interprets extreme postmodernist challenges
to experiential narrativity as rare phenomena that do not pose
a serious threat to the model of Natural Narratology. In a simi-
lar vein, Ryan’s (1996) concept of postmodernist anti-
narrativity leaves the model of narrativity intact by viewing
radical experimentation as a mere deviation from it (see also
Carroll 2001: 36). Furthermore, the discussion of game as a
concept of textual analysis (chapter 9) demonstrated that both
Fludernik’s and Ryan’s theories of narrativity need to be com-
plemented with more specialized accounts of narrative com-
prehension.
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Ryan’s (1991) work on possible world narratology and
artificial intelligence points further toward viewing possible
world narratology and cognitive narratology as complemen-
tary approaches to fiction. For instance, Ryan’s revision of tra-
ditional plot models combines the analytical potential of the
possible worlds of fiction with the concepts of computer pro-
gramming and thus provides a flexible and powerful frame-
work for the analysis of the dynamics of plots. In Ryan’s model,
the possible worlds (wish-worlds, dream-worlds, belief-worlds
and the like) provide indispensable tools for the description
and representation of the virtual and actual events of the plot.
The assumed cognitive processing of the plot can, in turn, be
described using the concepts of artificial intelligence. In this
respect, Ryan’s approach bridges the methodological gap be-
tween cognitive narratology and possible world narratology.
Moreover, Herman’s work on both possible world and
cognitive narratologies constitutes a deliberate attempt to syn-
thesize the approaches. For instance, in his revised version of
the notion of hypothetical focalization Herman (2002: ch. 8)
links the analytical power of possible world semantics to cog-
nitive accounts of narrative, such as Fludernik’s Natural
Narratology. In his study Story Logic Herman approaches nar-
rative from various methodological perspectives in order to
construct a comprehensive view of the logic of narrative.
Whether or not Herman’s heady optimism (2001b; see also
Fludernik 2001c: 112) regarding the bright future of the “sci-
ences of the text” is justified, remains still to be demonstrated,
however. Of course, in the most pragmatic sense – regardless
of their theoretical validity – the new approaches offer valu-
able new interpretive frameworks for the study of narrative.
Let me turn to the challenges that Pynchon’s fiction poses for
all kinds of narratology. What can one conclude about
Pynchon’s deconstructive intent?
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Many critics have noticed the affinity between Pynchon’s
texts and poststructuralist notions of textuality. McHoul and
Wills (1990) seek to ‘bookmatch’ the novels to critical theory,
Duyfhuizen (1991) perceives a poststructuralist theory of read-
ing inscribed in the text of Gravity’s Rainbow, while Berressem
(1993) considers the novel, among other things, a parody of
the poststructuralist notion of text. However, linking Pynchon’s
works to poststructuralist ideas is just as risky a strategy as
attributing them to structuralist ideas. To my mind, Pynchon’s
novel is best understood as reflecting the logic of deconstruct-
ion very loosely, almost sufficiently so as to make the connec-
tion trivial. Gravity’s Rainbow certainly is not a practical ap-
plication of poststructuralist theory.
It may be disappointing to find that “having your narra-
tive conventions and discarding them too” articulates the es-
sence of Pynchon’s deconstruction vis-à-vis narrative conven-
tions. However, what Pynchon’s deconstructive project may
lack in general theoretical finesse, it more than regains in the
depth and diversity of its subversive textual praxis. All textual
analyses have focused on Pynchon’s strategy of utilizing nar-
rative conventions to their logical limits. In the first of these,
Gravity’s Rainbow was found to make the conventions of nar-
rative hierarchy look arbitrary and artificial. Consequently,
fundamental narratological categories such as narrative level
and the narrator were subject to suspicion. Gravity’s Rainbow
is, to be sure, not alone in abusing narrative hierarchy –
Pynchon’s novel, however, is particularly exciting because of
its tendency to project irony also toward the conventions of
narrative transgression. Pynchon’s attitude toward the clichés
of metafiction exemplifies this ‘double’ deconstruction of nar-
rative.
In the introduction, the first text-analytical chapter was
described as the “intellectual blueprint” for the rest of the tex-
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tual analyses. Now we are in a position to see more clearly
what this means. In the course of this study, Gravity’s Rain-
bow has been found to exhibit its deconstructive logic on many
levels: formal categories of speech and thought representa-
tion, the categories of textual games, and the cognitive param-
eters of narrative comprehension are equally susceptible. This
is why the theoretically vague talk about the deconstructive
intent of Gravity’s Rainbow is intelligible; the novel really
seems to function according to a particularly evasive logic. In
fact, a good way to think about Gravity’s Rainbow is to con-
sider it a textual machine that has been ingeniously designed
(!) to deconstruct classifications of all kinds.
Now, the ardently formal approach of this study has been
clear from the outset. Issues that transcend the confines of
narrative conventions or problems pertaining to the analysis
of textual structures have generally not been addressed. The
deconstructive logic of Gravity’s Rainbow, nonetheless, obvi-
ously extends beyond the scope of this inquiry. This has been
amply demonstrated in the studies of the ideological and po-
litical dimensions of Pynchon’s work. In this respect, the tex-
tual and thematic traditions of Pynchon criticism share a mu-
tual interpretive standpoint. There is no reason not to continue
the tradition of Pynchon criticism and utilize the findings of
the above analyses for the purposes of thematic and ideologi-
cal criticism. But, again, there is relatively little to say in gen-
eral about Pynchon’s deconstructive strategy, formal or ideo-
logical. The most satisfying strategy consists of studying the
various ways in which Pynchon’s novel fulfills its paradoxi-
cally subversive mission of utilizing and overturning narra-
tive conventions, or ideological conceptions and beliefs.
The discussion of the deconstructive attitude of Gravity’s
Rainbow is, essentially, an example of “yielding to the inter-
pretive temptation”, according to Prince (1996: 164) a ques-
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tionable narratological strategy (cf. Lanser 1995). While the
analyses have sought the notorious narratological objectivity,
it is clear that an initial hypothesis of an implicit, vaguely
deconstructive narratology inscribed in Pynchon’s text has
informed the pursuit as a whole. In retrospect, the logic seems
very simple: read a text, form an intuitive interpretation, look
for textual evidence to support it – this is the logic of all re-
search. Surely rejecting this cannot be what Prince had in mind?
Here is Prince in context:
In short, without yielding to the interpretive temptation and
without renouncing the ideal of a description of narrative and
its possibilities that would be explicit, systematic, and univer-
sal, narratology should and can take into account calls for more
self-awareness, flexibility, and attention to the concrete. Indeed,
it is on this condition that it will perfect the fit between its
models and the texts they strive to characterize and that it will
find a place in a generalized semiotics. (Prince 1996: 164.)
It seems that yielding to interpretive temptation is pre-
cisely what is needed in narratological criticism – a real dis-
tinction should be made between yielding strategically to the
interpretative temptation and renouncing altogether the ideals
of narratology. While discarding the difference between the
particular and the general does not seem like a viable strategy,
one should be prepared to adjust preconceived notions of nar-
rative to make them truer to the real world of narratives as
well as to “generalized semiotics”. The strategy of
narratological criticism applied throughout this study consists
of a twofold procedure: first, for strategic purposes, rigidifying
the narratological concepts in order to make the most of their
descriptive power; second, concentrating on what remains
undescribed by the concepts in order to re-assess their valid-
ity. Granted, this procedure is a traditional one; the presuppo-
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sitions of the narratological models continue to inform the
analysis even in its inverted incarnation. Thus the advance-
ment of narratological criticism is always already (as the say-
ing goes) prescribed by previous positions. But only partially.
A truly deconstructive strategy of creating narratological
concepts would, of course, proceed further by situating the
inverted terms in a more general conceptual frame, thus dem-
onstrating the illusory basis of the dichotomies. This is what
Gibson (1996; 2001) proposes for narratology, and McHoul
and Wills (1990), hilariously, for Pynchon criticism. As a re-
sult, however, the role of narratological concepts would have
to be reconsidered. Concepts such as textual force are no longer
analytical tools but avowedly tentative interpretive metaphors
with which to approach literature. Indeed, in the most radical
form proposed by Gibson, deconstructionist narratology sev-
ers all meaningful links to traditional narratology. In short:
‘deconstructionist narratology’ is much more of an oxymoron
than ‘interpretive narratology’. Of course there are gradations;
for instance, narratologists such as Peter Brooks (1984) and
Chambers (1984) have sought to operationalize the metaphors
of narrative desire and seduction, respectively. There is, none-
theless, a significant difference: while Gibson seeks to form a
new paradigm of poststructuralist narrative theory, the analy-
ses of Brooks and Chambers are still to a significant extent
continuous with the textualist strategies of structuralist
narratology.
The analysis of the ludic identity of Gravity’s Rainbow in
chapter 9 most explicitly addressed the problem of metaphors
as concepts. Extending and refining Ryan’s (2001b) account
of textual games, the chapter outlined a thoroughly metaphori-
cal conceptual typology for the analysis of playful narrative.
In what sense, if any, are the game categories compatible with
narratological concepts? In terms of genealogy, the typology
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is obviously non-literary, based as it is on Caillois’s (1962)
categories of games. By contrast, narratological concepts such
as narrator and narrative level seem to spring more directly
from the reading experience. They are, nevertheless, also meta-
phors. In fact, there is no qualitative difference between
metaphoricity of the proposed game categories and most of
the traditional concepts of narratology; as Ryan (1999) points
out, only the neologisms of Genettean terminology are non-
metaphorical. The continuum-model of description has been
evoked or alluded to several times during this study, and per-
haps it would be fitting to consider the metaphoricity of
narratological concepts as a scalar phenomenon. The inherent
metaphoricity of most narratological concepts alleviates the
distinction between theoretical and illusionistic concepts. There
are limits, of course: a successful metaphor has to make sense.
Both the operationalization of a metaphorical system of
textual games and the discussion of Fludernik’s notions of theo-
retical and illusionistic approaches to narrative analysis invite
one to think further about the role of metaphors and illusionis-
tic concepts in narratology. The analyses of Pynchon presented
above suggest that traditional narratology provides indispen-
sable tools for augmenting new narratologies precisely because
it is capable of relatively rigorously considering the illusionis-
tic aspects of narrative literature, in addition to providing an
established, not to mention well-recognized, apparatus for tex-
tual analysis.
The point of departure for this study was a reference to
Genette’s Narrative Discourse (1980). It was claimed, some-
what brashly, that the analytical chapters straddle theoretical
conceptualizations and attention paid to the particularities of
the object text, in a way akin to Genette’s famous textual analy-
sis. It was further argued that the proper way to conduct
narratological criticism in general is to consider the analysis
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as a bi-directional process of influence between the theoreti-
cal concepts and the explicated text. In the light of the above
analyses, one could well argue that monsters such as Gravity’s
Rainbow permit no other procedure. It has proved simply im-
possible to force the narrative peculiarities of Pynchon’s work
into pre-established categories of narrative theory; too much
would be lost in translation. Moreover, Gravity’s Rainbow
works its slightly subversive magic just as much on cognitive
and possible world narratologies as it does on the structuralist
variety. This is an empowering and liberating observation, not
a cause for distress. It confirms that the multiple approaches,
regardless of their theoretical and methodological differences,
do the best that they conceivably could: together, they succeed
in providing a partial explication of Pynchon’s practical yet
immensely intricate narratologies. Needless to say, it is what
still remains outside all of the narratological models (and there
is so much!) that we should be particularly attentive to – now
and in the undoubtedly bright days of future narratologies.
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Notes
Introduction & Chapter 1:
1. Of course, the plural form also alludes (and not very
subtly) to the title of an anthology of narratological essays
edited by David Herman, Narratologies (1999).
 2. Moreover, the critical community apparently anticipated
Vineland as if it were Mason & Dixon (see Bloom 1986: 9;
Siegel 1977: 122).
3. It should perhaps be noted that “narratological criticism”
bears, for Prince, slightly negative connotations. Prince
(1996) uses the term to make a distinction between criticism
of specific texts and narratology proper. Thus, for instance,
questions of gender are questions pertaining to
narratological criticism, not to narratology. In this study,
“narratological criticism” has a thoroughly positive mean-
ing.
4. Early studies coming to terms with Pynchon’s fiction
include monographs by Slade (1974), Plater (1977), and
Siegel (1978); and critical anthologies edited by Levine and
Leverenz (1976), Mendelson (1978), Clerc (1983), and
Bloom (1986).
5. ’Bookmatching’, despite its capacity to turn nicely into
‘matchbook’, is an unfortunate choice for a metaphor de-
scribing intertextual relations. A standard method in luthiery
and other fine carpentry, bookmatching minimizes the
detrimental effects of the warping and shrinking characteris-
tics of individual pieces of wood, as the quotation from
David Russell Young in McHoul and Wills (1990: 11)
makes clear. Thus, structurally, in a bookmatched instrument
soundboard, for instance, the warping and twisting forces
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and tendencies of one ‘bookend’ are (ideally) neutralized by
the equal yet opposite forces and tendencies of the other
‘bookend’, both being cut from a single piece of wood and
glued so that the grain patterns oppose each other. This
neutralizing of the forces of individual pieces of wood
hardly provides basis for seeking “the space between covers
[…], between the bookends” (McHoul and Wills 1990: 12).
In terms of aesthetics, the metaphor functions equally
poorly: precisely the symmetry of the preferably subtle grain
patterns and sapillary rays in a well-matched soundboard is
apt to please the eye of, say, an average luthier; it is an
implicit promise of sound characteristics and structural
stability. Bookmatching, at least in the light of its original
context, does not evoke any connotations with (positive)
difference, complex relations, or the like. It is logical that
the vocabulary of woodwork should not provide useful
metaphors for poststructuralist criticism: carpentry is, at
least on the level of techniques, an ardently non-relativist
pursuit. In this respect, McHoul’s and Wills’s metaphor does
not make sense. (For a further discussion of the adoption of
metaphors for the uses of literary study, see chapters 7–8,
Conclusion and Ryan 1999; Ronen 1996.)
6. Other critics who consider Menippean satire or genres
akin to it in conjunction with Gravity’s Rainbow include
Morgan (1977), Mendelson (1976), and Safer (1989). Curi-
ously, Keith Bocker (1989: 66) argues for the novelistic
nature Gravity’s Rainbow on the basis of roughly the same
features as other critics consider it a  Menippea.
7. To be sure, Pynchon’s novels have been included in the
most selective canons of literary postmodernism; if a critic
considers postmodernism a viable concept of literary criti-
cism in the first place, Pynchon is likely to figure as an
example representing it. However, postmodernism remains
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today at least as elusive a generic concept as it was in the
days of its introduction to the literary scene. Hence, despite
the fact that critical texts that consider Pynchon a
postmodernist have a great deal to offer in terms of analyses
and interpretations, postmodernism cannot be considered a
satisfactory formal generic concept.
Chapter 2:
8. Gibson would probably disqualify any use of the term
narratology because, as Richard Aczel (2001a: 614) has
observed, narratology’s -ology still refers to the “the logos of
knowledge, of science; legein in the sense of counting and
reckoning”. Etymology, however, is not everything. To my
mind, narratology does not as such evoke scientific connota-
tions: instead it is situated (rather deliciously) on a discipli-
nary continuum inhabited equally by, say, pathology and
astrology. Of course there are other alternatives:
narratosophy, perhaps? Narrative theory is the least inter-
esting alternative.
9. The debate concerns Seltzer’s and Bender’s Foucauldian
interpretations of the conventions of realism, free indirect
discourse in particular.
10. Proteus Principle, for Sternberg (1982: 148), is a many
to many correspondence between literary forms and their
functions; a form can fulfill many functions, a function can
utilize many forms. Thus, for instance, expressive features
can signal both free indirect discourse and direct discourse,
depending on context. Jahn (1997) uses the principle to
describe the way in which “bottom level” textual features
can be used to fulfill different functions in different interpre-
tive frames.
11. “Possible world narratology” is used in this study in a
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rather unproblematic manner to designate the work of liter-
ary scholars who utilize the concepts of modal logic in their
theorizing. A comprehensive survey of the “school” being
impossible, I refer the reader to existing literature on the
detailed history of the approach (e.g. Ryan 1992; Ronen
1994; Dolezel 1998). The following works represent the
most important contributions to possible worlds narratology
by their respective authors: Dolezel (1998); Eco (1979);
Pavel (1986) Ronen (1994); Ryan (1991).
Chapter 3:
12. According to this view, the true subject of irony would
be the narratee, whose gullibility would make the implied
author and reader (and perhaps the latter’s representative in
the real world too, cf. Nelles 1997: 23) feel superior.
13. Focalization and FID, among other concepts of
narratology, are of course subjects of continuing theoretical
discussion (see Jahn 1996 and Oltean 1993, respectively, for
surveys). I do not think that current narratology is able to
analyze Pynchon’s narrative comprehensively, but it is the
best apparatus available.
14. Weisenburger (1988: 240) traces the origins of this
statement to a public exclamation an American nightclub
manager / dancer made after being deported from France
despite the apparent success among the French (male)
audience. In the context of Pynchon, the only thing to notice
is the obvious non-relevancy of this historical episode
regarding the story of the novel.
15. The characters’ and the narrator’s speech contain quite a
few obvious, or transparent, puns, too. These are largely
motivated by the narrative situation: “’Girl in distress, Jess?’
— ’Got a fag, Mag’ pretty automatic by now, you guess,
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Jess?’” (GR 127) or “’Slip the talcum to me, Malcolm!’”
(GR 64). Plays on words like these are far more innocent
than ones requiring pages of preparation.
16. says \‘sez. (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary.
Springfield: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1977)
17. The narrator’s quip about the limitations of the analysis
of Freemasonry is ironic: the reader has probably grasped
that additional information would not be of much use in
interpreting the novel. The mention of Ishmael Reed refers,
undoubtedly, to the novel Mumbo Jumbo (1972), in which
Freemasonry is indeed discussed extensively.
18. Hutcheon does not analyze Gravity’s Rainbow, however.
Chapter 4:
19. There is, of course, also explicit didacticism in fiction:
Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch (1966), for example, gives the
reader directions for its decipherment. Works like this can be
interpreted as exposing the notion of implicit didacticism,
playing with the conventions of reading. (Hopscotch, how-
ever, is in its own way quite serious about the guidelines it
offers.) Ronald Sukenick’s narrator in Out pleads ignorance
in the face of apparent didactic clues for reading (and writ-
ing) the novel (Out 162–164).
20. I hasten to acknowledge that the concept of mise-en-
abyme is used in this chapter to refer to cases that do not
fulfill the conditions set by Dällenbach (1989 e.g. 50, 108;
see also McHale 1987: 124–128; Ron 1987: 422–423, 426–
427, 436–437) for the phenomenon. An interpretive mise-
en-abyme, in the present discussion, is an embedded se-
quence of text that refers to the assumed interpretive process
of the reader.
21. As discussed in chapter 3, the “De Mille” -episode (557–
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559), seemingly set up only to establish a pun, produces this
effect. On a more general level, the Disgusting English
Candy Drill episode (114–120) can also be read like this.
Chapter 5:
22. Fludernik bases the concept of narrativization on
Jonathan Culler’s notion of naturalization, a strategy
whereby readers attempt to come to terms with strange and
irregular features of literature by a process of recuperating
them into something more familiar. (Fludernik 1996: 31;
Culler 1978: 134.)
23. In addition to the views of narrativity explicated in this
study, Fludernik’s and Ryan’s, Meir Sternberg has also
recently presented a comprehensive account of narrativity.
Sternberg’s theory, based on the temporality and “plot dy-
namics” of narratives, will not be further discussed here.
(See Sternberg 2001: 158 for further references).
24. Fludernik’s (1996) way of judging a particular text as
narrative relies, however, on more holistic criteria: a text can
involve a significant amount of non-experiential, formally
non-narrative material, and still be considered a narrative.
25. Fludernik is not particularly worried about her concep-
tion of narrativity possibly becoming obsolete because of
narrative experimentation. While the radical playfulness of
postmodernist literature presents insurmountable difficulties
to the narrativity as experientiality model, she considers
explorations of limit narrativity largely marginal and passé:
“[T]exts which maximally resist a realist or mimetic process
of narrativization are important but rare examples [;] the
recent trend in experimental writing (in Pynchon, Umberto
Eco and even in Josipovici) has been towards […] a ‘soft’
experimentalism, and in particular towards a literature that
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is again engagé” (Fludernik 1996: 306). Brian Richardson
(2000: 29–30) disagrees; he sees “postmodern transgres-
sion” of narrative conventions as an important challenge to
narratology and predicts that radical experimentation will
increase instead of fading out. Curiously, however,
Richardson (ibid.) builds his tentative concepts of
postmodern[ist] narrative transgression in part on
Fludernik’s Natural Narratology, or rather on Fludernik’s
discussion of the limit cases of narrativity.
26. Granted, in these situations the reader ostensibly resorts
to the “rock bottom schema of actionality” (Fludernik 1996:
44); this cognitive explanation has, at least in some cases,
nothing to do with experientiality.
27. The question of the presence or absence of covert narra-
tors in reflectoral narratives is a controversial issue that
cannot be comprehensively discussed here. For recent
accounts, see e.g. Chatman 1990; Genette 1988; Jahn 1997;
2001; Nelles 1997; Walsh 1997.
 28. Other theorists of cognitive narratology present ac-
counts of narrative perspective that are somewhat more
directly adaptable to narrative analysis, and rely more on
traditional narratological ideas: Nünning’s (2001) concept of
perspective-structure might provide tools for a
constructivist/cognitivist analysis of focalization. Similarly,
Jahn’s (1996) cognitivist account of the “windows of
focalization” combines the theory of interpretive frames
with a text-analytical approach that is fundamentally illu-
sionistic.
29. Fludernik’s denial of a general narrator should not be
over dramatized, however. In Fictions of Language (1993),
Fludernik actually subscribes to a continuum model of
narratorial presence. Fludernik does not want to call covert
‘narrator functions’ narrators proper. Thus the difference has
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at least in part to do with nomenclature.
Chapter 6:
30. It is impossible to review the relevant literature compre-
hensively; in the vast literature on FID, at least the following
discuss DV in some detail: Aczel 1998; Cohn 1978: 112;
Fludernik 1993; 1995; Hernadi 1972; McHale 1978: 264,
278–284; O’Neill 1994: ch. 3, passim.; Pascal 1977; Stanzel
1984, 1990: 809.
31. Herman (1995) has also recently presented an alternative
conception of speech and thought representation based on
the metapragmatic insights of the Prague School functional-
ism. The conception differs fundamentally from the frame-
theoretical model and as a result is not a good point of
comparison with Fludernik’s view of FID and DV.
32. Richard Aczel (1998: 476–477; cf. Jahn 1994: endnote
3) argues that Fludernik’s account of dual voice makes the
distinction between the voice of an extratextual authority
(such as the implied author) and that of a character instead
of between the narrator’s and the characters’ voices. This is
true of Fludernik’s discussion of ironic dual voice; however,
Fludernik’s conception does in fact allow for a dual voice
effect consisting of the interplay of inferred voices the
narrator and a character (see Fludernik 1993: 452–453).
Although Fludernik does not present such an option, an
ironic narrator could presumably be possible in her account,
provided that the narrative situation makes such an inference
sensible.
33. In fact, elsewhere in her study Fludernik (1993: 326)
interprets the narrator of Gravity’s Rainbow as essentially
non-colloquial, to illustrate narratorial focalization that
employs character’s idiom. The idiomatically indeterminate
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narrator makes the novel excellent exemplary material (see
also Fludernik 1996: 215).
34. Disturbingly, the typographic rendering of Mexico’s
short-tempered speech is also once echoed in Slothrop’s
represented thought (GR 199).
35. “Batman” is military slang for an officer’s aide. As
Donald Larsson (2002) observes, the first name of this
particular batman is in all likelihood Bruce!
36. “Incoming mail” is a military slang expression referring
to unforeseen (and unpleasant) assignments (Weisenburger
1998: 17).
37. The relationship between focalization and speech and
thought representation is troublesome and remains unspeci-
fied; Fludernik (1993: 326; see also 1996: 343–346; Aczel
1998: 467–472) rightly chastises Genette because he “never
really specifies how precisely voice and focalization inter-
act” and Bal for her “near silence on the issue of representa-
tional speech an thought”. As a result, designating a passage
such as the one discussed as internal focalization does not
say much. William Nelles struggles with the same problem
while discussing a passage D.H. Lawrence’s “The Blind
Man”: “This passage is internal focalization, and certainly
there is no shift of focalization when Stephen closes his eyes
(although the movement between what Dorrit Cohn has
termed ‘quoted monologue’ and ‘psycho-narration’ does
suggest that different degrees of internal focalization might
be distinguished here)” (Nelles 1997: 78; emphasis mine;
see also O’Neill 1994: 83). Again, rethinking the whole
issue of focalization and voice in terms of Stanzel’s /
Fludernik’s reflectorization, would be one possible approach
(see also Nünning 2001).
38. Interestingly, on the narrative macro level of Gravity’s
Rainbow McHale’s integrational model corresponds to his
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notion of retroactive worldmaking and -unmaking (see
McHale 1992).
39. Kenner’s example of UCP illustrates, in addition, an anti
mimetic view of speech representation; see note 39; it is one
of Fludernik’s examples (1993: 399–400).
40. In fact, Kenner’s description of the phenomenon, “as if
for these fifty pages [Bloom] held the pen” implicitly aban-
dons the idea of a pseudo-oral narrator persona. The imag-
ined source of the narrative is no longer a narrator but a
writer (see also Fludernik 1996: 216).
41. “Loonies on Leave” is a significant instance among
Pynchonian musical interludes because of its narrative
quality. Unlike most of the songs or musical scenes of
Gravity’s Rainbow, “Loonies on Leave” tells a part of the
novel’s story.
42. Though not essential to the present inquiry, the de-
naturalizing of characters’ discourse has considerable impli-
cations for Fludernik’s as well as Banfield’s (see 1982: 26–
28) accounts of speech and thought representation: it is
evidence supporting the refutation of the idea that cases of
indirect speech representation are transformations of
originary direct utterances (see also McHale 1978: 256–257;
Sternberg 1982; 2001: 170; cf. Cohn 1978: 100–103;
Herman 1995: 172–173).
Chapter 8:
43. Again, the concept of context is inherently problematic
in the discourse of literary studies. It has traditionally been
used to refer both to the non-linguistic features of a narrative
situation, and to linguistic features not included in a passage
yet relevant to its interpretation (see Herman 1995: 144). In
this chapter, I will use the concept of contextual when
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referring to non-linguistic features of narrative situation, and
grammatical when referring to linguistic markers of HF,
however distant.
44. This type of HF is also displayed in Pynchon’s earlier
fiction. In V., the externally focalized episode VIII of chapter
3 ventures briefly into HF at the very end: “Vision must be
last to go. There must also be a nearly imperceptible line
between an eye that reflects and an eye that receives” (V.
94). (My thanks to Brian McHale for pointing out this
scene.)
45. Furthermore, the passage is embedded in an extended
metaphoric meditation on (ostensibly) Edward Pointsman’s
yearning for human subjects of psychological testing. Thus,
in terms of the story-world of the novel, the events do not
take place. This does not stop readers from processing them
as real events, however.
46. The term explicitness might seem to echo Dolezel’s
1979: 207–208) intensional function explicitness/implicit-
ness. There is, in principle, nothing wrong with this; the
uses of the term are roughly identical. (See also Dolezel
1998: 137–143.)
47. In fact, many parameters involved in focalization could
be described as independent scalar functions, much like
Joseph Ewen’s three-function approach to character descrip-
tion (summarized by Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 41). More
recent points of comparison are Margolin’s (1999: 145–146,
164) model of narrative description based on Tense-Aspect
Modality linguistics, and Ryan’s (2001a: 147–148) account
of narratorial functions. Both Margolin’s and Ryan’s concep-
tions would ostensibly subsume the problematic of
focalization. The nature of focalization could be described in
great detail, for example, by observing the following func-
tions:
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1) congruence between the expressed world and the refer-
ence world,
2) explicitness of focalizer,
3) actuality of focalizer in the reference world,
4) focalizer’s access to the belief-contexts of possible
worlds, etc.
It is easy to see that this approach, though not assuming
preset categories, would hardly be the most economical or
illuminating in practice. After all, it is very easy to say
“character x is the focalizer in passage y”, whereas execut-
ing a multiple-function analysis of focalization is not.
Chapter 9:
48. In her essay “Beyond Myth and Metaphor; The Case of
Narrative in the Digital Media”, Ryan emphasizes, however,
also the role of textual features in warranting playful read-
ing: “The external/exploratory mode [of interactivity] is
therefore better suited for self-referential fiction than for
narrative worlds that hold us under their spell for the sake of
what happens in them. It promotes a metafictional stance, at
the expense of immersion in the fictional world.” (Ryan
2001b: ch. 3, par. 10.)
49. The non-random interpretation of the rocket strikes is
also flirted with elsewhere in the novel. According to one
Thomas Gwenhidwy, for example, the poorer areas of
London are particularly vulnerable to hits (GR 171–172). In
addition, the well-known coincidence of rocket strikes and
Slothrop’s erections (and, according to Gwenhidwy, babies
born in London) casts a supernatural suspicion on the ran-
domness of the hits.
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50. An obvious natural reason for the difficulty of the
“Prince” in all its variations is the increasing intoxication of
(most) participants. This is evidently the case in the game
conducted by Slothrop: some of the participants blunder
deliberately in order to get free drinks (GR 212). In terms of
a moderate account of Caillois’s typology, then, real-life
drinking games should perhaps be considered games of
ilinx, being “based on the pursuit of vertigo and consist[ing]
of an attempt to momentarily destroy the stability of percep-
tion and inflict a kind of voluptuous panic on an otherwise
lucid mind” (Caillois 1961: 23). Curiously, Caillois (1961:
51–54) interprets drug abuse and alcoholism as social symp-
toms of the “corruption” of the game of ilinx.
51. This phenomenon can be interpreted in many ways: in
terms of the structural principle of the text, the text obvi-
ously is a game of agon, regardless of whether or not the
reader knows the rules of the game; from the perspective of
the attitude of reading/playing, the game is agon or alea
depending on the reader’s interpretation of its structural
principle. The difficulty of forming such an interpretation is
precisely what keeps the readers of Gravity’s Rainbow on
their toes.
52. WYSIWYG is a pseudo-acronym in computer jargon:
What You See Is What You Get.
53. The reader has obviously no clue of the relevance of the
information at this point in the novel, unless he or she
recognizes the themes and embedded plotlines from
Pynchon criticism or lore (which is probably the case).
54.  Of course, in the passage Prentice is most likely acting
in his capacity as fantasist-surrogate and thus mediating a
haunting ‘belonging’ to someone else; Katje Borgesius,
perhaps. This possible ‘host consciousness’ adds yet another
layer to the functional polyvalence of the scene.
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55. The relevance of the causal/non-causal dispute is also
underscored elsewhere in the novel. As I have argued else-
where (chapter 4.2), the numerous opposing explanations of
random phenomena are part of the novel’s faux-didactic
scheme.
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